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1. Introduction
Psycholinguistics aims to describe the psychological pro-
cesses underlying language use. The most natural and ba-
sic form of language use is dialogue: Every language user,
including young children and illiterate adults, can hold a
conversation, whereas reading, writing, preparing speeches
and even listening to speeches are far from universal skills.
Therefore, a central goal of psycholinguistics should be to
provide an account of the basic processing mechanisms that
are employed during natural dialogue.
Currently, there is no such account. Existing mechanis-
tic accounts are concerned with the comprehension and
production of isolated words or sentences, or with the pro-
cessing of texts in situations where no interaction is possi-
ble, such as in reading. In other words, they rely almost en-
tirely on monologue. Hence, theories of basic mechanisms
depend on the study of a derivative form of language pro-
cessing. We argue that such theories are limited and inad-
equate accounts of the general mechanisms that underlie
processing. In contrast, this paper outlines a mechanistic
theory of language processing that is based on dialogue, but
that applies to monologue as a special case.
Why has traditional psycholinguistics ignored dialogue?
There are probably two main reasons, one practical and one
theoretical. The practical reason is that it is generally as-
sumed to be too hard or impossible to study, given the de-
gree of experimental control necessary. Studies of language
comprehension are fairly straightforward in the experi-
mental psychology tradition – words or sentences are stim-
uli that can be appropriately controlled in terms of their
characteristics (e.g., frequency) and presentation condi-
tions (e.g., randomized order). Until quite recently it was
also assumed that imposing that level of control in many
language production studies was impossible. Thus, Bock
(1996) points to the problem of “exuberant responsing” –
how can the experimenter stop subjects from saying what-
ever they want? However, it is now regarded as perfectly
possible to control presentation so that people produce the
appropriate responses on a high proportion of trials, even
in sentence production (e.g., Bock 1986a; Levelt & Maas-
sen 1981).
Contrary to many people’s intuitions, the same experi-
mental control is possible with dialogue. For example,
Branigan et al. (2000) showed effects of the priming of syn-
tactic structure during language production in dialogue that
were exactly comparable to the priming shown in isolated
sentence production (Bock 1986b) or sentence recall (Pot-
ter & Lombardi 1998). In Branigan et al.’s study, the degree
of control of independent and dependent variables was no
different from that in Bock’s study, even though the exper-
iment involved two participants engaged in a dialogue
rather than one participant producing sentences in isola-
tion. Similar control is exercised in studies by Clark and col-
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leagues (e.g., Brennan & Clark 1996; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark
1992; also Brennan & Schober 2001; Horton & Keysar
1996). Well-controlled studies of language production in di-
alogue may require some ingenuity, but such experimental
ingenuity has always been a strength of psychology.
The theoretical reason why psycholinguistics has ignored
dialogue is that psycholinguistics has derived most of its
predictions from generative linguistics, and generative lin-
guistics has developed theories of isolated, decontextual-
ized sentences that are used in texts or speeches, that is, in
monologue. In contrast, dialogue is inherently interactive
and contextualized: Each interlocutor both speaks and
comprehends during the course of the interaction; each in-
terrupts both others and himself; on occasion two or more
speakers collaborate in producing the same sentence
(Coates 1990). So it is not surprising that generative lin-
guists commonly view dialogue as being of marginal gram-
maticality, contaminated by theoretically uninteresting
complexities. Dialogue sits ill with the competence/perfor-
mance distinction assumed by most generative linguistics
(Chomsky 1965), because it is hard to determine whether a
particular utterance is “well-formed” or not (or even
whether that notion is relevant to dialogue). Thus, linguis-
tics has tended to concentrate on developing generative
grammars and related theories for isolated sentences; and
psycholinguistics has tended to develop processing theories
that draw upon the rules and representations assumed by
generative linguistics. So far as most psycholinguists have
thought about dialogue, they have tended to assume that
the results of experiments on monologue can be applied to
the understanding of dialogue, and that it is more profitable
to study monologue because it is “cleaner” and less complex
than dialogue. Indeed, they have commonly assumed that
dialogue simply involves chunks of monologue stuck to-
gether.
The main advocate of the experimental study of dialogue
is Clark. However, his primary focus is on the nature of the
strategies employed by the interlocutors rather than basic
processing mechanisms. Clark (1996) contrasts the “lan-
guage-as-product” and “language-as-action” traditions. The
language-as-product tradition is derived from the integra-
tion of information-processing psychology with generative
grammar and focuses on mechanistic accounts of how peo-
ple compute different levels of representation. This tradi-
tion has typically employed experimental paradigms and
decontextualized language; in our terms, monologue. In
contrast, the language-as-action tradition emphasizes that
utterances are interpreted with respect to a particular con-
text and takes into account the goals and intentions of the
participants. This tradition has typically considered pro-
cessing in dialogue using apparently natural tasks (e.g.,
Clark 1992; Fussell & Krauss 1992). Whereas psycholin-
guistic accounts in the language-as-product tradition are
admirably well-specified, they are almost entirely decon-
textualized and, quite possibly, ecologically invalid. On the
other hand, accounts in the language-as-action tradition
rarely make contact with the basic processes of production
or comprehension, but rather present analyses of psy-
cholinguistic processes purely in terms of their goals (e.g.,
the formulation and use of common ground; Clark 1985;
1996; Clark & Marshall 1981).
This dichotomy is a reasonable historical characteriza-
tion. Almost all mechanistic theories happen to be theories
of the processing of monologue; and theories of dialogue
are almost entirely couched in intentional non-mechanistic
terms. But this need not be. The goals of the language-as-
product tradition are valid and important, but researchers
concerned with mechanisms should investigate the use of
contextualized language in dialogue.
In this paper we propose a mechanistic account of dia-
logue and use it to derive a number of predictions about 
basic language processing. The account assumes that in 
dialogue, production and comprehension become tightly
coupled in a way that leads to the automatic alignment of
linguistic representations at many levels. We argue that the
interactive alignment process greatly simplifies language
processing in dialogue. It does so (1) by supporting a
straightforward interactive inference mechanism, (2) by
enabling interlocutors to develop and use routine expres-
sions, and (3) by supporting a system for monitoring lan-
guage processing.
The first part of the paper presents the main argument
(sects. 2–6). In section 2 we show how successful dialogue
depends on alignment of representations between inter-
locutors at different linguistic levels. In section 3 we con-
trast the interactive alignment model developed in section
2 with the autonomous transmission account that underpins
current mechanistic psycholinguistics. Section 4 describes
a simple interactive repair mechanism that supplements
the interactive alignment process. We argue that this repair
mechanism can reestablish alignment when interlocutors’
representations diverge without requiring them to model
each other’s mental states. Thus, interactive alignment and
repair enable interlocutors to get around many of the prob-
lems normally associated with establishing what Stalnaker
(1978) called common ground. The interactive alignment
process leads to the use of routine or semi-fixed expres-
sions. In section 5 we argue that such “dialogue routines”
greatly simplify language production and comprehension
by short-circuiting the decision making processes. Finally,
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in section 6 we discuss how interactive alignment enables
interlocutors to monitor dialogue with respect to all levels
at which they can align.
The second part of the paper explores implications of the
interactive alignment account. In section 7 we discuss im-
plications for linguistic theory. In section 8 we argue for a
graded distinction between dialogue and monologue in
terms of different degrees of coupling between speaker and
listener. In section 9 we argue that the interactive alignment
account may have broader implications in terms of current
developments in areas such as social interaction, language
acquisition, and imitation more generally. Finally, in section
10 we enumerate the differences between the interactive
alignment model developed in the paper and the more tra-
ditional autonomous transmission account of language pro-
cessing.
2. The nature of dialogue and the alignment of
representations
Table 1 shows a transcript of a conversation between two
players in a cooperative maze game (Garrod & Anderson
1987). In this extract one player A is trying to describe his
position to his partner B, who is viewing the same maze on
a computer screen in another room. The maze is shown in
Figure 1.1
At first glance the language looks disorganized. Many of
the utterances are not grammatical sentences (e.g., only one
of the first six contains a verb). There are occasions when
production of a sentence is shared between speakers, as in
(7–8) and (43–44). It often seems that the speakers do not
know how to say what they want to say. For instance, A de-
scribes the same position quite differently in (4) “two along
from the bottom one up,” and (46) “two along, two up.”
In fact the sequence is quite orderly so long as we assume
that dialogue is a joint activity (Clark 1996; Clark & Wilkes-
Gibbs 1986). In other words, it involves cooperation be-
tween interlocutors in a way that allows them to sufficiently
understand the meaning of the dialogue as a whole; and this
meaning results from these joint processes. In Lewis’s
(1969) terms, dialogue is a game of cooperation, where both
participants “win” if both understand the dialogue, and nei-
ther “wins” if one or both do not understand.
Pickering and Garrod: Toward a mechanistic psychology of dialogue
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Table 1. Example dialogue taken from Garrod and Anderson (1987)
1——B: . . . Tell me where you are?
2——A: Ehm : Oh God (laughs) 
3——B: (laughs)
4——A: Right : two along from the bottom one up:*
5——B: Two along from the bottom, which side? 
6——A: The left : going from left to right in the second box. 
7——B: You’re in the second box. 
8——A: One up (1 sec.) I take it we’ve got identical mazes? 
9——B: Yeah well : right, starting from the left, you’re one along:
10——A: Uh-huh: 
11——B: and one up?
12——A: Yeah, and I’m trying to get to . . .
[ 28 utterances later ]
41——B: You are starting from the left, you’re one along, one up? (2 sec.) 
42——A: Two along : I’m not in the first box, I’m in the second box: 
43——B: You’re two along:
44——A: Two up (1 sec.) counting the : if you take : the first box as being one up: 
45——B: (2 sec.) Uh-huh: 
46——A: Well : I’m two along, two up (1.5 sec.) 
47——B: Two up ? : 
48——A: Yeah (1 sec.) so I can move down one: 
49——B: Yeah I see where you are:
* The position being described in the utterances shown in bold is identified with an arrow in Figure 1. Colons mark noticeable pauses
of less than 1 second.
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the maze being described
in the conversation shown in Table 1. The crossed bars indicate
closed paths. The arrow points to the position being described by
the utterances marked in boldface in the table.
Conversational analysts argue that dialogue turns are
linked across interlocutors (Sacks et al. 1974; Schegloff &
Sacks 1973). A question, such as (1) “Tell me where you
are?”, calls for an answer, such as (4) “Two along from the
bottom one up.” Even a statement like (4) “Right, two along
from the bottom one up,” cannot stand alone. It requires ei-
ther an affirmation or some form of query, such as (5) “Two
along from the bottom, which side?” (Linnell 1998). This
means that production and comprehension processes be-
come coupled. B produces a question and expects an an-
swer of a particular type; A hears the question and has to
produce an answer of that type. For example, after saying
“Tell me where you are?” in (1), B has to understand “two
along from the bottom one up” in (4) as a reference to A’s
position on the maze; any other interpretation is ruled out.
Furthermore, the meaning of what is being communicated
depends on the interlocutors’ agreement or consensus
rather than on dictionary meanings (Brennan & Clark
1996) and is subject to negotiation (Linnell 1998, p. 74).
Take for example utterances (4–11) in the fragment shown
above. In utterance (4), A describes his position as “Two
along from the bottom one up,” but the final interpretation
is only established at the end of the first exchange when
consensus is reached on a rather different description by B
(9–11) “You’re one along . . . and one up?” These examples
demonstrate that dialogue is far more coordinated than it
might initially appear.
At this point we should distinguish two notions of coor-
dination that have become rather confused in the literature.
According to one notion (Clark 1985), interlocutors are co-
ordinated in a successful dialogue just as participants in any
successful joint activity are coordinated (e.g., ballroom
dancers, lumberjacks using a two-handed saw). According
to the other notion, coordination occurs when interlocutors
share the same representation at some level (Branigan et al.
2000; Garrod & Anderson 1987). To remove this confusion,
we refer to the first notion as coordination and the second
as alignment. Specifically, alignment occurs at a particular
level when interlocutors have the same representation at
that level. Dialogue is a coordinated behavior ( just like ball-
room dancing). However, the linguistic representations that
underlie coordinated dialogue come to be aligned, as we
claim below.
We now argue six points: (1) Alignment of situation mod-
els (Zwaan & Radvansky 1998) forms the basis of success-
ful dialogue; (2) the way that alignment of situation models
is achieved is by a primitive and resource-free priming
mechanism; (3) the same priming mechanism produces
alignment at other levels of representation, such as the lex-
ical and syntactic; (4) interconnections between the levels
mean that alignment at one level leads to alignment at other
levels; (5) another primitive mechanism allows interlocu-
tors to repair misaligned representations interactively; and
(6) more sophisticated and potentially costly strategies that
depend on modeling the interlocutor’s mental state are only
required when the primitive mechanisms fail to produce
alignment. On this basis, we propose an interactive align-
ment account of dialogue in the next section.
2.1. Alignment of situation models is central to
successful dialogue
A situation model is a multi-dimensional representation of
the situation under discussion (Johnson-Laird 1983; San-
ford & Garrod 1981; van Dijk & Kintsch 1983; Zwaan &
Radvansky 1998). According to Zwaan and Radvansky, the
key dimensions encoded in situation models are space,
time, causality, intentionality, and reference to main indi-
viduals under discussion. They discuss a large body of re-
search that demonstrates that manipulations of these di-
mensions affect text comprehension (e.g., people are faster
to recognize that a word has previously been mentioned
when that word refers to something that is spatially, tem-
porally, or causally related to the current topic). Such mod-
els are assumed to capture what people are “thinking about”
while they understand a text, and therefore are in some
sense within working memory (they can be contrasted with
linguistic representations on the one hand and general
knowledge on the other).
Most work on situation models has concentrated on com-
prehension of monologue (normally, written texts) but they
can also be employed in accounts of dialogue, with inter-
locutors developing situation models as a result of their in-
teraction (Garrod & Anderson 1987). More specifically, we
assume that in successful dialogue, interlocutors develop
aligned situation models. For example, in Garrod and An-
derson, players aligned on particular spatial models of the
mazes being described. Some pairs of players came to refer
to locations using expressions like right turn indicator, up-
side down T shape, or L on its side. These speakers repre-
sented the maze as an arrangement of patterns or figures.
In contrast, the pair illustrated in the dialogue in Table 1
aligned on a spatial model in which the maze was repre-
sented as a network of paths linking the points they de-
scribed to prominent positions on the maze (e.g., the bot-
tom left corner). Pairs often developed quite idiosyncratic
spatial models, but both interlocutors developed the same
model (Garrod & Anderson 1987; Garrod & Doherty 1994;
see also Markman & Makin 1998).
Alignment of situation models is not necessary in princi-
ple for successful communication. It would be possible to
communicate successfully by representing one’s interlocu-
tor’s situation model, even if that model were not the same
as one’s own. For instance, one player could represent the
maze according to a figure scheme but know that his part-
ner represented it according to a path scheme, and vice
versa. But this would be wildly inefficient as it would re-
quire maintaining two underlying representations of the sit-
uation, one for producing one’s own utterances and the
other for comprehending one’s interlocutor’s utterances.
Even though communication might work in such cases, it is
unclear whether we would claim that the people under-
stood the same thing. More critically, it would be computa-
tionally very costly to have fundamentally different repre-
sentations. In contrast, if the interlocutors’ representations
are basically the same, there is no need for listener model-
ing.
Under some circumstances storing the fact that one’s in-
terlocutors represent the situation differently from oneself
is necessary (e.g., in deception, or when trying to commu-
nicate to one interlocutor information that one wants to
conceal from another). But even in such cases, many as-
pects of the representation will be shared (e.g., I might lie
about my location, but would still use a figural representa-
tion to do so if that was what you were using). Additionally,
it is clearly tricky to perform such acts of deception or con-
cealment (Clark & Schaefer 1987). These involve sophisti-
cated strategies that do not form part of the basic process
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of alignment, and are difficult because they require the
speaker to concurrently develop two representations.
Of course, interlocutors need not entirely align their sit-
uation models. In any conversation where information is
conveyed, the interlocutors must have somewhat different
models, at least before the end of the conversation. In cases
of partial misunderstanding, conceptual models will not be
entirely aligned. In (unresolved) arguments, interlocutors
have representations that cannot be identical. But they
must have the same understanding of what they are dis-
cussing in order to disagree about a particular aspect of it
(e.g., Sacks 1987). For instance, if two people are arguing
the merits of the Conservative versus the Labour parties for
the U.K. government, they must agree about who the
names refer to, roughly what the politics of the two parties
are, and so on, so that they can disagree on their evalua-
tions. In Lewis’ (1969) terms, such interlocutors are play-
ing a game of cooperation with respect to the situation
model (e.g., they succeed insofar as their words refer to the
same entities), even though they may not play such a game
at other “higher” levels (e.g., in relation to the argument it-
self ). Therefore, we assume that successful dialogue in-
volves approximate alignment at the level of the situation
model at least.
2.2. Achieving alignment of situation models
In theory, interlocutors could achieve alignment of their
models through explicit negotiation, but in practice they
normally do not (Brennan & Clark 1996; Clark & Wilkes-
Gibbs 1986; Garrod & Anderson 1987; Schober 1993). It is
quite unusual for people to suggest a definition of an ex-
pression and obtain an explicit assent from their interlocu-
tor. Instead, “global” alignment of models seems to result
from “local” alignment at the level of the linguistic repre-
sentations being used. We propose that this works via a
priming mechanism, whereby encountering an utterance
that activates a particular representation makes it more
likely that the person will subsequently produce an utter-
ance that uses that representation. (On this conception,
priming underpins the alignment mechanism and should
not simply be regarded as a behavioral effect.) In this case,
hearing an utterance that activates a particular aspect of a
situation model will make it more likely that the person will
use an utterance consistent with that aspect of the model.
This process is essentially resource-free and automatic.
This was pointed out by Garrod and Anderson (1987) in
relation to their principle of output/input coordination.
They noted that in the maze game task speakers tended to
make the same semantic and pragmatic choices that held
for the utterances that they had just encountered. In other
words, their outputs tended to match their inputs at the
level of the situation model. As the interaction proceeded,
the two interlocutors therefore came to align the semantic
and pragmatic representations used for generating output
with the representations used for interpreting input.
Hence, the combined system (i.e., the interacting dyad) is
completely stable only if both subsystems (i.e., speaker A’s
representation system and speaker B’s representation sys-
tem) are aligned. In other words, the dyad is only in equi-
librium when what A says is consistent with B’s currently ac-
tive semantic and pragmatic representation of the dialogue
and vice versa (see Garrod & Clark 1993). Thus, because
the two parties to a dialogue produce aligned language, the
underlying linguistic representations also tend to become
aligned. In fact, the output/input coordination principle ap-
plies more generally. Garrod and Anderson also assumed
that it held for lexical representations. We argue that align-
ment holds at a range of levels, including the situational
model and the lexical level, but also at other levels, such as
the syntactic, as discussed in section 2.3, and that alignment
“percolates” between levels, as discussed in section 2.4.
Other work suggests that specific dimensions of situation
models can be aligned. With respect to the spatial dimen-
sion, Schober (1993) found that interlocutors tended to
adopt the same reference frame as each other. When inter-
locutors face each other, terms like on the left are ambigu-
ous depending on whether the speaker takes what we can
call an egocentric or an allocentric reference frame.
Schober found that if, for instance, A said on the left mean-
ing on A’s left (i.e., an egocentric reference frame), then B
would subsequently describe similar locations as on the
right (also taking an egocentric frame of reference). Other
evidence for priming of reference frames comes from ex-
periments conducted outside dialogue (which involve the
same priming mechanism in our account). Thus, Carlson-
Radvansky and Jiang (1998) found that people responded
faster on a sentence-picture verification task if the refer-
ence frame (in this case, egocentric vs. intrinsic to the ob-
ject) used on the current trial was the same as the reference
frame used on the previous trial.2
So far we have assumed that the different components of
the situation model are essentially separate (in accord with
Zwaan & Radvansky 1998), and that they can be primed in-
dividually. But in a particularly interesting study, Borodit-
sky (2000) found that the use of a temporal reference frame
can be primed by a spatial reference frame. Thus, if people
had just verified a sentence describing a spatial scenario
that assumed a particular frame of reference (in her terms,
ego moving or object moving), they tended to interpret a
temporal expression in terms of an analogous frame of ref-
erence. Her results demonstrate priming of a structural as-
pect of the situation model that is presumably shared be-
tween the spatial and temporal dimensions at least. Indeed,
work on analogy more generally suggests that it should be
possible to prime abstract characteristics of the situation
model (e.g., Gentner & Markman 1997; Markman & Gen-
tner 1993), and that such processes should contribute to
alignment in dialogue.
There is some evidence for alignment of situation mod-
els in comprehension. Garrod and Anderson (1987) found
that players in the maze game would query descriptions
from an interlocutor that did not match their own previous
descriptions (see sect. 4). Recently, Brown-Schmidt et al.
(in press) have provided direct and striking evidence for
alignment in comprehension. Previous work has shown that
eye movements during scene perception are a strong indi-
cation of current attention, and that they can be used to in-
dex the rapid integration of linguistic and contextual infor-
mation during comprehension (Chambers et al. 2002;
Tanenhaus et al. 1995). Brown-Schmidt et al. monitored
eye movements during unscripted dialogue, and found that
the entities considered by the listener directly reflected the
entities being considered by the speaker at that point. For
example, if the speaker used a referring expression which
was formally ambiguous but which the speaker used to re-
fer to a specific entity (and hence regarded as disam-
biguated), the listener also looked at that entity. Hence,
Pickering and Garrod: Toward a mechanistic psychology of dialogue
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whatever factors were constraining the speaker’s situation
model were also constraining the listener’s situation model.
2.3. Achieving alignment at other levels
Dialogue transcripts are full of repeated linguistic elements
and structures indicating alignment at various levels in 
addition to that of the situation model (Aijmer 1996;
Schenkein 1980; Tannen 1989). Alignment of lexical pro-
cessing during dialogue was specifically demonstrated by
Garrod and Anderson (1987), as in the extended example
in Table 1 (see also Garrod & Clark 1993; Garrod & Do-
herty 1994), and by Clark and colleagues (Brennan & Clark
1996; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs 1986; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark
1992). These latter studies show that interlocutors tend to
develop the same set of referring expressions to refer to
particular objects, and that the expressions become shorter
and more similar on repetition with the same interlocutor
and are modified if the interlocutor changes.
Levelt and Kelter (1982) found that speakers tended to
reply to “What time do you close?” or “At what time do you
close?” (in Dutch) with a congruent answer (e.g., “Five 
o’clock” or “At five o’clock”). This alignment may be syn-
tactic (repetition of phrasal categories) or lexical (repetition
of at). Branigan et al. (2000) found clear evidence for syn-
tactic alignment in dialogue. Participants took it in turns to
describe pictures to each other (and to find the appropriate
picture in an array). One speaker was actually a confeder-
ate of the experimenter and produced scripted responses,
such as “the cowboy offering the banana to the robber” or
“the cowboy offering the robber the banana.” The syntac-
tic structure of the confederate’s description strongly influ-
enced the syntactic structure of the experimental subject’s
description. Branigan et al.’s work extends “syntactic prim-
ing” to dialogue: Bock (1986b) showed that speakers
tended to repeat syntactic form under circumstances in
which alternative non-syntactic explanations could be ex-
cluded (Bock 1989; Bock & Loebell 1990; Bock et al. 1992;
Hartsuiker & Westenberg 2000; Pickering & Branigan
1998; Potter & Lombardi 1998; cf. Smith & Wheeldon
2001, and see Pickering & Branigan 1999, for a review).
Branigan et al.’s (2000) results support the claim that
priming activates representations and not merely proce-
dures that are associated with production (or comprehen-
sion) – in other words, that the explanation for syntactic
priming effects is closely related to the explanation of align-
ment in general. This suggests an important “parity” be-
tween the representations used in production and those
used in comprehension (see sect. 3.2). Interestingly, Brani-
gan et al. (2000) found very large priming effects compared
to the syntactic priming effects that occur in isolation.
There are two reasons why this might be the case. First, a
major reason why priming effects occur is to facilitate align-
ment, and therefore they are likely to be particularly strong
during natural interactions. In the Branigan et al. (2000)
study, participants responded at their own pace, which
should have made processing “natural,” and hence con-
ducive to strong priming. Second, we would expect inter-
locutors to have their production systems highly activated
even when listening, because they have to be constantly
prepared to become the speaker, whether by taking the
floor or simply making a backchannel contribution.
If syntactic alignment is due, in part, to the interactional
nature of dialogue, then the degree of syntactic alignment
should reflect the nature of the interaction between speaker
and listener. As Clark and Schaeffer (1987; see also Schober
& Clark 1989; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark 1992) have demon-
strated, there are basic differences between addressees and
other listeners. So we might expect stronger alignment for
addressees than for other listeners. To test for this, Branigan
et al. (submitted) had two speakers take turns describing
cards to a third person, so the two speakers heard but did
not speak to each other. Priming occurred under these con-
ditions, but it was weaker than when two speakers simply
responded to each other. Hence, syntactic alignment is af-
fected by speaker participation in dialogue. Although, we
would claim, the same representations are activated under
these conditions as during dyadic interaction, the closeness
of dyadic interaction means that it leads to stronger priming.
For instance, we assume that the production system is ac-
tive (and hence is ready to produce an interruption) when
the addressee is listening to the speaker. By contrast, Brani-
gan et al.’s (submitted) side participant is not in a position to
make a full contribution, and hence does not need to acti-
vate his production system to the same extent.
Alignment also occurs at the level of articulation. It has
long been known that as speakers repeat expressions, artic-
ulation becomes increasingly reduced (i.e., the expressions
are shortened and become more difficult to recognize when
heard in isolation; Fowler & Housum 1987). However,
Bard et al. (2000) found that reduction was just as extreme
when the repetition was by a different speaker in the dia-
logue as it was when the repetition was by the original
speaker. In other words, whatever is happening to the
speaker’s articulatory representations is also happening to
his interlocutor’s. There is also evidence that interlocutors
align accent and speech rate (Giles & Powesland 1975;
Giles et al. 1992).
Finally, there is some evidence for alignment in compre-
hension. Levelt and Kelter (1982, Experiment 6) found that
people judged question-answer pairs involving repeated
form as more natural than pairs that did not; and that the
ratings of naturalness were highest for the cases where
there was the strongest tendency to repeat form. This sug-
gests that speakers prefer their interlocutors to respond
with an aligned form.
2.4. Alignment at one level leads to alignment 
at another
So far, we have concluded that successful dialogue leads to
the development of both aligned situation models and
aligned representations at all other linguistic levels. There
are good reasons to believe that this is not coincidental, but
rather that aligned representations at one level lead to
aligned representations at other levels.
Consider the following two examples of influences be-
tween levels. First, Garrod and Anderson (1987) found that
once a word had been introduced with a particular inter-
pretation it was not normally used with any other interpre-
tation in a particular stretch of maze-game dialogue. For in-
stance, the word row could refer either to an implicitly
ordered set of horizontal levels of boxes in the maze (e.g.,
with descriptions containing an ordinal like “I’m on the
fourth row”) or to an unordered set of levels (e.g., with de-
scriptions that do not contain ordinals like “I’m on the bot-
tom row”).3 Speakers who had adopted one of these local
interpretations of row and needed to refer to the other
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would introduce a new term, such as line or level. Thus, they
would talk of the fourth row and the bottom line, but not the
fourth row and the bottom row (see Garrod & Anderson
1987, p. 202). Aligned use of a word seemed to go with a
specific aligned interpretation of that word. Restricting us-
age in this way allows dialogue participants to assume quite
specific unambiguous interpretations for expressions. Fur-
thermore, if a new expression is introduced they can as-
sume that it has a different interpretation from a previous
expression, even if the two expressions are “dictionary syn-
onyms.” This process leads to the development of a lexicon
of expressions relevant to the dialogue (see sect. 5). What
interlocutors are doing is acquiring new senses for words or
expressions. To do this, they use the principle of contrast
just like children acquiring language (e.g., Clark 1993).
Second, it has been shown repeatedly that priming at one
level can lead to more priming at other levels. Specifically,
syntactic alignment (or “syntactic priming”) is enhanced
when more lexical items are shared. In Branigan et al.’s
(2000) study, the confederate produced a description using
a particular verb (e.g., the nun giving the book to the clown).
Some experimental subjects then produced a description
using the same verb (e.g., the cowboy giving the banana to
the burglar), whereas other subjects produced a description
using a different verb (e.g., the cowboy handing the banana
to the burglar). Syntactic alignment was considerably en-
hanced if the verb was repeated (as also happens in mono-
logue; Pickering & Branigan 1998). Thus, interlocutors do
not align representations at different linguistic levels inde-
pendently. Likewise, Cleland and Pickering (2003) found
people tended to produce noun phrases like the sheep that’s
red as opposed to the red sheep more often after hearing the
goat that’s red than after the book that’s red. This demon-
strates that semantic relations between lexical items en-
hance syntactic priming.
These effects can be modeled in terms of a lexical repre-
sentation outlined in Pickering and Branigan (1998). A
node representing a word (i.e., its lemma; Levelt et al. 1999;
cf. Kempen & Huijbers 1983) is connected to nodes that
specify its syntactic properties. So the node for give is con-
nected to a node specifying that it can be used with a noun
phrase and a prepositional phrase. Processing giving the
book to the clown activates both of these nodes and there-
fore makes them both more likely to be employed subse-
quently. However, it also strengthens the link between
these nodes, on the principle that coactivation strengthens
association. Thus, the tendency to align at one level, such
as the syntactic, is enhanced by alignment at another level,
such as the lexical. Cleland and Pickering’s (2003) finding
demonstrates that exact repetition at one level is not nec-
essary: the closer the relationship at one level (e.g., the se-
mantic), the stronger the tendency to align at the other
(e.g., the syntactic). Note that we can make use of this ten-
dency to determine which specific levels are linked.
In comprehension, there is evidence for parallelism at
one level occurring more when there is parallelism at an-
other level. Thus, pronouns tend to be interpreted as coref-
erential with an antecedent in the same grammatical role
(e.g., “William hit Oliver and Rod slapped him” is inter-
preted as Rod slapping Oliver; Sheldon 1974; Smyth 1994).
Likewise, the likelihood of a gapping interpretation of an
ambiguous sentence is greater if the relevant arguments are
parallel (e.g., “Bill took chips to the party and Susan to the
game” is often given an interpretation where Susan took
chips to the game; Carlson 2001). Finally, Gagné and
Shoben (2002; cf. Gagné 2001) found evidence that inter-
preting a compound as having a particular semantic relation
(e.g., type of doctor in adolescent doctor) was facilitated by
prior interpretation of a compound containing either the
same noun or adjective that used the same relation (e.g.,
adolescent magazine or animal doctor). These effects have
only been demonstrated in reading, but we would also ex-
pect them to occur in dialogue.
The mechanism of alignment, and in particular the per-
colation of alignment between levels, has a very important
consequence that we discuss in section 5. Interlocutors will
tend to align expressions at many different levels at the
same time.4 When all levels are aligned, interlocutors will
repeat each others’ expressions in the same way (e.g., with
the same intonation). Hence, dialogue should be highly
repetitive, and should make extensive use of fixed expres-
sions. Importantly, fixed expressions should be established
during the dialogue, so that they become dialogue routines.
2.5. Recovery from misalignment
Of course, these primitive processes of alignment are not
foolproof. For example, interlocutors might align at a “su-
perficial” level but not at the level of the situation model
(e.g., if they both refer to John but do not realize that they
are referring to different Johns; cf. Garrod & Clark 1993).
In such cases, interlocutors need to be able to appeal to
other mechanisms to establish or reestablish alignment.
The account is not complete until we outline such mecha-
nisms, which we do in section 4 below. For now, we simply
assume that such mechanisms exist and are needed to sup-
plement the basic process of alignment.
3. The interactive alignment model of dialogue
processing
The interactive alignment model assumes that successful
dialogue involves the development of aligned representa-
tions by the interlocutors. This occurs by priming mecha-
nisms at each level of linguistic representation, by percola-
tion between the levels so that alignment at one level
enhances alignment at other levels, and by repair mecha-
nisms when alignment goes awry. Figure 2 illustrates the
process of alignment in fairly abstract terms. It shows the
levels of linguistic representation computed by two inter-
locutors and ways in which those representations are
linked. Critically, Figure 2 includes links between the in-
terlocutors at multiple levels.
In this section, we elucidate the figure in three ways. First,
we contrast it with a more traditional “autonomous trans-
mission” account, as represented in Figure 3, where multi-
ple links between interlocutors do not exist. Second, we in-
terpret these links as corresponding to channels whereby
priming occurs. Finally, we argue that the bidirectional na-
ture of the links means that there must be parity between
production and comprehension processes.
3.1. Interactive alignment versus autonomous
transmission
In the autonomous transmission account, the transfer of in-
formation between producers and comprehenders takes
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place via decoupled production and comprehension
processes that are “isolated” from each other (see Fig. 3).
The speaker (or writer) formulates an utterance on the ba-
sis of his representation of the situation. Crudely, a non-lin-
guistic idea or “message” is converted into a series of lin-
guistic representations, with earlier ones being syntactic,
and later ones being phonological. The final linguistic rep-
resentation is converted into an articulatory program,
which generates the actual sound (or hand movements)
(e.g., Levelt 1989). Each intermediate representation
serves as a “way station” on the road to production – its sig-
nificance is internal to the production process. Hence,
there is no reason for the listener to be affected by these in-
termediate representations.
In turn, the listener (or reader) decodes the sound (or
movements) by converting the sound into successive levels
of linguistic representation until the message is recovered
(if the communication is successful). He then infers what
the speaker (or writer) intended on the basis of his au-
tonomous representation of the situation. So, from a pro-
cessing point of view, speakers and listeners act in isolation.
The only link between the two is in the information con-
veyed by the utterances themselves (Cherry 1956). Each
act of transmission is treated as a discrete stage, with a par-
ticular unit being encoded into sound by the speaker, being
transmitted as sound, and then being decoded by the lis-
tener. Levels of linguistic representation are constructed
during encoding and decoding, but there is no particular as-
sociation between the levels of representation used by the
speaker and listener. Indeed, there is even no reason to as-
sume that the levels will be the same, nor that the levels in-
volved in comprehension should constrain those in pro-
duction or vice versa. Hence, Figure 3 could just as well
involve different levels of representation for speaker and
listener.
The autonomous transmission model is not appropriate
for dialogue because, in dialogue, production and compre-
hension processes are coupled (Garrod 1999). In formulat-
ing an utterance the speaker is guided by what has just been
said to him and in comprehending the utterance the lis-
tener is constrained by what the speaker has just said, as in
the example dialogue in Table 1. The interlocutors build up
utterances as a joint activity (Clark 1996), with interlocutors
often interleaving production and comprehension tightly.
They also align at many different levels of representation,
as discussed in section 2. Thus, in dialogue each level of rep-
resentation is causally implicated in the process of commu-
nication and these intermediate representations are re-
tained implicitly. Because alignment at one level leads to
alignment at others, the interlocutors come to align their
situation models and hence are able to understand each
other. This follows from the interactive alignment model
described in Figure 2, but is not reflected in the au-
tonomous transmission account in Figure 3.
3.2. Channels of alignment
The horizontal links in Figure 2 correspond to channels by
which alignment takes place. The communication mecha-
nism used by these channels is priming. Thus, we assume
that lexical priming leads to the alignment at the lexical
level, syntactic priming leads to alignment at the syntactic
level, and so on. Although fully specified theories of how
such priming operates are not available for all levels, sec-
tions 2.2 and 2.3 described some of the evidence to support
priming at these levels, and detailed mechanisms of prim-
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Figure 2. A and B represent two interlocutors in a dialogue in this schematic representation of the stages of comprehension and pro-
duction processes according to the interactive alignment model. The details of the various levels of representation and interactions be-
tween levels are chosen to illustrate the overall architecture of the system rather than to reflect commitment to a specific model. Links
between interlocutors at multiple levels are included here.
ing are proposed in many of the papers referred to there.
As an example, Branigan et al. (2000) provided an account
of syntactic alignment in dialogue that involved priming of
syntactic information at the lemma stratum. Because chan-
nels of alignment are bidirectional, the model predicts that
if evidence is found for alignment in one direction (e.g.,
from comprehension to production) it should also be found
for alignment in the other (e.g., from production to com-
prehension). Of course, the linguistic information conveyed
by the channels is encoded in sound.
Critically, these channels are direct and automatic (as im-
plied by the term “priming”). The activation of a represen-
tation in one interlocutor leads to the activation of the
matching representation in the other interlocutor directly.
There is no intervening “decision box” where the listener
makes a decision about how to respond to the “signal.” Al-
though such decisions do of course take place during dia-
logue (see sect. 4 below), they do not form part of the basic
interactive alignment process, which is automatic and
largely unconscious. We assume that such channels are sim-
ilar to the direct and automatic perception-behavior link
that has been proposed to explain the central role of imita-
tion in social interaction (Bargh & Chartrand 1999; Dijk-
sterhuis & Bargh 2001).
Figure 2 therefore indicates how interlocutors can align
in dialogue via the interactive alignment model. It does not
of course provide an account of communication in mono-
logue, but the goal of monologue is not to get to aligned 
representations. Instead, the listener attempts to obtain a
specific representation corresponding to the speaker’s mes-
sage, and the speaker attempts to produce the appropriate
sounds that will allow the listener to do this. Moreover, in
monologue (including writing), the speaker’s and the lis-
tener’s representations can rapidly diverge (or never align
at all). The listener then has to draw inferences on the ba-
sis of his knowledge about the speaker, and the speaker has
to infer what the listener has inferred (or simply assume
that the listener has inferred correctly). Of course, either
party could easily be wrong, and these inferences will often
be costly. In monologue, the automatic mechanisms of
alignment are not present (the consequences for written
production are demonstrated in Traxler & Gernsbacher
1992; 1993). It is only when regular feedback occurs that
the interlocutors can control the alignment process.
The role of priming in dialogue is very different from
monologue. In monologue, it can largely be thought of as
an epiphenomenal effect, which is of considerable use to
psycholinguists as a way of investigating representation and
process, but of little importance in itself. However, our
analysis of dialogue demonstrates that priming is the cen-
tral mechanism in the process of alignment and mutual un-
derstanding. Thus, dialogue indicates the important func-
tional role of priming. In conclusion, we regard priming as
underlying the links between the two sides of Figure 2, and
hence the mechanism that drives interactive alignment.
3.3. Parity between comprehension and production
On the autonomous transmission account, the processes
employed in production and comprehension need not draw
upon the same representations (see Fig. 3). By contrast, the
interactive alignment model assumes that the processor
draws upon the same representations (see Fig. 2). This par-
ity means that a representation that has just been con-
structed for the purposes of comprehension can then be
used for production (or vice versa). This straightforwardly
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Figure 3. A and B represent two interlocutors in a dialogue in this schematic representation of the stages of comprehension and pro-
duction processes according to the autonomous transmission account. The details of the various levels of representation and interactions
between levels are chosen to illustrate the overall architecture of the system rather than to reflect commitment to a specific model. Links
between interlocutors are missing here.
explains, for example, why we can complete one another’s
utterances (and get the syntax, semantics, and phonology
correct; see sect. 7.1). It also serves as an explanation of why
syntactic priming in production occurs when the speaker
has only heard the prime (Branigan et al. 2000; Potter &
Lombardi 1998), as well as when he has produced the
prime (Bock 1986b; Pickering & Branigan 1998).
The notion of parity of representation is controversial but
has been advocated by a wide range of researchers working
in very different domains (Calvert et al. 1997; Liberman &
Whalen 2000; MacKay 1987; Mattingly & Liberman 1988).
For example, Goldinger (1998) demonstrated that speech
“shadowers” imitate the perceptual characteristics of a
shadowed word (i.e., their repetition is judged acoustically
more similar to the shadowed word than to another pro-
duction of the same word by the shadower). Goldinger ar-
gued that this vocal imitation in shadowing strongly sug-
gests an underlying perception-production link at the
phonological level.
Parity is also increasingly advocated as a means of ex-
plaining perception/action interactions outside language
(Hommel et al. 2001). We return to this issue in section 9.
Note that parity only requires that the representations be
the same. The processes leading to those representations
need not be related (e.g., there is no need for the mapping
between representations to be simply reversed in produc-
tion and comprehension).
4. Common ground, misalignment, and interactive
repair
In current research on dialogue, the key conceptual notion
has been “common ground,” which refers to background
knowledge shared between the interlocutors (Clark & Mar-
shall 1981). Traditionally, most research on dialogue has as-
sumed that interlocutors communicate successfully when
they share a common ground, and that one of the critical
preconditions for successful communication is the estab-
lishment of common ground (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs 1986).
Establishment of common ground involves a good deal of
modeling of one’s interlocutor’s mental state. In contrast,
our account assumes that alignment of situation models fol-
lows from lower-level alignment, and is therefore a much
more automatic process. We argue that interlocutors align
on what we term an implicit common ground, and only go
beyond this to a (full) common ground when necessary. In
particular, interlocutors draw upon common ground as a
means of repairing misalignment when more straightfor-
ward means of repair fail.
4.1. Common ground versus implicit common ground
Alignment between interlocutors has traditionally been
thought to arise from the establishment of common, mu-
tual, or joint knowledge (Lewis 1969; McCarthy 1990;
Schiffer 1972). Perhaps the most influential example of this
approach is Clark and Marshall’s (1981) argument that suc-
cessful reference depends on the speaker and the listener
inferring mutual knowledge about the circumstances sur-
rounding the reference. Thus, for a female speaker to be
certain that a male listener understands what is meant by
“the movie at the Roxy,” she needs to know what he knows
and what he knows that she knows, and so forth. Likewise,
for him to be certain about what she means by “the movie
at the Roxy,” he needs to know what she knows and what
she knows that he knows, and so forth. However, there is no
foolproof procedure for establishing mutual knowledge ex-
pressed in terms of this iterative formulation because it re-
quires formulating recursive models of interlocutors’ be-
liefs (see Barwise 1989; Clark 1996, Ch 4; Halpern & Moses
1990; Lewis 1969). Therefore, Clark and Marshall (1981)
suggested that interlocutors instead infer what Stalnaker
(1978) called the common ground. Common ground re-
flects what can reasonably be assumed to be known to both
interlocutors on the basis of the evidence at hand. This ev-
idence can be non-linguistic (e.g., if both know that they
come from the same city, they can assume a degree of com-
mon knowledge about that city; if both admire the same
view and it is apparent to both that they do so, they can in-
fer a common perspective) or can be based on the prior
conversation.
Even though inferring common ground is computation-
ally more feasible than inferring the iterative formulation of
mutual knowledge, it still requires the interlocutor to main-
tain a very complex situation model that reflects both his
own knowledge and the knowledge that he assumes to be
shared with his partner. To do this, he has to keep track of
the knowledge state of the interlocutor in a way that is sep-
arate from his own knowledge state. This is a very stringent
requirement for routine communication, in part because he
has to make sure that this model is constantly updated ap-
propriately (e.g., Halpern & Moses 1990).
In contrast, the interactive alignment model proposes
that the fundamental mechanism that leads to alignment of
situation models is automatic. Specifically, the information
that is shared between the interlocutors constitutes what
we call an implicit common ground. When interlocutors are
well aligned, the implicit common ground is extensive. Un-
like common ground, implicit common ground does not 
derive from interlocutors explicitly modeling each other’s
beliefs. Implicit common ground is therefore built up au-
tomatically and is used in straightforward processes of re-
pair. Interlocutors do of course make use of (full) common
ground on occasion, but it does not form the basis for align-
ment.
Implicit common ground is effective because an inter-
locutor builds up a situation model that contains (or at least
foregrounds) information that the interlocutor has pro-
cessed (either by producing that information or compre-
hending it). But because the other interlocutor is also pres-
ent, he comprehends what the first interlocutor produces
and vice versa. This means that both interlocutors fore-
ground the same information, and therefore tend to make
the same additions to their situation models. Of course,
each interlocutor’s situation model will contain some infor-
mation that he is aware of but the other interlocutor is not,
but as the conversation proceeds and more information is
added, the amount of information that is not shared will be
reduced. Hence, the implicit common ground will be ex-
tended. Notice that there is no need to infer the situation
model of one’s interlocutor.
This interactive alignment account predicts that speak-
ers only automatically adapt their utterances when the in-
formation can be accessed from their own situation model.
However, because access is from aligned representations,
which reflect the implicit common ground, these adapta-
tions will normally be helpful incidentally for the listener.
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This point was first made by Brown and Dell (1987), who
noted that if speaker and listener have very similar repre-
sentations of a situation, then most utterances that appear
to be sensitive to the mental state of the listener may in fact
be produced without reference to the listener. This is be-
cause what is easily accessible for the speaker will also be
easily accessible for the listener. In fact, the better aligned
speaker and listener are, the closer such an implicit com-
mon ground will be to the full common ground, and the less
effort need be exerted to support successful communica-
tion.
Hence, we argue that interlocutors do not need to mon-
itor and develop full common ground as a regular, constant
part of routine conversation, as it would be unnecessary and
far too costly. Establishment of full common ground is, we
argue, a specialized and non-automatic process that is used
primarily in times of difficulty (when radical misalignment
becomes apparent). We now argue that speakers and lis-
teners do not routinely take common ground into account
during initial processing. We then discuss interactive repair,
and suggest that full common ground is only used when
simpler mechanisms are ineffective.
4.2. Limits on common ground inference
Studies of both production and comprehension in situa-
tions where there is no direct interaction (i.e., situations
that do not allow feedback) indicate that language users do
not always take common ground into account in producing
or interpreting references. For example, Horton and
Keysar (1996) found that speakers under time pressure did
not produce descriptions that took advantage of what they
knew about the listener’s view of the relevant scene. In
other words, the descriptions were formulated with respect
to the speaker’s current knowledge of the scene rather than
with respect to the speaker and listener’s common ground.
Keysar et al. (1998) found that, in visually searching for a
referent for a description, listeners are just as likely to ini-
tially look at things that are not part of the common ground
as things that are, and Keysar et al. (2000) found that lis-
teners initially considered objects that they knew were not
visible to their conversational partner. In a similar vein,
Brown and Dell (1987) showed that apparent listener-di-
rected ellipsis was not modulated by information about the
common ground between speaker and listener, but rather
was determined by the accessibility of the information for
the speaker alone (though cf. Lockridge & Brennan 2002,
and Schober & Brennan, 2003, for reservations). Finally,
Ferreira and Dell (2000) found that speakers did not try to
construct sentences that would make comprehension easy
(i.e., by preventing syntactic misanalysis on the part of the
listener).
Even in fully interactive dialogue it is difficult to find ev-
idence for direct listener modeling. For example, it was
originally thought that articulation reduction might reflect
the speaker’s sensitivity to the listener’s current knowledge
(Lindblom 1990). However, Bard et al. (2000) found that
the same level of articulation reduction occurred even after
the speaker encountered a new interlocutor. Degree of re-
duction seemed to be based only on whether the reference
was given information for the speaker, and not on whether
it was part of the common ground. Additionally, speakers
will sometimes use definite descriptions (to mark the ref-
erent as given information; Haviland & Clark 1974) when
the referent is visible to them, even when they know it is
not available to their interlocutor (Anderson & Boyle 1994).
Nevertheless, under certain circumstances interlocutors
do engage in strategic inference relating to (full) common
ground. As Horton and Keysar (1996) found, with less time
pressure speakers often do take account of common ground
in formulating their utterances. Keysar et al. (1998) argued
that listeners can take account of common ground in com-
prehension under circumstances in which speaker/listener
perspectives are radically different (see also Brennan &
Clark 1996; Schober & Brennan 2003), though they pro-
posed that this occurs at a later monitoring stage, in a
process that they called perspective adjustment. More re-
cently, Hanna et al. (2003) found that listeners looked at an
object in a display less if they knew that the speaker did not
know of the object’s existence (see Nadig & Sedivy 2002, for
a related study with 5–6 year old children). These differ-
ences emerged during the earliest stages of comprehen-
sion, and therefore suggest that the strongest form of per-
spective adjustment cannot be correct. However, their task
was repetitive and involved a small number of items, and
listeners were given explicit information about the discrep-
ancies in knowledge. Under such circumstances, it is not
surprising that listeners develop strategies that may invoke
full common ground. During natural dialogue, we predict
that such strategies will not normally be used.
In conclusion, we have argued that performing infer-
ences about common ground is an optional strategy that in-
terlocutors employ only when resources allow. Critically,
such strategies need not always be used, and most “simple”
(e.g., dyadic, non-didactic, non-deceptive) conversation
works without them most of the time.
4.3. Interactive repair using implicit common ground
Of course, the automatic process of alignment does not al-
ways lead to appropriately aligned representations. When
interlocutors’ representations are not properly aligned, the
implicit common ground is faulty. We argue that they em-
ploy an interactive repair mechanism that helps to maintain
the implicit common ground. The mechanism relies on two
processes: (1) checking whether one can straightforwardly
interpret the input in relation to one’s own representation,
and (2) when this fails, reformulating the utterance in a way
that leads to the establishment of implicit common ground.
Importantly, this mechanism is iterative, in that the original
speaker can then pick up on the reformulation and, if align-
ment has not been established, reformulate further.
Consider again the example in Table 1. Throughout this
section of dialogue A and B assume subtly different inter-
pretations for two along. A interprets two along by count-
ing the boxes on the maze, whereas B is counting the links
between the boxes (see Fig. 1). This misalignment arises
because the two speakers represent the meaning of expres-
sions like two along differently in this context. In other
words, the implicit common ground is faulty.
Therefore, the players engage in interactive repair, first
by determining that they cannot straightforwardly interpret
the input, and then by reformulation. The reformulation
can be a simple repetition with rising intonation (as in 7), a
repetition with an additional query (as when B says “two
along from the bottom, which side?” in 5), or a more radi-
cal restatement (as when A reformulates “two along” as
“second box” in 6). Such reformulation is very common in
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conversation and is described by some linguists as clarifi-
cation request (see Ginzburg 2001). None of these refor-
mulations requires the speaker to take into account the lis-
tener’s situation model. They simply reflect failures to
understand what the speaker is saying in relation to the lis-
tener’s own model. They serve to throw the problem back to
the interlocutor who can then attempt a further simple re-
formulation if he still fails to understand the description. For
example, B says “you’re one along, one up?” (41), which A
reformulates as “Two along” (42). Probably because of this
reformulation, B then asks the clarification request “You’re
two along.” The cycle continues until the misalignment has
been resolved in (44) when A is able to complete B’s utter-
ance without further challenge (for discussion of such em-
bedded repairs see also Jefferson 1987). This repair process
can be regarded as involving a kind of dialogue inference,
but notice that it is externalized, in the sense that it can only
operate via the interaction between the interlocutors. It con-
trasts with the kind of discourse inference that occurs dur-
ing text comprehension (or listening to a speech), where the
reader has to mentally infer the writer’s meaning (e.g., via a
bridging inference; Haviland & Clark 1974).
4.4. Interactive repair using full common ground
Interactive repair using implicit common ground is basic
because it only relies on the speaker checking the conver-
sation in relation to his own knowledge of the situation. Of
course there will be occasions when a more complicated
and strategic assessment of common ground may be neces-
sary, most obviously when the basic mechanism fails. In
such cases, the listener may have to draw inferences about
the speaker (e.g., “She has referred to John; does she mean
John Smith or John Brown? She knows both, but thinks I
don’t know Brown, hence she probably means Smith.”).
Such cases may of course involve internalized inference, in
a way that may have more in common with text compre-
hension than with most aspects of everyday conversation.
But interlocutors may also engage in explicit negotiation or
discussion of the situation models. This appears to occur in
our example when A says “I take it we’ve got identical
mazes” (8).
Use of full common ground is particularly likely when
one speaker is trying to deceive the other or to conceal in-
formation (e.g., Clark & Schaefer 1987), or when inter-
locutors deliberately decide not to align at some level (e.g.,
because each interlocutor has a political commitment to a
different referring expression; Jefferson 1987). Such cases
may involve complex (and probably conscious) reasoning,
and there may be great differences between people’s abili-
ties (e.g., between those with and without an adequate “the-
ory of mind”; Baron-Cohen et al. 2000). For example, Gar-
rod and Clark (1993) found that younger children could not
circumvent the automatic alignment process. Seven-year-
old maze game players failed to introduce new description
schemes when they should have done so, because they
could not overcome the pressure to align their description
with the previous one from the interlocutor. By contrast,
older children and adults were twice as likely to introduce
a new description scheme when they had been unable to
understand their partner’s previous description. Whereas
the older children could adopt a strategy of non-alignment
when appropriate, the younger children seemed unable to
do so. Our claim is that these strategic processes are over-
laid on the basic interactive alignment mechanism. How-
ever, such strategies are clearly costly in terms of process-
ing resources and may be beyond the abilities of less skilled
language users.
The strategies discussed above relate specifically to
alignment (either avoiding it or achieving it explicitly), but
of course many aspects of dialogue serve far more compli-
cated functions. A speaker can attempt to produce a par-
ticular emotional reaction in the listener by an utterance, or
persuade the listener to act in a particular way or to think
in depth about an issue (e.g., in expert-novice interactions).
Likewise, the speaker can draw complex inferences about
the mental state of the listener and can try to probe this
state by interrogation. Thus, it is important to stress that we
are proposing interactive alignment as the primitive mech-
anism underlying dialogue, not a replacement for the more
complicated strategies that conversationalists may employ
on occasion.
Nonetheless, we claim that normal conversation does not
routinely require modeling the interlocutor’s mind. In-
stead, the overlap between interlocutors’ representations is
sufficiently great that a specific contribution by the speaker
will either trigger appropriate changes in the listener’s rep-
resentation, or will bring about the process of interactive re-
pair. Hence, the listener will retain an appropriate model of
the speaker’s mind, because, in all essential respects, it is the
listener’s representation as well.
Processing monologue is quite different in this respect.
Without automatic alignment and interactive repair the lis-
tener can only resort to costly bridging inferences whenever
he fails to understand anything. And, to ensure success, the
speaker will have to design what he says according to what
he knows about the audience (see Clark & Murphy 1982).
In other words, he will have to model the mind or minds of
the audience. Interestingly, Schober (1993) found that
speakers in monologue were more likely to adopt a listener-
oriented reference frame than speakers in dialogue, and
that this was costly. Because adopting the listener’s per-
spective can be very complex (e.g., if different members of
the audience are likely to know different amounts), it is not
surprising that people’s skill at public speaking differs enor-
mously, in sharp contrast to everyday conversation.
5. Alignment and routinization
The process of alignment means that interlocutors draw
upon representations that have been developed during the
dialogue. Thus, it is not always necessary to construct rep-
resentations that are used in production or comprehension
from scratch. This perspective radically changes our ac-
counts of language processing in dialogue. One particularly
important implication is that interlocutors develop and use
routines (set expressions) during a particular interaction.
Most of this section addresses the implications of this per-
spective for language production, where they are perhaps
most profound. We then turn more briefly to language com-
prehension.
5.1. Speaking: Not necessarily from intention 
to articulation
The seminal account of language production is Levelt’s
(1989) book Speaking, which has the informative subtitle
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From intention to articulation. Chapter by chapter, Levelt
describes the stages involved in the process of language
production, starting with the conceptualization of the mes-
sage, through the process of formulating the utterance as a
series of linguistic representations (representing grammat-
ical functions, syntactic structure, phonology, metrical
structure, etc.), through to articulation. The core assump-
tion is that the speaker necessarily goes through all of these
stages in a fixed order. The same assumption is common to
more specific models of word production (e.g., Levelt et al.
1999) and sentence production (e.g., Bock & Levelt 1994;
Garrett 1980). Experimental research is used to back up
this assumption. In most experiments concerned with un-
derstanding the mechanisms underlying language produc-
tion, the speaker is required to construct the word or ut-
terance from scratch, or from a pre-linguistic level at least.
For example, a common method is picture description (e.g.,
Bock 1986b; Schriefers et al. 1990). These experiments
therefore employ methods that reinforce the ideomotor
tradition of action research that underlies Levelt’s frame-
work (see Hommel et al. 2001).
It appears to be generally agreed that this exhaustive
process is logically necessary because speakers have to ar-
ticulate the words. Indeed, a common claim in work on lan-
guage production is that, although comprehenders can
sometimes “short-circuit” the comprehension process by
taking into account the prior context (e.g., guessing the-
matic roles without actually parsing), producers always have
to go through each step from beginning to end. To quote
Bock and Huitema (1999):
There may be times when just knowing the words in their con-
texts is enough to understand the speaker, without a complete
syntactic analysis of the sentence. But in producing a sentence,
a speaker necessarily assigns syntactic functions to every ele-
ment of the sentence; it is only by deciding which phrase will
be the subject, which the direct object, and so on that a gram-
matical utterance can be formed – there is no way around syn-
tactic processing for the speaker. (p. 385)
In fact, this assumption is wrong: It is logically just as pos-
sible to avoid levels of representation in production as in
comprehension. Although we know that a complete output
normally occurs in production, we do not know what has
gone on at earlier stages. Thus, it is entirely possible, for ex-
ample, that people do not always retrieve each lexical item
as a result of converting an internally generated message
into linguistic form (as assumed by Levelt et al. 1999, for
example), but rather that people draw upon representa-
tions that have been largely or entirely formed already.
Likewise, sentence production need not go through all the
representational stages assumed by Garrett (1980), Bock
and Levelt (1994), and others. For instance, if one speaker
simply repeated the previous speaker’s utterance, the rep-
resentation might be taken “as a whole,” without lexical ac-
cess, formulation of the message, or computation of syn-
tactic relations.
Repetition of an utterance may seem unnatural or un-
certainly related to normal processing, but in fact, as we
have noted, normal dialogue is highly repetitive (e.g., Tan-
nen 1989). This is of course different from carefully crafted
monologue where – depending to some extent on the genre
– repetition is regarded as an indication of poor style (see
Amis 1997, pp. 246–50). In our example dialogue in Table
1, 82% of the 127 words are repetitions; in this paragraph
only 25% of the 125 words are repetitions. (Ironically, we –
the authors – have avoided repetition even when writing
about it.) In fact, the assumption that repetition is unusual
or special is a bias probably engendered by psychologists’
tendency to spend much of their time reading formal prose
and designing experiments using decontextualized “labora-
tory” paradigms like picture naming.
So it is possible that people can short-circuit parts of the
production process just as they may be able to short-circuit
comprehension. Moreover, this may be a normal process
that occurs when engaged in dialogue. We strongly suspect
(see sect. 5.2.2) that phrases (for instance) are not simply
inserted as a whole, but that the true picture is rather more
complicated. But it is critical to make the logical point that
the stages of production are not set in stone, as previous
theories have assumed.
5.2. The production of routines
A routine is an expression that is “fixed” to a relatively great
extent. First, the expression occurs at a much higher fre-
quency than the frequency of its component words would
lead us to expect (e.g., Aijmer 1996). (In computational lin-
guistics this corresponds to having what is called a high
“mutual information” content; Charniak 1993.) Second, it
has a particular analysis at each level of linguistic represen-
tation. Thus, it has a particular meaning, a particular syn-
tactic analysis, a particular pragmatic use, and often partic-
ular phonological characteristics (e.g., a fixed intonation).
Extreme examples of routines include repetitive conversa-
tional patterns such as How do you do? and Thank you very
much. Routines are highly frequent in dialogue: Aijmer es-
timates that up to 70% of words in the London-Lund
speech corpus occur as part of recurrent word combina-
tions (see Altenberg 1990). However, different expressions
can be routines to different degrees, so actual estimates of
their frequency are somewhat arbitrary. Some routines are
idioms, but not all (e.g., I love you is a routine with a literal
interpretation in the best relationships; see Nunberg et al.
1994; Wray & Perkins 2001).
Most discussion of routines focuses on phrases whose
status as a routine is pretty stable. Although long-term rou-
tines are important, we also claim that routines are set up
“on the fly” during dialogue. In other words, if an inter-
locutor uses an expression in a particular way, it may be-
come a routine for the purposes of that conversation alone.
We call this process routinization. Here we consider why
routines emerge and why they are useful. The next section
considers how they are produced (in contrast to non-rou-
tines). This, we argue, leads to a need for a radical refor-
mulation of accounts of sentence production. Finally, we
consider how the comprehension of routines causes us to
reformulate accounts of comprehension.
5.2.1. Why do routines occur? Most stretches of dialogue
are about restricted topics and therefore have quite a lim-
ited vocabulary. Hence, it is not surprising that routiniza-
tion occurs in dialogue. But monologue can also be about
restricted topics, and yet all indications suggest it is much
less repetitive and routinization is much less common. The
more interesting explanation for routinization in dialogue is
that it is due to interactive alignment. A repeated expres-
sion (with the same analysis and interpretation) is of course
aligned at most linguistic levels. Thus, if interlocutors share
highly activated semantic representations (what they want
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to talk about), lexical representations (what lexical items are
activated), and syntactic representations (what construc-
tions are highlighted), they are likely to use the same ex-
pressions, in the same way, to refer to the same things. The
contrast with most types of monologue occurs (in part, at
least) because the producer of a monologue has no one to
align his representations with (see sect. 2). The use of rou-
tines contributes enormously to the fluency of dialogue in
comparison to most monologue – interlocutors have a
smaller space of alternatives to consider and have ready ac-
cess to particular words, grammatical constructions, and
concepts.
Consider the production of expressions that keep being
repeated in a dialogue, such as “the previous administra-
tion” in a political discussion. When first used, this expres-
sion is presumably constructed by accessing the meaning of
“previous” and combining it with the meaning of “adminis-
tration.” The speaker may well have decided “I want to re-
fer to the Conservative Government, but want to stress that
they are no longer in charge, etc., so I’ll use a circumlocu-
tion.” He will construct this expression by selecting the
words and the construction carefully. Likewise, the listener
will analyze the expression and consider alternative inter-
pretations. Both interlocutors are therefore making impor-
tant choices about alternative forms and interpretations.
But if the expression is repeatedly used, the interlocutors
do not have to consider alternatives to the same extent. For
example, they do not have to consider that the expression
might have other interpretations, or that “administration” is
ambiguous (e.g., it could refer to a type of work). Instead,
they treat the expression as a kind of name that refers to the
last Conservative Government. Similar processes presum-
ably occur when producing expressions that are already
frozen (Pinker & Birdsong 1979; see also Aijmer 1996).
Generally, the argument is that people can “short-circuit”
production in dialogue by removing or drastically reducing
the choices that otherwise occur during production (e.g.,
deciding which synonym to use, or whether to use an active
or a passive form).
Why might this happen? The obvious explanation is that
routines are in general easier to produce than non-routines.
Experimental work on this is lacking, but an elegant series
of field studies by Kuiper (1996) suggests that this explana-
tion is correct. Kuiper investigated the language of sports
commentators and auctioneers, who are required to speak
extremely quickly and fluently. For example, radio horse-
racing commentators have to produce a time-locked and 
accurate monologue in response to rapidly changing events.
This monologue is highly repetitive and stylized, but quite
remarkably fluent. He argued that the commentators achieve
this by storing routines, which can consist of entirely fixed
expressions (e.g., they are coming round the bend) or ex-
pressions with an empty slot that has to be filled (e.g., X is
in the lead), in long-term memory, and then accessing these
routines, as a whole, when needed. Processing load is
thereby greatly reduced in comparison to non-routine pro-
duction. Of course, this reduction in load is only possible
because particular routines are stored; and these routines
are stored because the commentators repeatedly produce
the same small set of expressions in their career.
Below, we challenge Kuiper’s assumption that routines
are accessed “as a whole,” and argue instead that some lin-
guistic processing is involved. But we propose a weaker ver-
sion of his claims, namely that routines are accessed tele-
graphically, in a way that is very different from standard as-
sumptions about language production (as in, e.g., Levelt
1989). Moreover, we argue that not all routines are learned
over a long period, but that they can instead emerge “on the
fly,” as an effect of alignment during dialogue.
5.2.2. Massive priming in language production. Contrary
to Kuiper (1996), some compositional processes take place
in routines, as we know from the production of idiom
blends (e.g., that’s the way the cookie bounces; Cutting &
Bock 1997). However, there are good reasons to assume
that production of idioms and other routines may be highly
telegraphic. The normal process of constructing complex
expressions involves a large number of lexical, syntactic,
and semantic choices (why choose one word or form rather
than another, for instance). In contrast, when a routine is
used, most of these choices are not necessary. For example,
speakers do not consider the possibility of “passivizing” an
idiom that is normally active (e.g., The bucket was kicked),
so there is no stage of selection between active and passive.
Likewise, they do not consider replacing a word with a syn-
onym (e.g., kick the pail), as the meaning would not be pre-
served. Similarly, a speech act like I name this ship X is
fixed, insofar as particular illocutionary force depends on
the exact form of words (cf. I give this ship the name X).
Also, flat intonation suggests that no choices are made
about stress placement (Kuiper 1996).
Let us expand this by extending some of the work of Pot-
ter and Lombardi to dialogue (Lombardi & Potter 1992;
Potter & Lombardi 1990; 1998). They address the question
of how people recall sentences (see also Bock 1986b; 1996).
Recall differs from dialogue in that (1) the same sentences
are perceived and produced; and (2) there is only one par-
ticipant, acting as both comprehender and producer. Pot-
ter and Lombardi had experimental subjects read and then
recall sentences while performing concurrent tasks. They
found that a “lure” word sometimes intruded into the re-
called sentence, indicating that subjects did not always
store the surface form of the sentence; that these lure words
caused the surface syntax of the sentence to change if they
intruded and did not fit with the sentence that was read; and
that other clauses could syntactically prime the target sen-
tence so that it was sometimes misremembered as having
the form of the prime sentence. They argued that people
did not remember the surface form of the sentence but
rather remembered its meaning and had the lexical items
and syntactic constructions primed during encoding. Recall
therefore involved converting the meaning into the surface
form using the activation of lexical items and syntax to cause
a particular form to be regenerated. In normal sentence re-
call, this is likely to be the form of the original sentence.
This suggests that language production can be greatly en-
hanced by the prior activation of relevant linguistic repre-
sentations (in this case, lexical and syntactic representa-
tions). In dialogue, speakers do not normally aim simply to
repeat their interlocutors’ utterances. However, production
will be greatly enhanced by the fact that previous utter-
ances will activate their syntactic and lexical representa-
tions. Hence, they will tend to repeat syntactic and lexical
forms, and therefore to align with their interlocutors. These
arguments suggest why sentence recall might actually pre-
sent a reasonable analogue to production in naturalistic di-
alogue; and why it is probably a better analogue than, for
example, isolated picture description. In both sentence re-
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call and production in dialogue, very much less choice
needs to be made than in monologue. The decisions that
occur in language production (e.g., choice of word or struc-
ture) are to a considerable extent driven by the context and
do not need to be a burden for the speaker. Thus, they are
at least partly stimulus-driven rather than entirely internally
generated, in contrast to accounts like Levelt (1989).
However, our account differs from Potter and Lom-
bardi’s in one respect. They assume no particular links be-
tween the activation of syntactic information, lexical infor-
mation, and the message. In other words, the reason that
we tend to repeat accurately is that the appropriate message
is activated, the appropriate words are activated, and the
appropriate syntax is activated. But we have already argued
that alignment at one level leads to more alignment at other
levels (e.g., syntactic priming is enhanced by lexical over-
lap; Branigan et al. 2000). The alignment model assumes in-
terrelations between all levels, so that a meaning, for in-
stance, is activated at the same time as a word. This explains
why people not only repeat words but also repeat their
senses in a dialogue (Garrod & Anderson 1987). In other
words, what actually occurs in dialogue is lots of lexical, syn-
tactic, and semantic activation of various tokens at each
level, and activation of particular links between the levels.
This leads to a great deal of alignment, and hence the pro-
duction of routines. It also means that the production of a
word or utterance in dialogue is only distantly related to the
production of a word or utterance in isolation.
Kuiper (1996) assumes that most routines are stored af-
ter repeated use, in a way that is not directly related to di-
alogue. However, he considers an example of how an auc-
tioneer creates a “temporary formula” by repeating a phrase
(p. 62). He regards this case as exceptional and does not em-
ploy it as part of his general argument. In contrast, we as-
sume that the construction of temporary formulae is the
norm in dialogue. Many studies show how new descriptions
become established for the dialogue (e.g., Brennan & Clark
1996; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs 1986; Garrod & Anderson
1987). In general, it is striking how quickly a novel expres-
sion can be regarded as entirely normal, whether it is a gen-
uine neologism or a novel way of referring to an object
(Gerrig & Bortfeld 1999).
In situations in which a community of speakers regularly
discusses the same topic we might expect the transient rou-
tines that they establish to eventually become fixed within
that community. In fact, Garrod and Doherty (1994)
demonstrated that an experimentally established commu-
nity of maze-game players quickly converged on a common
description scheme. They also found that the scheme es-
tablished by the community of players was used more con-
sistently than schemes adopted by isolated pairs of players
over the same period. This result points to the interesting
possibility that the interactive alignment process can be re-
sponsible for fixing routines in the language or dialect spo-
ken by a community of speakers (see Clark 1998).
5.3. Producing words and sentences
Most models of word production assume that the apparent
fluency of production hides a number of stages that lead
from conceptual activation to articulation. In Levelt et al.
(1999) a lexical entry consists of sets of nodes at different
levels (or strata): a semantic representation, a syntactic (or
lemma) representation, a phonological representation, a
phonetic representation, and so on. Each level is connected
to the one after it, so that the activation of a semantic rep-
resentation (e.g., for cat) leads to the activation of its syn-
tactic representation (the “cat” lemma plus syntactic infor-
mation specifying that it is a singular count noun), which in
turn leads to the access of the phonological representation
/k//æ//t/. Evidence for the sequential nature of activation
comes from time-course data (Schriefers et al. 1990; van
Turennout et al. 1998), “tip-of-the-tongue” data (Vigliocco
et al. 1997), and so on. Alternative accounts question the
specific levels assumed by Levelt et al. and the mechanisms
of activation, but do not question the assumption that ear-
lier levels become activated before later ones (Caramazza
1997; Dell 1986). Notice that the data used to derive these
accounts is almost entirely based on paradigms that require
generation from scratch (e.g., picture naming) or from lin-
guistic information with a very indirect relationship to the
actual act of production required (e.g., responding with the
object of a definition).
We do not contend that the dialogical perspective leads
us to a radically different view of word production. More
specifically, we have no reason to doubt that the same lev-
els of representation are accessed in the same order during
production in dialogue (though this question has not been
addressed by mainstream psycholinguistic research). For
example, Potter and Lombardi’s (1990) data suggest that
even in repetition of a word, it is likely that lexical access oc-
curs (and that there is no direct access of the word-form, for
example). However, contextual activation is likely to have
some effects on the time-course of production, particularly
in relation to the decisions at different stages in the pro-
duction process. For example, a choice between two syn-
onyms might normally involve some processing difficulty,
but if one has been established in the dialogue (e.g., by lex-
ical entrainment), no meaningful process of selection is
needed.
The situation is very different with isolated sentence pro-
duction. Models of production assume that a speaker ini-
tially constructs a message, then converts this message into
a syntactic representation, then into a phonological repre-
sentation, and then into sound (Bock & Levelt 1994; Gar-
rett 1980; Levelt 1989). Normally, they also assume that the
syntactic level involves at least two stages: a functional rep-
resentation, and a constituent-structure representation. It
is accepted that cascading may happen, so that the com-
plete message does not need to be computed before syn-
tactic encoding can begin (e.g., Meyer 1996). But ordering
is assumed, so that, for instance, a word cannot be uttered
until it is assigned a functional role and a position within a
syntactic representation.
However, we propose that it may be possible to break this
rigid order of sentence production, and instead to build a
sentence “around” a particular phrase if that phrase has
been focused in the dialogue. In accord with this, context
can affect sentence formulation in monologue, so that a fo-
cused phrase is produced first (Bock 1986a; Prat-Sala &
Branigan 2000). Prat-Sala and Branigan, in particular,
found effects of focus on word order that were not due to
differences in grammatical role. Hence it may be possible
to utter a phrase before assigning it a grammatical role. For
example, in Pictures, I think you like, and Pictures, I think
please you, the meaning of Pictures does not vary but its
grammatical role (subject or object) does vary. Assuming
that production is at least partially incremental, people can
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therefore utter Pictures before deciding which role it
should be given. This would of course not be possible within
traditional models where phonological representations and
acoustic form cannot be constructed before grammatical
role is assigned (e.g., Bock & Levelt 1994). So the effects of
strong context, in either dialogue or monologue, may be to
change the process of sentence production quite radically.
5.4. Alignment in comprehension
The vast literature on lexical comprehension is almost en-
tirely concerned with monologue (e.g., reading words in
sentential or discourse contexts) or isolated words. But the
alignment model suggests that lexical comprehension in di-
alogue is very different from monologue. A major conse-
quence of alignment at a lexical level is that local context
becomes central. Listeners, just like speakers, should be
able to select words from a set that have been central to that
dialogue – a “dialogue lexicon.”
One of the most universally accepted phenomena in ex-
perimental psychology, which is enshrined in all classic
models (e.g., Morton 1969), is the word frequency effect:
More frequent words are understood and produced faster
than less frequent words. Of course, processing is affected
by repetition but this is normally regarded as only modu-
lating the underlying frequency effect. However, in dia-
logue, local context is so central that the frequency of an ex-
pression (or, e.g., its age of acquisition) should become far
less important. To a large extent, frequency is replaced by
accessibility with respect to the dialogue context. In con-
trast, the analogous context in monologue does not lead to
alignment and there is a strong tendency to avoid repetition
in many genres (e.g., formal writing) so the value of local
context will be much less. Frequency is central to compre-
hension of monologue because it is what people fall back on
if they have no strong context. So a prediction of our ac-
count is that frequency effects will be dramatically reduced
in dialogue.
With respect to lexical ambiguity, we predict that context
will have a very strong role, so that effects of meaning fre-
quency can be overridden. Most current theories of lexical
ambiguity resolution follow Swinney (1979) in assuming
that multiple meanings of an ambiguous word are accessed
in a bottom-up manner, largely irrespective of context. Sim-
ilarly, differences in frequency do not affect access, unless
perhaps one meaning is highly infrequent (see Balota et al.
1999 and Moss & Gaskell 1999, for discussion). But in dia-
logue, only the contextually relevant meaning may be acti-
vated (or, in a modular account, the irrelevant meaning may
always be suppressed rapidly). Hence, an interlocutor will
straightforwardly adopt the appropriate meaning. An im-
plication is that dialogue context should allow “subordinate
bias effect” to be overridden (Duffy et al. 1988). According
to Duffy et al., context can support the less frequent mean-
ing and make it as accessible as the more frequent mean-
ing, but it cannot cause the less frequent meaning to be-
come more accessible than the more frequent meaning
(Binder & Rayner 1998; cf. Kellas & Vu 1999; Rayner et al.
1994). Although this may be true for reading (and mono-
logue processing generally), it may not hold for dialogue.
The comprehension of routines is in a sense like lexical
comprehension, in that their “frequency” and interpreta-
tion is set by the dialogue. However, this effect is in fact so
strong that it appears to occur in monologue comprehen-
sion as well. A great deal of work is concerned with the com-
prehension of novel compounds in isolation (e.g., Murphy
1988; Wisniewski 1996), and the interpretations assigned
depend on specific aspects of the words combined. Strong
discourse contexts appear to enable direct access to infre-
quent interpretations of compound nouns such as baseball
smile in reference to the smile of a boy given a baseball
(Gerrig & Bortfeld 1999). This would indicate that people
can also “short-circuit” the normal access to the individual
nouns in a compound when there is a restricted meaning
available from the immediate context.
6. Self-monitoring
The autonomous transmission model assumes that the
speaker constructs a message, formulates an utterance as a
series of linguistic representations and then articulates it as
sound; and the listener then hears the message, converts it
into linguistic representations and then comprehends it.
The interlocutors (ideally) end up with the same semantic
representation, and alignment at other levels is a derivative
process (if it ever occurs at all). In contrast, Figure 2 pro-
poses that interlocutors align themselves at different levels
simultaneously via the automatic channels, and the parity
assumption insures that the same representations are used
in production and comprehension. Self-monitoring uses
the same mechanism of alignment, but within the speaker.
All models assume that speakers monitor their own out-
put, so that, for instance, they are able to interrupt their
productions in order to change what they say (Hartsuiker &
Kolk 2001; Levelt 1983; 1989). This can occur either before
or after they start to produce a word. According to Levelt,
speakers monitor their own productions by using the com-
prehension system (cf. Postma 2000, for discussion of al-
ternatives). They can monitor their actual outputs, in which
case comprehension proceeds in an essentially normal way.
According to a model that only contained this outer loop,
monitoring would fit straightforwardly into the autonomous
transmission model shown in Figure 3. The only difference
would be that both interlocutors are the same person. How-
ever, Levelt assumed the existence of an inner loop as well,
which acts upon the phonological representation according
to Wheeldon and Levelt (1995). Additionally, Levelt as-
sumes that monitoring can occur within conceptualization,
to make so-called “appropriateness repairs,” for example. It
is impossible to include “inner” monitoring straightfor-
wardly within the autonomous transmission model, be-
cause the monitor acts upon a representation that the in-
terlocutor cannot act upon. From another perspective, it is
unclear how the inner loop or the loop within the concep-
tualizer should have developed, given that they bear no re-
lationship to any process involved in comprehending one’s
interlocutor. The postulation of a monitor that uses the
comprehension system is parsimonious (and it is easy to see
how it could have evolved), but the postulation of special
routes from production to comprehension that serve no
other purpose is not.
In contrast, the inner loop and the loop within the con-
ceptualizer fit straightforwardly into the interactive align-
ment model. Interlocutors are affected by each other’s se-
mantic and phonological representations via the channels
of alignment represented in Figure 2. Hence a speaker can
also be affected by his own representations at these levels.
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Self-monitoring is therefore compatible with Figure 2, ex-
cept that A and B now refer to the same person (regarded
as producer and comprehender). However, there is an im-
portant difference between interacting with oneself and in-
teracting with an interlocutor. When interacting with an in-
terlocutor, the information conveyed by the channels is
encoded as sound. But when interacting with oneself, there
is no need to encode the information as sound (indeed, the
existence of internal monitoring proves that this is not nec-
essary).
Given the existence of such levels of representation,
there is no reason why the speaker should not automatically
monitor at these levels. We propose that the speaker per-
forms monitoring at these different levels in a way that leads
to self-alignment. When the speaker produces an error at
(say) the syntactic level (e.g., by selecting the wrong
lemma), the result is a lack of alignment between the in-
tended representation and the representation available to
the monitor. This will become apparent as the levels of rep-
resentation are traversed. For example, if a speaker ac-
cesses the semantic and syntactic forms of “dog” in order to
utter it but wrongly accesses the phonological form of “cat,”
he will monitor this form, and then access its syntactic and
semantic representations. Because these do not match the
representation that he has accessed during production, the
speaker will realize his error and (normally) attempt to cor-
rect himself. If he detects the mismatch and begins to cor-
rect himself before articulation begins, the repair will be
covert; if not, some or all of “cat” will be produced. Self-cor-
rection involves a repair process that is essentially similar to
the straightforward repair process used during interaction
(see sect. 4.3). As the speaker’s production and compre-
hension systems draw upon the same implicit common
ground, this repair process will tend to be successful, and
hence there is normally no need to make reference to full
common ground in self-monitoring.5
The interactive alignment model makes the very inter-
esting prediction that monitoring can occur at any level of
linguistic representation that can be aligned. For example,
we predict the existence of syntactic monitoring. Consider
the misassignment of syntactic gender and its subsequent
detection. Speakers clearly can begin to say Le tête and then
correct to La tête. This detection could occur externally or
via the phonological channel. But an important prediction
of this account is that monitoring (and the correction of er-
rors) can also occur at the syntactic level (e.g., correcting
gender, count/mass errors, errors of auxiliary selection, or
errors of subcategorization), and at other levels as well. One
reason for suspecting that this might be correct is that
“other monitoring” (i.e., detecting errors in others’ speech)
appears faster for phonological than syntactic errors
(Oomen & Postma 2002). If self-monitoring of syntax oc-
curred via the phonological loop, we would predict that it
would be slow in comparison to self-monitoring of phono-
logical errors. But we know of no evidence for this claim.
More generally, the existence of monitoring appears to
be a consequence of dialogue. In dialogue, interlocutors
have to switch between speaking and listening rapidly and
repeatedly, and interlocutors have to be able to listen and
plan their next utterance at the same time (otherwise the
lack of pauses, for instance, could not be explained). The
obvious way in which this can occur is for interlocutors to
be listening at all times, with that listening involving align-
ing one’s representations with the input. If interlocutor A is
speaking, then B is listening to A and thus aligning with A.
But if A is speaking, then A listens to himself through mon-
itoring and thus aligns with himself. In other words, moni-
toring is a by-product of a language processing system that
is sufficiently flexible to allow comprehension and produc-
tion to occur to some extent simultaneously in dialogue.
This means that monitoring should tend to be hard during
periods of overlapping speech. Furthermore, monitoring is
a key part of the checking and interactive repair process dis-
cussed in section 4.3. As a speaker you have to monitor your
own contributions with respect to the implicit common
ground and as a listener you have to monitor your partner’s
contributions with respect to the same implicit common
ground.
7. Dialogue and linguistic representation
In the introduction, we noted that the main theoretical rea-
son why mechanistic psycholinguistics has largely ignored
dialogue is that formal linguistics has largely failed to ad-
dress dialogue. We cannot of course rectify this situation
here, but it is important to provide some sketch of how lin-
guistic theory could support the study of dialogue, just as it
has so far provided support for the study of monologue.
Rather than attempt to address all relevant phenomena, we
restrict ourselves to the discussion of two important general
issues: the analysis of linked utterances and the architecture
of the language system.
7.1. Dealing with linked utterances
As noted in section 2, dialogue turns are not isolated utter-
ances, but are linked across interlocutors. However, tradi-
tional linguistics is based on monologue, and therefore
treats the contribution of a single speaker as the unit of
analysis. Even when the contributions are linked fragments,
each contribution is treated on its own.6 However, this is
clearly wrong. As long ago as 1973, Morgan demonstrated
that there were syntactic restrictions on well-formed ex-
changes between interlocutors. For example, in A: What
does Tricia enjoy most? B: Being called “your highness”/*To
be called “your highness”, the grammatical form of the an-
swer is constrained by the subcategorization requirements
of the verb in the question (Morgan 1973; see also Ross
1969). Likewise, if A utters Is Jack in town? and B replies
Jack?, B’s clarification request can only be analyzed with re-
spect to A’s utterance (Ginzburg 2001). The syntactic form
of such elliptical requests is determined by the context (e.g.,
Who? is also a possible response because it is a noun phrase
like Jack). Hence, this demonstrates a syntactic parallelism
constraint between turns in dialogue.
The meaning of dialogue turns is also heavily constrained
by context. If produced in isolation, the meaning of Jack?
would be unclear; as a reply to Is Jack in town?, it means
either “are you asking if Jack is in town?” (the clausal read-
ing) or “who is the person named Jack you were referring
to?” (the constituent reading). On both readings, some syn-
tactic parallelism is required (e.g., he but not him can be
used to clarify Is he in town?). The constituent reading 
employs phonological (or perhaps phonetic) parallelism, 
as it actually requires “echoing” of the exact form used
(Ginzburg 2001). A satisfactory linguistic account of dia-
logue should provide an account of how the form and in-
terpretation of such short answers is constrained by the lin-
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guistic context. In part, this is because they are very com-
mon: According to Fernández and Ginzburg (2002), non-
sentential utterances constitute more than 11% of dialogue
turns in their sample of the British National Corpus
(Burnard 2000), and clarification ellipses constitute nearly
9% of these. Ginzburg and Sag (2001) offer a linguistic ac-
count of such phenomena by incorporating context into lin-
guistic representations.7 The interactive alignment model
predicts parallelism in general and hence it is not surpris-
ing that parallelism emerges as a linguistic constraint in
linked dialogue turns. Thus, Goldinger’s (1998) finding of
phonological echoing and the phonological restriction on
the constituent reading of clarification ellipsis may not be
coincidental. Note that an adequate theory of language pro-
duction also needs to be able to account for the contextual
dependency of such utterances. It is not clear that current
theories can do this, because they are designed to account
for the production of isolated (and “complete”) sentences
(e.g., Bock & Levelt 1994; Garrett 1980).
The linguistic analysis of linked contributions as a single
unit means that the mechanisms used to produce and com-
prehend them can be narrowly linguistic, in the sense that
there is no need to appeal to “bridging” inference. Let us
consider this in relation to a particularly extreme example
of joint construction, when one interlocutor completes the
other’s fragment. For example, Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs
(1986) cite the following exchange: A: That tree has, uh,
uh, . . . B: Tentworms. A: Yeah. B: Yeah. Here, A appears
unable to utter the appropriate expression, and B helps out
by making a suggestion (which is then accepted). Of course,
B’s response is only felicitous because it is syntactically con-
gruent with A’s fragment (has can take a noun-phrase com-
plement such as Tentworms, but could not take a preposi-
tional-phrase complement such as Of tentworms).
According to the orthodox (monological) view, B would
have to parse A’s utterance and assign it a semantic inter-
pretation. Presumably, the parser can interpret an input
(That tree has, uh, uh,) that is ungrammatical and not even
a traditional constituent (though how this can be done is
rarely specified). Then B would have to access its syntax and
semantics (at least) but suppress production of these words.
Next B must “fill in” the missing noun phrase by accessing
and producing Tentworms. A will in turn have to interpret
B’s “degenerate” utterance, and then integrate these two
fragments via a bridging inference (though note that nei-
ther fragment has a propositional interpretation). This
should cause processing difficulty (Haviland & Clark 1974),
but does not appear to. If things are this complicated it is
unclear why interruptions should occur at all,8 why they can
occur so rapidly, or why producing language in such con-
texts is not manifestly harder, say, than monologue. It also
predicts that elliptical responses to questions should be
harder than non-elliptical ones. This is clearly incorrect
(e.g., Clark, 1979, showed that full responses are complex
and have special implicatures).
Contrast this with the claim of the interactive alignment
model, in which B, as listener, activates the same represen-
tations as A. These representations can be used in produc-
tion in just the same way as in comprehension. Thus, we pre-
dict that it should be more-or-less as easy to complete
someone else’s sentence as one’s own, and this does appear
to be the case. Similarly, interlocutors should be able to com-
plete each other’s words (e.g., if one speaker has difficulty)
by making use of shared phonological representations. One
prediction is that speech errors could be induced through
perception as well as production (e.g., if B finishes off A’s
tongue twister, then B should be liable to produce errors).
The existence of non-sentential turns in dialogue sug-
gests that any appropriate grammatical account needs to be
able to deal with such fragments, and allow their interpre-
tations to be integrated into the dialogue context (as in, e.g.,
Poesio & Traum 1997). A reasonable assumption is that the
grammar should treat all well-formed dialogue turns as con-
stituents, with a semantic interpretation, so that their
meaning can be combined with the meanings of other par-
ticipants’ turns in a compositional manner. This would re-
quire a “flexible” notion of constituency, where many frag-
ments that are traditionally not constituents are treated as
constituents (e.g., The tree has). One linguistic approach
that accords with this is Combinatorial Categorial Gram-
mar (Steedman 2000; cf. Ades & Steedman 1982; Pickering
& Barry 1993). It allows most (but not all) fragments to be
constituents, and is therefore a plausible candidate for an-
alyzing the syntax of dialogue (and can also deal with mono-
logue). It also provides a natural account of routines, be-
cause these may be constituents within flexible categorial
grammar but not traditional linguistics (e.g., He’s overtak-
ing; Kuiper 1996; for other linguistic treatments, see
Kempson et al. 2001; Phillips 2003). Such linguistic pro-
posals have already had some impact on psycholinguistic
accounts concerned primarily with monologue compre-
hension (e.g., Altmann & Steedman 1988; Pickering &
Barry 1991), in part because they provide a natural account
of incremental interpretation (e.g., Just & Carpenter 1980;
Marslen-Wilson 1973). Of course, any appropriate account
also has to treat some dialogue utterances as ill-formed, for
example, when a speaker simply stops mid-utterance (Lev-
elt 1983). In general, we need a linguistic account of well-
formed dialogue utterances, and this account cannot be de-
rived straightforwardly from linguistic theories based on
monologue or citation speech.
7.2. The architecture of the language system
The interactive alignment model assumes independent but
linked representations for syntax, semantics, and phonology
(at least), where each level of representation plays a causal
role via alignment channels (see Fig. 2). This sits ill with a
Chomskyan “transformational” theory, with a central gen-
erative syntactic component and peripheral semantic and
phonological systems that are purely “interpretative.” In
Chomskyan approaches (whether Standard Theory, Gov-
ernment and Binding Theory, or Minimalism), syntax cre-
ates sentence structure, and sound and meaning are “read
off ’ this structure (Chomsky 1965; 1981; 1995). Instead, the
interactive alignment model is compatible with constraint-
based grammar approaches in which syntax, semantics, and
phonology form separate but equal parts of a multidimen-
sional sign (Gazdar et al. 1985; Kaplan & Bresnan 1982;
Pollard & Sag 1994).
Within this tradition, Jackendoff ’s (1997; 1999; 2002)
framework forms a particularly appropriate linguistic basis
for the interactive alignment model. He assumes that
phonological, syntactic, and semantic formation rules gen-
erate phonological, syntactic, and semantic structures re-
spectively, and are brought into correspondence by inter-
face rules, which encode the relationship between different
systems.9 In our terms, the alignment channels can affect
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the application of the formation rules, whereas the inter-
face rules are encoded in the links between the levels.10
Jackendoff ’s framework also provides a natural account of
idioms and other routines, because the lexicon includes
complex expressions (2002, Ch. 6).
In contrast, it is much more difficult to see why align-
ment should occur at phonological and semantic levels if no
generative component underlies these levels. Moreover,
the correspondence between the Chomskyan architectures
and models of production and comprehension has always
been difficult to sustain (e.g., Bock et al. 1992; Fodor et al.
1974; Pickering & Barry 1991). Thus, we see the integration
of a framework incorporating multiple generative compo-
nents with a grammar that has a flexible approach to con-
stituency as forming the linguistic basis for a psycholinguis-
tic account of dialogue.
8. Distinguishing between dialogue and
monologue
In this target article we have argued that dialogue is the pri-
mary setting for language use and, hence, that dialogue pro-
cessing represents the basic form of language processing.
Throughout, we have treated dialogue and monologue as
distinct kinds of language use. But is there a clear-cut dis-
tinction between dialogue and monologue or do they range
along a dialogic continuum?
8.1. Degree of coupling defines a dialogic continuum
Interactive activities vary according to the degree of cou-
pling between the interacting agents. Whereas a tightly
coupled activity such as ballroom dancing requires contin-
uous coordination between partners, a loosely coupled ac-
tivity such as golf only requires intermittent coordination
(one may have to wait until one’s partner has struck the ball,
quality of play may be affected by how close the scores are,
etc.). Similarly, different styles of communication vary in
the degree of coupling between communicators. Whereas
holding a one-to-one intimate conversation may require
precise and continuous coordination (e.g., interruption,
joint construction of utterances, backchanneling), giving a
lecture only requires intermittent coordination (e.g., alter-
ing one’s style according to visual or vocal feedback from the
audience, or responding to an occasional question).
The interactive alignment model was primarily devel-
oped to account for tightly coupled processing of the sort
that occurs in face-to-face spontaneous dyadic conversation
between equals with short contributions. We propose that
in such conversation, interlocutors are most likely to re-
spond to each other’s contributions in a way that is least af-
fected by anything apart from the need to align. Hence, it
is not surprising that such language use in such situations is
often regarded as primitive or basic (Clark 1996; Linnell
1998). As the conversational setting deviates from this
“ideal,” the process of alignment becomes less automatic.
For example, video-mediated conversation, ritualized in-
teractions, multi-party discussions, tutorials, and speeches
during debates each deviate in different ways from the
ideal. In such cases, interlocutors will be less able to rely on
automatic alignment and repair, and will need to spend
more time constructing models of their interlocutors’ men-
tal states if they are to be successful.
For example, Doherty-Sneddon et al. (1997) found that
interlocutors in a collaborative problem-solving task were
more efficient when they could see and hear each other
than when they could only hear each other or when they in-
teracted via a high-quality video link. Specifically, face-to-
face participants employed fewer words and checked their
interlocutors’ comprehension less often than participants in
the other conditions. Likewise, Fay et al. (2000) compared
discussions involving five- or ten-member groups. In the
small groups, the pattern of interruptions and turn-taking
were similar to those in dyadic dialogue. Most interestingly,
speakers tended to align with the immediately preceding
speaker (with respect to their opinions about what was most
important). But in the large groups, speakers did not align
with the preceding speaker, but rather with the dominant
speaker in the group. Hence, the interactive alignment
model predicted behavior in small groups but not large
groups, where speakers appeared to use “serial mono-
logue.”
Whereas the prototypical form of dialogue involves
tightly coupled contributions by interlocutors, the proto-
typical form of monologue involves one communicator
making a single presentation without receiving any feed-
back. Good examples of this are speeches where there is no
possibility of audience reaction (e.g., when speaking on the
radio), and traditional written communication. In such
cases, the communicator has to formulate everything on his
own. He receives no help about what to produce, and can-
not make use of an interlocutor’s contributions, because
nothing from the addressee comes in through the align-
ment channels. (The only information that comes through
the channels is via self-monitoring, and this is of much more
limited use.) Hence, true monologue is very difficult, with
successful communication often requiring very consider-
able planning (as in planning and rehearsing speeches) or
use of very routinized speech (as in Kuiper’s sportscasters
and auctioneers). However, much narrative is not as diffi-
cult as this, because the audience provides a considerable
amount of feedback via backchannel and non-linguistic
contributions (e.g., Bavelas et al. 2000). In cases where an
interchange moves between highly interactive interchanges
and long speeches by one interlocutor, we predict dynamic
shifts in the difficulty of production.
In the comprehension of monologue, the listener will
have to bring to bear appropriate inference skills. For ex-
ample, he will often have to draw costly bridging inferences
to help understand what the writer or speaker had really
meant with a definite reference (Garrod & Sanford 1977;
Haviland & Clark 1974), though again the difficulty is re-
duced if the listener can give feedback (Schober & Clark
1989). But in “passive” comprehension, there is no oppor-
tunity to call on aligned linguistic representations and no
opportunity to resolve ambiguities using interactive align-
ment. Instead people have to fall back on the frequency of
words, syntactic forms, and meanings in making compre-
hension decisions, as no other useful information is avail-
able.
Therefore, language users need to develop a whole range
of elaborate strategies to become competent processors of
monologue. Of course much of education involves training
in writing essays and producing speeches, and the like, and
a smaller part involves comprehension of monologue (e.g.,
in being able to identify the important arguments in a text).
In contrast, people are very rarely taught how to hold con-
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versations (except in some clinical circumstances). Without
training in monologue, people are very likely to go off track
during comprehension and production. Even after these
strategies have been developed, people still find mono-
logue far more difficult than dialogue.
9. Implications
The interactive alignment model is designed to account for
the processing of dialogue, but we have already suggested
that monologue can be regarded as an extreme case of non-
interactive language use. This means that it can be har-
nessed into accounts of monologue processing as well. We
shall briefly suggest its relevance to a range of other issues
that extend beyond dialogue.
One interesting possibility is that it can serve as the basis
for predominantly automatic accounts of social interaction
more generally. There is considerable evidence that people
imitate each other in non-linguistic ways, and hence align-
ment is presumably not purely linguistic. For example,
Chartrand and Bargh (1999) demonstrated non-conscious
imitation of such bodily movements as foot rubbing. Such
findings, together with findings of the effects of the auto-
matic activation of stereotypes on behavior, have led to the
postulation of an automatic perception-behavior link that
underlies such imitation (Bargh & Chartrand 1999; Bargh
et al. 1996; Dijksterhuis & Bargh 2001; Dijksterhuis & Van
Knippenberg 1998). According to these researchers, the
strength of this link means that the great majority of social
acts do not involve a decision component. Our contention
is somewhat related, in that we argue that the process of
alignment allows the reuse of representations that are con-
structed during comprehension, in a way that removes the
need to make complex decisions about how to represent the
mental state of the interlocutor. Of course, there are still
some conscious decisions about what one wants to talk
about, but the computational burden is greatly reduced
by making the process as automatic as possible. The social-
psychological literature is fairly vague about precisely what
is imitated; in contrast, our account assumes that people
align on well-defined linguistic representations.
Indeed, the interactive-alignment account of dialogue
meshes well with recent proposals about the central role of
imitation within psychological and neuroscientific theoriz-
ing more generally (Heyes 2001; Hurley & Chater, in
press). The discovery of mirror neurons provides a reason
to expect certain forms of imitation to be straightforward,
and the finding that the same areas of the brain (Brod-
mann’s Areas 44 and 45) are involved in imitation as in lan-
guage use (Iacoboni et al. 1999; Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998)
provides support for the assumption that alignment consti-
tutes a fundamental aspect of language use. To make these
links more explicit, it would probably be necessary to per-
form the very difficult task of investigating brain activity
during dialogue.
An obvious application of our account is to language ac-
quisition, because alignment underlies imitative processes
that occur as children acquire language. For instance,
Brooks and Tomasello (1999) showed that 2–3-year-olds
could be trained to use passives by being presented with
other passives. A prediction of the interactive-alignment
model is that children will tend to repeat a construction that
is novel to them to a greater extent when they also repeat
lexical items.11 From a rather different perspective, work
on atypical language development might provide evidence
for the circumstances under which the propensity for align-
ment might be disrupted. One would predict that this
would be most likely when social functioning was impaired,
and indeed there is evidence that imitation in general is im-
paired in autism (Williams et al. 2001). However, it is im-
portant to stress that alignment is unlikely to require a com-
plete “theory of mind,” because it is not dependent on the
modeling of the interlocutor’s mental state. Indeed, find-
ings such as Brooks and Tomasello’s speak against this ac-
count, on the grounds that such alignment occurs before
most children pass “false belief” tasks (e.g., Baron-Cohen
et al. 2000).
However, the model does not claim that assumptions
about the mental state of one’s interlocutor are irrelevant to
alignment. Presumably, one can decide whether one is in-
teracting with an agent with which it is appropriate to align.
Thus, we can consider the interesting case of human-com-
puter interaction, where people may or may not align with
computers’ utterances. If the conscious ascription of a men-
tal state is necessary for alignment, then people will only
align if they perform such ascriptions. But if people behave
toward computers as “social agents,” whatever they con-
sciously believe about their mental states, then we predict
unimpaired alignment will occur with computers, just as
many other aspects of social behavior do (Reeves & Nass
1996).
10. Summary and conclusion
This article has presented a mechanistic model of language
processing in dialogue, the interactive alignment model.
The model assumes that as dialogue proceeds, interlocutors
come to align their linguistic representations at many levels
ranging from the phonological to the syntactic and seman-
tic. This interactive alignment process is automatic and only
depends on simple priming mechanisms that operate at the
different levels, together with an assumption of parity of
representation for production and comprehension. The
model assumes that alignment at one level promotes align-
ment at other levels including the level of the discourse
model and hence acts as a mechanism to promote mutual
understanding between interlocutors.
The interactive alignment model was contrasted with an
autonomous transmission account that represents the tra-
ditional psycholinguistic framework for language process-
ing applied to dialogue. The main points of contrast be-
tween the two models are summarized in Table 2.
First, according to the interactive alignment account, the
interaction between interlocutors supports direct channels
between the linguistic representations that they use for lan-
guage processing. In effect, the sounds come to directly en-
code words, meanings and even aspects of the situation
model. Alignment occurs at different levels of representa-
tion and alignment at one level leads to further alignment
at other levels. One of the mechanisms for this direct en-
coding is what we call routinization (see Table 2[3.]): the
setting up of semi-fixed complex expressions that directly 
encode specific meanings. A second contrast with the au-
tonomous processing account relates to the nature of the in-
ference processes associated with establishing the common
ground in dialogue. Whereas inference in the traditional ac-
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count is internalized in the minds of the speaker and lis-
tener, in the interactive alignment account it is externalized
through an interactive repair mechanism that makes use of
clarification requests. A third set of contrasts derives from
the nature of the monitoring process assumed in the inter-
active alignment account. Whereas in the traditional ac-
count internal self-monitoring leads to the stipulation of a
special mechanism in addition to the normal comprehen-
sion process, in the interactive alignment account it arises
directly from the parity assumption. Monitoring output can
occur at any level at which there is interactive alignment.
Furthermore, there is a direct and simple relationship be-
tween self-repair processes and other repair processes in
dialogue because the self-monitoring process is directly
comparable to the other-monitoring process (see Table 2
[4.]). Finally, the interactive alignment account challenges
linguists to come up with a more flexible account of gram-
mar capable of capturing linguistic constraints on linked
sentence fragments.
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NOTES
1. In more detail, the procedure is as follows. Two players are
confronted with two computer-controlled mazes that do not dif-
fer in relevant ways. They are seated in different rooms but com-
municate via an audio link. The players each have a token repre-
senting their current position in their maze, which is only visible
to them, and they take turns to move the tokens through the maze
one position at a time until both players have reached their re-
spective goal positions. At any time approximately half of the paths
in each maze are closed. The closed paths are in different posi-
tions for each player and are only visible to that player. What
makes the game collaborative is that the mazes are linked in such
a way that when one player lands in a position where the other
player’s maze has a “switch” box, all of his closed paths open and
open paths close. This means that the players have to keep track
of each other’s positions to successfully negotiate their mazes. The
dialogue shown in Table 1 is taken from a conversation that oc-
curred at the beginning of a game. Garrod and Anderson (1987)
analyzed transcripts from 25 pairs of players to see how location
descriptions developed over the course of each game. Some of the
results of this analysis are considered in more detail in section 2.2.
2. Actually, Carlson-Radvansky and Jiang only found inhibition
if the two trials used the same axis of the reference frame (e.g., the
up-down axis). This limitation may be related to the fact that prim-
ing was assessed outside a dialogue situation. An interesting pre-
diction is that interlocutors would align on reference frames, not
just axes.
3. Critically, ordinals such as 4th can only quantify over or-
dered sets of items, whereas locative adjectives such as top or bot-
tom usually modify unordered sets of items. Therefore when
speakers say 4th row, they either have to give a post-modifying
phrase such as from the bottom, which imposes a particular or-
dering on the set of rows, or they have to assume that row denotes
an element in an implicitly ordered set of rows. In other words,
they assume that row in the bare 1st row is to be interpreted like
storey of a building in 1st storey. (Notice that it is odd to talk of
the 2nd storey from the bottom or even the bottom storey of a
building, but fine to talk about the bottom floor.)
4. A very interesting issue occurs when alignment at one level
conflicts with alignment at another. Perhaps the most obvious
cases of this are when alignment at the situation model requires
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Table 2. Contrasts between autonomous transmission account of language processing in dialogue 
and the interactive alignment account
Autonomous transmission account Interactive alignment account
1. Linkage between interlocutors 1. Linkage between interlocutors
Via sound alone – no direct links across other Links across multiple levels of representation via “alignment 
levels of representation. channels.” Sound comes to encode words, linguistic information, 
2. Inference and aspects of situational models.
Internalized in the mind of speaker/listener: Speaker 2. Inference
in terms of audience design; Listener in terms of bridging  Externalized in the interaction between interlocutors via a 
inference process. basic interactive repair mechanism.
3. Routines 3. Routines
Special case of language largely associated with idioms. Arise out of the application of the interactive alignment process. 
4. Self-monitoring A high proportion of dialogue uses routines, which simplify 
Inner loop monitoring requires a special internal route from both production and comprehension.
production to comprehension. 4. Self-monitoring
5. Repair mechanisms Monitoring occurs at any level of representation that is subject to 
Distinct repair mechanisms for self-repair and other-repair alignment as a consequence of the account.
in dialogue. 5. Repair mechanisms
6. Linguistic representations The same basic repair mechanism for self-repair and other
Only need to account for the structure of isolated and repair
complete sentences. 6. Linguistic representations
Needed to deal with linked utterances in dialogue, including 
non-sentential “fragments.”
nonalignment at the lexical level. For example, in Schober’s (1993)
example, two interlocutors who are facing each other use differ-
ent terms to refer to similar locations (on the left vs. on the right)
to maintain the same egocentric frame of reference. Likewise,
Markman and Gentner (1993) show that successful use of analogy
can require lexical misalignment. In Garrod and Anderson’s
(1987) maze game, if one player uses second row to refer to the
second row from the top in a five-row maze, then the other player
will tend to use fourth row to refer to the second row from the bot-
tom. The player could lexically align by using second row in this
way, but of course this would involve misalignment of situation
models, and would therefore be misleading. The implication is
that normally alignment at the situation level overrides alignment
at lower levels.
5. We assume that a case, for example, where the speaker could
not remember who he meant by John (while speaking) would be
pathological.
6. Most theories accept that a few dialogue phenomena do
need to be explained. For example, “binding” theory (Chomsky
1981) can be evoked to explain why himself is coreferential with
John in A: Who does John love? B: Himself; though see Ginzburg
(1999) for evidence against an account in such terms. Rather than
think of question-answer pairs as a marginal phenomenon that
needs special explanation in a monological account, we regard
them as a particularly orderly aspect of dialogue.
7. Roughly, Ginzburg and Sag assume feature structures taken
from Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (Pollard & Sag
1994), in which context is incorporated into the representation of
the fragments using the critical notion of QUDs (“questions un-
der discussion”).
8. Estimates from small group dialogues indicate that as many
as 31% of turns are interrupted by the listener (Fay et al. 2000).
9. Jackendoff uses the term conceptual structures instead of se-
mantic structures, for reasons that we shall ignore for current pur-
poses.
10. Note that Jackendoff (2002) assumes interface rules be-
tween semantic (conceptual) structures and phonological struc-
tures (p. 127, Fig. 5.5). If this is correct, it suggests that Figure 2
should incorporate such a link as well. He also suggests that the
lexicon should be regarded as part of the interface components
(p. 131).
11. The tendency might even be stronger for young children
than adults, at least when it is the verb that is repeated. According
to the “verb island hypothesis,” syntactic information is more
strongly associated with individual verbs in young children than it
is in adults (e.g., children are often able to use a particular con-
struction with some verbs but not others; Tomasello 2000).
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod (P&G) claim that the automatic mecha-
nisms that underlie language processing in dialogue are absent in mono-
logue. We disagree with this claim, and argue that dialogue simply pro-
vides a different context in which the same basic processes operate.
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) call for closer attention to the mecha-
nisms underlying coordination in dialogue. There are good em-
pirical grounds for accepting many of the basic assumptions of the
interactive alignment model. Specifically, the strong egocentrism
of speakers and listeners that we have uncovered in our own stud-
ies (cf. Barr & Keysar [in press], for a recent review) makes much
sense within a context of strong representational overlap, and the
interactive alignment model provides an appealing explanation for
how such overlap comes about.
A central assumption of P&G is a categorical distinction be-
tween language processing in monologue and in dialogue. Clearly,
monologue is different from dialogue because in monologue there
is no feedback and no opportunity for interactive repair. But P&G
go further than this, asserting that in monologue, “the automatic
mechanisms of alignment are not present” (sect. 3.2, para. 3) and
that “there is no opportunity to call on aligned linguistic repre-
sentations” (sect. 8.1, para. 5). Under this view, dialogue involves
processes that are fundamentally distinct from those present in
monologue. We disagree. We suggest that only the strategic mech-
anisms of feedback and interactive repair are absent in mono-
logue, not the automatic mechanisms of alignment. Just as there
is a “dialogic continuum” defining different kinds of interactive ac-
tivities, we argue that there is a continuum of processing and that
alignment will be observed even under non-interactive circum-
stances.
Differences in processing may simply be a matter of degree, not
of kind, especially given that monologue-like episodes are com-
mon even in naturalistic conversation. Consider, for example, the
first utterance of a conversation, which in many cases is a mini-
monologue before a full-fledged interactive exchange develops.
The speaker will need to go through the various stages to produce
the first utterance (e.g., Levelt 1989), and the comprehender must
parse the utterance in order to appreciate its significance. Later
on in the exchange, enough of shared but nonmutual information
(what P&G unfortunately term “implicit common ground”)1 may
have built up to short-circuit many aspects of these processes. But
there is no reason to believe that different theories would be re-
quired to explain the processing of the first utterance of a dialogue
versus the hundred-and-first. Indeed, P&G claim that the align-
ment processes are automatic and resource-free, and processes of
these sorts cannot simply be switched off. Finally, the “dialogic
continuum” cited by the authors does not just provide a means for
classifying whole conversations but actually represents a domain
of activity that can be fully traversed even within the span of a sin-
gle conversation. A conversationalist can at any point secure turn
space in order to engage in an extended monologue (Sacks et al.
1974) – for example, about her trip to India – followed by close
coordination with her interlocutor in order to arrange a time for a
future meeting. There is no reason to expect alignment processes
and bridging inferences to toggle on and off as the interactivity of
the discourse changes.
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Studies that find differences between the quality of compre-
hension of interlocutors and of overhearers (e.g., Schober & Clark
1989; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark 1992) might be taken as evidence to
support the idea of radically different cognitive processes in in-
teractive discourse. They need not be. In such studies interlocu-
tors had opportunities for feedback and repair that the overhear-
ers lacked. Because different people will misunderstand different
things, those who can ask for clarification will receive feedback
that is relevant to them and consequently might understand bet-
ter. Therefore any difference between such noninteractive and in-
teractive comprehension could be fully attributable to strategic,
effortful feedback but not necessarily to automatic alignment. In
fact, Barr and Keysar (2002) found that even when such feedback
is removed, listeners who believed themselves to be overhearers
automatically aligned their semantic representations with the
speaker’s to the same degree as listeners who believed themselves
to be addressees.
In closing, far from qualitatively changing the nature of pro-
cessing, it is likely that dialogue provides a radically different con-
text in which the same processes operate. The context includes an
interlocutor and mechanisms for feedback and interactive repair.
For us there is no question that it is important to study conversa-
tion in vivo, but it remains to be seen whether this would reveal
automatic processes that are truly unique to dialogue.
NOTE
1. In their seminal work on common ground, Clark and Marshall
(1981) clearly make the case that common ground is a form of meta-
knowledge that is conceptually distinct from shared knowledge. What
P&G are referring to by “implicit common ground” is really just shared
knowledge, not common ground, because interlocutors need not repre-
sent the fact that their representations are shared. Such usage is certain to
contribute to the legacy of confusion that has plagued discussions of mu-
tual knowledge and common ground (see Keysar 1997 and Lee 2001 for
discussion).
Full alignment of some but not all
representations in dialogue
Holly P. Branigan
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Abstract: I argue that alignment of linguistic representations and situa-
tion models in dialogue are qualitatively distinct. By virtue of the isomor-
phy between interlocutors’ linguistic representations, interlocutors align
their linguistic representations fully. However, evidence about situation
models is indirect and mediated through language, with the result that
alignment of situation models is only partial.
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) provide a plausible and very welcome
account of language processing in dialogue. Their account assigns
a central importance to the notion of alignment. Here I consider
the nature of alignment and, in particular, whether alignment of
strictly linguistic representations and alignment of situation mod-
els are qualitatively distinct.
P&G suggest that successful dialogue arises from the alignment
of representations between interlocutors, and particularly align-
ment of situation models. Alignment is defined as interlocutors
having the same representation at a particular level of structure.
It is uncontroversial that language is represented in the same way
in different speakers. Linguists and psycholinguists assume a com-
mon competence grammar in adult speakers (Chomsky 1965),
even though they may differ as to whether this grammar is innate
(e.g., Pinker 1989) or to some extent constructed through experi-
ence (e.g., Tomasello 2000). Crucially, adult speakers’ internalised
knowledge of the syntax, lexicon, and morpho-phonology of a lan-
guage is held to be identical, such that there is an isomorphic map-
ping from any one speaker’s internalised representation of the lan-
guage to any other’s. In a dialogue, then, interlocutors necessarily
make use of identical representations in producing their utter-
ances.
Under P&G’s maximally parsimonious assumption of parity of
representations, interlocutors also necessarily draw upon identi-
cal representations in both producing and comprehending utter-
ances. Note also that speakers’ utterances provide direct linguis-
tic evidence to the listener. So when a listener hears an utterance,
he receives direct evidence (except in cases of mishearing or un-
resolved structural ambiguities) about the syntactic, lexical, and
morpho-phonological representations that the speaker has em-
ployed. If a speaker produces an utterance like I am in row two,
for example, the listener has direct evidence that she has used the
words I, am, and so on (and their relevant inflectional markings),
that she has used a pronoun and a verb and so on, and that she
has used a noun phrase, a verb phrase, a prepositional phrase, and
so on. Taken together, the combination of isomorphy of repre-
sentations and direct evidence strongly supports P&G’s con-
tention (summarised in their Fig. 2) that linguistic representa-
tions used by interlocutors in dialogue act directly upon one
another, and that, in a very real sense, when we talk about inter-
locutors having aligned linguistic representations, we mean that
those representations are identical. In summary, P&G’s argu-
ments for full alignment at linguistic levels of representation
seem well founded.
But are situation models aligned in the same way as linguistic
representations? It is unclear that this is the case. In P&G’s model,
interlocutors’ situation models act directly upon one another (see
the authors’ Fig. 2), in the same way as syntactic, lexical, and mor-
pho-phonological representations do, and alignment of situation
models is taken as critical for successful communication. But sit-
uation models differ qualitatively from strictly linguistic repre-
sentations. A speaker’s utterances do not give direct evidence of
the situation model that the speaker holds, only indirect evidence
encoded in linguistic representations, from which the listener has
to infer the speaker’s situation model. So whereas an utterance like
I am in row two gives direct evidence about the speaker’s syntac-
tic, lexical, and morpho-phonological representations, it gives only
indirect evidence about the speaker’s situation model. The listener
must construct a situation model based upon his or her interpre-
tation of the speaker’s meaning – which may or may not be cor-
rect. Of course, as P&G note, misunderstandings may come to
light, and interlocutors may initiate repairs to bring about situa-
tion models that are aligned in the relevant aspects. But as they
also note, some misunderstandings may not be repaired. In fact,
it seems likely that interlocutors quite frequently have situation
models that are misaligned in major respects. Communication will
be (apparently) successful as long as the misalignment is not ap-
parent to the interlocutors. To take P&G’s example of interlocu-
tors using John to refer to different people, it is quite possible for
them to have a mutually satisfying dialogue concerning this per-
son without ever realising that they are discussing different peo-
ple; unless one of them says something that is inconsistent with
the other’s knowledge, they can successfully (for their purposes)
complete a dialogue with quite radically different situation mod-
els. Equally, a doctor and a patient may have a dialogue concern-
ing the patient’s chronic back problem that appears to be success-
ful, in that they are both satisfied that they understand each other
well; yet their situation models may differ considerably because of
unresolved (and unapparent) differences in their interpretation of
chronic. Situation models need only be aligned sufficiently for the
current communicative goal to be (apparently) met.
So it seems that alignment of situation models and alignment of
linguistic representations are quite different. With linguistic rep-
resentations, interlocutors genuinely employ aligned (i.e., identi-
cal) representations that act directly upon one another; whereas,
because evidence for situation models is only indirect, interlocu-
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tors rarely if ever have identical models. Instead, they have par-
tially aligned models that may differ in many – sometimes impor-
tant – respects. And because evidence for situation models is me-
diated through language, it seems highly unlikely that they can act
directly upon one another (contra P&G’s Fig. 2).
One interesting result of the distinction between alignment of
linguistic and situation models is that alignment of linguistic rep-
resentations may sometimes lead to misaligned situation models.
Garrod and Clark (1993) found that young children had a ten-
dency to use the same words to describe a maze – that is, showed
lexical alignment – even when their situation models were quite
different. Similarly, in the case of the doctor-and-patient scenario,
one speaker’s use of the term chronic may well reinforce the
other’s use of the same term, leading to more misunderstanding
than if a different term were used. In both examples, full align-
ment at the linguistic level misleads interlocutors into believing
that they also have alignment at the level of situation models.
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) call to study language processing
in dialogue context is an appealing one. Their interactive alignment model
is ambitious, aiming to explain the converging behavior of dialogue part-
ners via both intra- and interpersonal priming. However, they ignore the
flexible, partner-specific processing demonstrated by some recent dia-
logue studies. We discuss implications of these data.
In human language processing, the whole is greater than the sum
of the parts; therefore, those who study the language processing sys-
tem in dialogue contexts are poised to make different sorts of dis-
coveries than those who study the parts working alone. Pickering &
Garrod (P&G) present a convincing argument that psycholinguists
should pay attention to dialogue. In fields such as artificial intelli-
gence and human-computer interaction, where the goal is often to
build a fully working dialogue partner, many will find this a worthy
enterprise as well. After presenting evidence for phonological, lex-
ical, and syntactic convergence between dialogue partners and for
representations shared between comprehension and production,
P&G make a strong claim that is far less convincing: “normal con-
versation does not routinely require modeling the interlocutor’s
mind” (sect. 4.4, para. 4). They support this position with evidence
from studies that fail to meet the very standards they seek to ad-
vance, while ignoring evidence that complicates matters for their in-
teractive alignment model. Thus, their position on the importance
of studying language in dialogue does not go far enough.
This position assumes that interlocutors achieve aligned men-
tal representations without having to track anything specific about
each other’s knowledge because both have evolved with the same
cognitive architecture; what is easiest for speakers is easiest for ad-
dressees (Brown & Dell 1987). It further assumes that there is no
need to track common ground, as interlocutors each use their own
memory of the conversation as a proxy. By this argument, what ap-
pears to be partner-specific or “audience design” is actually in-
flexible and unavoidable, at least in the earliest moments of pro-
cessing. P&G propose a two-stage model (similar to that of Horton
& Keysar 1996), arguing that interlocutors “do not routinely take
common ground into account during initial processing . . . full
common ground is only used when simpler mechanisms are inef-
fective” (sect. 4.1, last para.). This (circular) view relegates any as-
pect of production or interpretation that displays flexibility or sen-
sitivity to an interlocutor’s needs (as distinct from one’s own) to the
status of a relatively late adjustment, managed as a kind of repair
or pragmatic garden path.
Granted, it is difficult to design a good experiment on audience
design. A good experiment must distinguish one interlocutor’s
perspective from another’s, avoid confounding individual per-
spectives with common ground (Keysar 1997), and allow inter-
locutors to interact naturally or contingently (Schober & Brennan
2003). But we are surprised that studies succeeding in all this (and
finding partner-specific effects early in processing, e.g., Hanna et
al. 2003; Nadig & Sedivy 2002) are dismissed by P&G: “their task
was repetitive and involved a small number of items, and listeners
were given explicit information about the discrepancies in knowl-
edge” (target article, sect. 4.2, para. 3). Then follows a very broad
claim: “Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that listen-
ers develop strategies that may invoke full common ground. Dur-
ing natural dialogue, we predict that such strategies will not nor-
mally be used.”
Paradoxically, evidence to support this position comes mainly
from studies that did not allow any potential for interaction. These
include Brown and Dell (1987), Ferreira and Dell (2000), Horton
and Keysar (1996), and others in which partners did not interact
naturally or provide contingent feedback. Sometimes this matters;
for example, Brown and Dell (1987) concluded that speakers did
not take addressees’ specific needs into account when retelling
stories; but their addressees had no needs (they were confeder-
ates who knew the stories better than the speakers did). When we
ran a similar study using spontaneously interacting speakers and
addressees (Lockridge & Brennan 2002), speakers’ early syntactic
choices indeed showed sensitivity to addressees’ needs.
There is additional good evidence of rapid, partner-specific ef-
fects from the comprehension side. Hanna and Tanenhaus (2004)
asked addressees to follow a (confederate) speaker’s directions in
a cooking task (e.g., Hand me the cake mix); the addressees’ eye
fixations showed that they restricted candidate referents for am-
biguous expressions (e.g., when two cake mixes were present) de-
pending on what the speaker was holding and what she could not
reach; they did this from the earliest moments of processing.
And we have demonstrated that addressees interpret the same
utterance differently when it is spoken by different speakers with
whom the addressees have different dialogue histories (Metzing
& Brennan 2001; 2003). In our experiment, addressees were in-
structed by (confederate) speakers to reposition objects among a
relatively large set; they did this several times, evolving shared
perspectives and terms for critical objects (e.g., the shiny cylin-
der). Then the speaker left the room and either returned or else a
new confederate speaker entered. In the final trial, the new or old
speaker used either the familiar term or a new, equally good term
(e.g., the silver pipe) for the same critical object (amid many other
references that did not use different terms). Addressees gazed im-
mediately at the object when either speaker used the old term.
However, when the old speaker used a new term (inexplicably
breaking a conceptual pact), addressees experienced interference,
delaying gazing at the target object. There was no such delay when
the new speaker used the new term (in fact, resolving this was just
as fast as the old term spoken by the new speaker). This partner-
specific interference suggests that the pragmatic force of break-
ing a conceptual pact has impact immediately, rather than just as
a late adjustment or repair.
Such immediate effects provide evidence of impressive agility
and potential for partner-specific processing in the language pro-
cessing system, which the interactive alignment proposal fails to
address. Pragmatic and partner-specific knowledge is imple-
mented by basic mechanisms of memory and does not rely on spe-
cial processes or exhaustive partner models. Audience design –
truly partner-specific processing – can occur immediately and ef-
fortlessly as well as more slowly and deliberately, depending on
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how activated relevant information is. P&G’s strong separation be-
tween “implicit common ground” (automatic but excluding any
partner specificity) and “full common ground” (requiring repro-
cessing) is unconvincing.
Yes, the potential for interaction matters! But the interactive
alignment model has farther to go before it can accommodate the
flexible and adaptive processing that these data support.
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Abstract: We agree with Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) proposal that dia-
logue is an important empirical and theoretical test bed for models of lan-
guage processing. However, we offer two cautionary notes. First, the en-
terprise will require explicit computational models. Second, such models
will need to incorporate both joint and separate speaker and hearer com-
mitments in ways that go beyond priming and alignment.
We applaud and second Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) call to psy-
cholinguists to include dialogue as an empirical and theoretical
test bed for models of language processing. There is much to be
gained by combining the tools for studying real-time processing
developed within the language-as-product tradition with the more
natural interactive situations typically used within the action tra-
dition (Tanenhaus et al. 2004). And we believe that many of the
basic processes in language comprehension, including spoken-
word recognition, syntactic processing, and reference resolution,
can be studied with the same precision in dialogue settings as in
more traditional controlled experiments (e.g., Brown-Schmidt et
al. 2002; in press). However, we would place a somewhat differ-
ent emphasis on why it is important to study dialogue.
First, unlike P&G, who suggest that theories of language pro-
cessing within the product tradition are admirably well-specified,
we think that there has been a dearth of explicit mechanistic mod-
els of language processing. This is especially true within language
comprehension, where, with the exception of some limited mod-
els developed within the neural network tradition, most computa-
tional models make only tenuous contact with behavioral data, and
vice versa (Christiansen & Chater 2001). However, we believe that
the emergence of interactive dialogue systems within computa-
tional linguistics offers an opportunity to develop explicit compu-
tational models in domains that can also be used to study human
language processing, thus creating a synergistic feedback loop be-
tween modeling and experimentation. Although the field has not
yet reached this stage, the opportunity is on the horizon, as com-
putational linguists strive to implement systems that can engage
in continuous generation and understanding.
The motivation for continuous understanding and generation in
dialogue systems is instructive (Allen et al. 2001). During utter-
ance generation, a speaker needs to have the capacity to monitor
feedback from an addressee, both verbal and nonverbal, and plan
or adjust the continuation of her utterance accordingly. Consider,
for example, an utterance which begins, “Now, take thee,1 uh,
Phillips head screwdriver. . . .” If the addressee nods or says “uh
huh,” the speaker can continue with, “and tighten the bolt.” How-
ever, if the addressee says “huh,” looks perplexed, or begins to
reach for the wrong tool, the speaker is likely to continue with,
“the one with the blue handle, the one closest to your wrench” or
say “No, that one” (while pointing). This example illustrates one
of the potential benefits of studying interactive dialogue: It can
shed different light on some basic assumptions. For example, most
psycholinguists use the fact that comprehension occurs more or
less continuously as a reason why they focus on response measures
that are closely time-locked to the input. Yet, if pressed to answer
the question of why comprehension is so incremental, they would
likely appeal to the fact that memory capacity is limited. But,
working memory constraints do not explain why processing is as
relentlessly continuous as it is. In fact, the early theories of lan-
guage comprehension, which were largely driven by working-
memory assumptions, assumed that comprehension was a catch-
up game, with many delays so that listeners could avoid making
premature commitments. However, incremental processing is
necessary for efficient use of feedback from an interlocutor.
In confronting the challenges involved in integrating compre-
hension and production, as well as speech recognition, intention
recognition, and utterance planning, psycholinguists will be re-
quired to go beyond the boxes and arrows and consider more de-
tailed models of what needs to be computed. Here, the study of di-
alogue provides a useful paradigm by allowing psycholinguists and
computational linguists to study and model these processes in rel-
atively constrained domains where it is possible to be explicit about
the relevant components of the system and how they interact.
We believe that when P&G consider the problem of dialogue
from this perspective, they will need to rethink two assumptions
that guide their approach. The first is that interlocutors do not
need to take into account differences between speaker and hearer
knowledge and perspectives, except for repair strategies. We
agree that many aspects of language use can be egocentric, though
we think that P&G overstate the case, mistaking evidence that
common ground does not fully constrain referential domains, with
evidence for the stronger claim that it is ignored in initial pro-
cessing (cf. Hanna et al. 2003). Moreover, natural language is rife
with constructions that depend crucially on differences between
assumed speaker and hearer knowledge. To take a simple exam-
ple, the declarative question “You used the Phillips tool?” can be
uttered only when the speaker believes the addressee is commit-
ted to the presupposed assertion that is being questioned (Gun-
logson 2003). If the addressee had in fact used the tool, she might
respond with an explanation; if she had not, she would need to
contradict the presupposed commitment by saying something like
“No, of course not, I. . . .”
These kinds of phenomena will emerge as psycholinguists con-
sider richer dialogue situations in which the participants have rea-
sons to make choices between alternative forms of utterances, and
more complex interactions where it is important for interlocutors
to track each other’s attention and intentions. Finally, note that
both intention and attention, which are crucial components of
monitoring an interlocutor, do not necessarily appeal to high-level,
resource-demanding processes. Eye gaze, for example, is a pow-
erful source of information about attention. Moreover, the aspect
of an interlocutor’s knowledge that has to be monitored can often
be circumscribed by goal structures. Cast in this light, perspective
monitoring can be seen as one of the basic components of com-
munication, rather than a special purpose, resource-intensive, re-
vision process. In many of the examples that P&G focus on, the
goal structures are completely defined by the task and the choice
of utterances is limited. Under these conditions, it is easy to view
alignment and priming as the primary mechanisms of dialogue,
rather than as interesting phenomena that can be used to provide
insight into the representations and processes underlying interac-
tive conversation.
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NOTE
1. We use the word “thee” to indicate a disfluent pronunciation of the
word “the” (and not in the old English usage as a pronoun).
A call for more dialogue and more details
J. Cooper Cutting
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod (P&G) argue that contemporary models of
language use are inadequate. This has resulted largely because of an ex-
perimental focus on monologue rather than dialogue. I agree with the
need for increased experimentation that focuses on the interplay between
production and comprehension. However, I have some concerns about the
Interactive Alignment model that the authors propose.
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) make an excellent argument for the
need to increase the study of the interplay between production
and comprehension in mainstream psycholinguistic research. His-
torically, most research on language has treated the processes of
comprehension and production as largely independent systems.
This separation may reflect the different starting points of the two
processes. Input for comprehension is easy to manipulate and
control experimentally. Input for production is thought, some-
thing that is much harder to control experimentally (Bock 1996).
As a result, language comprehension research has a long history
relative to that of language production research. Furthermore,
theories of comprehension are rarely informed by research on
production, and vice versa; however, the two processes are clearly
intertwined. A complete model of language use needs to consider
how production and comprehension processes work in conjunc-
tion. The Interactive Alignment model is explicitly designed to do
just that. Rather than focus on how we process language as a
monologue, as most mainstream psycholinguistic research does,
the model focuses on the processes involved in dialogue between
two (or more) language users.
Although I support the idea that much more research focusing
on the interplay of production and comprehension is needed, I be-
lieve that the Interactive Alignment model that the authors pro-
pose is underspecified in several important respects.
1. What is alignment? The central feature of the model is the
alignment of multiple levels of linguistic representations between
interlocutors. This is achieved via “channels of alignment” through
which “the activation of a representation in one interlocutor leads
to the activation of the matching representation in the other in-
terlocutor directly” (sect. 3.2, para. 2; my emphasis). In P&G’s Fig-
ure 2, these channels are depicted as bidirectional links between
representations within both dialogue participants. Although it is
easy to imagine direct links between representations within a per-
son (see the parity assumption below), it is much more difficult to
determine what these “direct” links between different individuals
correspond to. The authors propose that the mechanism of align-
ment is a “primitive and resource-free priming mechanism” both
within and between levels of representation. Although this may be
different from strict serial models of language use, it seems to be
a feature of existing interactive models of language use (for recent
reviews, see Dell et al. 1999; Pickering et al. 2000). Within these
models, the impact of recent use (of representations) in dialogue
could be modeled with residual activation of representations from
earlier parts of the conversation. However, this priming mecha-
nism does not seem to be very “direct” but is instead indirect.
2. Is all priming alike? The authors suggest that alignment of
multiple levels of representation (including phonological, syntac-
tic, lexical, semantic, and situational) is achieved by priming. How-
ever, “priming” phenomena in language may not all share the same
underlying mechanisms. For example, Bock and Griffin (2000)
have suggested that syntactic persistence is a reflection of learn-
ing rather than spreading of activation. It is unclear how the in-
teractive alignment model distinguishes between activation-based
and learning-based priming mechanisms.
3. Parity of representations. The authors propose that there is
parity between the representation used by production and that
used by comprehension. In other words, although production and
comprehension processes may be different, they share the same
set of linguistic representations. However, the issue of shared ver-
sus distinct representations needs to be considered for each level
of representation (e.g., Balota 1990; Caramazza 1991; Levelt
1989). For example, Cutting (1998) used a word-picture priming
technique in which two words were presented in the prime trial.
The participant produced one word while the other was ignored.
Cutting found that both produced and ignored semantically re-
lated prime words interfered with picture naming. However, only
produced phonologically related primes influenced picture nam-
ing; ignored phonologically related primes had no effect. Cutting
interpreted this pattern of results as support for a model in which
semantic representations are shared by production and compre-
hension whereas phonological representations are separate. The
authors refer to Hommel et al.’s (2001) Theory of Event Coding
(TEC) as a model for language representations. Interestingly,
Hommel et al.’s proposal also states that TEC is most appropriate
for abstract distal coding. In other words, because phonological
representations are the linguistic representations “nearest” to the
sensory code and muscular innervation patterns, it should not be
surprising that they are different for production and comprehen-
sion (cf. Martin et al. 1999; Zwitserlood 1994).
4. Routinized language. The authors propose that interlocu-
tors use routines which are developed “on the fly” during dialogue
(similar to idioms like “kick the bucket”). These routines result
from the processes of alignment in dialogue. As speakers and lis-
teners use particular lexical, semantic, and syntactic representa-
tions, some of these representations become bound into routines.
The use of these routines may allow a speaker to “bypass” some of
the early stages of processing assumed by traditional models of
language production (e.g., Bock & Levelt 1994; Levelt 1989; Lev-
elt et al. 1999). However, the process of routinization in the inter-
active alignment account is underdeveloped. It is unclear how
these representations are bound (concurrent activation, learned
connections, etc.), how they are represented (in either the short-
term or the long-term; Cutting & Bock 1997), or how they actu-
ally “bypass” stages of language production (i.e., do routines by-
pass stages or just grease the wheels a bit?). Without further
specification of these issues it is difficult to evaluate the model’s
predictions.
In conclusion, the interactive alignment model as currently pro-
posed is underspecified with respect to how processes of align-
ment, priming, and routines work. As currently stated, it is diffi-
cult to determine specific testable predictions that would
distinguish this model from currently available models of produc-
tion and comprehension. However, the point of taking a dialogue
perspective to these models (and the creation of new ones) is an
excellent one. Although there is no shortage of monologue use of
language (television, radio, print, lecture, etc.), clearly dialogue
should be a central aspect of research. It is time to tear down some
of the historically designed barriers between models of language
comprehension and production and examine what impact a dia-
logue perspective has on these models.
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Situation alignment and routinization in
language acquisition
Peter F. Dominey
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod (P&G) describe a mechanism by which the
situation models of dialog participants become progressively aligned via
priming at different levels. This commentary attempts to characterize how
alignment and routinization can be extended into the language acquisition
domain by establishing links between alignment and joint attention, and
between routinization and grammatical construction learning.
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) describe a mechanism by which the
situation models of dialogue participants become progressively
aligned via priming at different levels, including lexical, syntactic,
semantic, and situational representations. An essential interest
and novelty of this approach is that, instead of requiring a complex
and effortful mechanism for explicitly constructing a common
ground, it offers a rather straightforward mechanism that operates
largely automatically via priming.
It is of potential interest that this type of alignment can be seen
to be useful in other communicative contexts besides dialogue.
Two such contexts can be considered, both of which extend the
situation alignment mechanism into the domain of language ac-
quisition. The first concerns the alignment of situation models in
which one of the interlocutors is in a prelingual, acquisition phase.
This emphasizes the suggestion that alignment can take place via
nonverbal influences. Second, in the current formulation, the
process of alignment and the formation of routines takes place on
the time scale of single dialogues; however, these mechanisms can
also be considered to span time frames that greatly exceed a sin-
gle dialogue, particularly in the case of familiar repeated situations
(feeding, bathing, playing), yielding “virtual dialogues” that can
span a time period of several months. In such a situation, we can
consider the formation of routines in the context of language ac-
quisition to be analogous to the development of grammatical con-
structions.
Language acquisition can be functionally defined as the process
of establishing the relation between sentences/discourses and
their meanings. A significant part of this problem concerns the is-
sue that before these relations can be established, the speaker and
listener should be aligned with respect to the target meaning. If
the meaning for the target utterance is not established both for the
speaker and the listener, then construction of the mapping from
utterance to meaning is indeterminate. This suggests the required
existence of extra- or prelinguistic alignment mechanisms. Inter-
estingly, there is indeed a significant body of research indicating
that by six months of age, human infants achieve prelinguistic sit-
uation alignment by exploiting joint attention cues (e.g., gaze di-
rection, postural orientation) in order to identify intended refer-
ents (e.g., Morales et al. 2000; Tomasello 2003). This indicates that
P&G’s Figure 2 could be modified to include nonlinguistic inputs
at the semantic and situation model levels. Such a modification
will allow both the “alignment bootstrapping” in which initial sit-
uation model alignment will play a crucial role in language acqui-
sition as well as the influence of extralinguistic inputs in adult
alignment contexts.
In a related extension of the alignment model into the acquisi-
tion domain, we can consider the relation between the develop-
ment of production and comprehension routines in the time
frame of a single dialogue and the development of grammatical
constructions in the time frame of the first years of language ac-
quisition. As specified by P&G, the creation of routines requires
a coherent context in which the routines are applicable, and so,
stretching this time frame to the scale of months and years is a
non-negligible issue. Interestingly, Tomasello (2003) notes that
repetitive events such as feeding, bathing, playing, and so on are
relatively similar from episode to episode, and thus provide ap-
propriate contexts that coherently span significant time periods.
Given a temporally extended “virtual dialogue” domain, we can
consider the development of routines as facilitatory not only
within the context of a single dialogue but also in the more fun-
damental role of the development of communicative conventions
that span significant time periods, thus forming the basis for lan-
guage acquisition. In this context, routines take on the alternative
identity of grammatical constructions (see Goldberg 1995), with
all of their processing advantages. In particular, as described by
P&G, the use of routines significantly eliminates the need for syn-
tactic derivation of the appropriate grammatical structural forms,
both for production and comprehension. When this approach is
applied at the acquisition time scale, it is remarkably similar to the
usage-based developmental approach to language acquisition ad-
vocated by Tomasello (2003).
In this framework, relatively fixed grammatical forms are linked
to their corresponding meanings in the context of repetitive events
(e.g., feeding, playing, etc.). These constructions/routines are
then progressively opened to allow generalization within a given
construction (e.g., variable replacement) to form new instances,
and subsequent generalization to new constructions. Again, in
both P&G’s dialogue context and Tomasello’s development con-
text, highly functional communicative form-meaning construc-
tions/routines are developed without reliance on a heavy initial in-
vestment in generative syntactic capabilities.
I have recently performed a series of simulation (Dominey
2000) and robotic (Dominey 2003a; 2003b) experiments to deter-
mine the feasibility of this type of approach to language acquisi-
tion in a restricted context. The underlying assumptions in the
model are (1) that grammatical constructions correspond to the
learned mapping between a given sentence type and its corre-
sponding meaning frame (see Goldberg 1995), and (2) that gram-
matical constructions are uniquely identified by a limited set of
cues that include word order and grammatical morphology in-
cluding free and bound morphemes (Bates & MacWhinney 1987).
The model is provided with 〈sentence, meaning〉 pairs as input
and should learn the Word-to-Referent and Sentence-to-Meaning
mappings. For the current discussion, we assume that a limited set
of concrete, open-class elements have been learned and will con-
sider how this knowledge allows the learning of simple grammat-
ical constructions. When a (sentence, meaning) pair is presented,
the configuration of closed-class (function) elements is extracted
and used as an index to “look up” the corresponding construction
(routine) in the construction inventory. The construction corre-
sponds to the learned mapping of open-class element positions in
the sentence onto their thematic and event roles in the meaning
representation. If there is no entry in the construction inventory
(i.e., the current sentence type has never been previously en-
countered), then the construction is built on the fly by matching
the referents for the open-class words with their respective roles
in the meaning representation. The construction is then stored for
future use. The developmental aspects of this learning are pre-
sented in more detail in Dominey (2000).
Thus, similar to P&G’s routines, constructions are built by pair-
ing the grammatical form with the aligned meaning (situation)
representation. The interesting suggestion is that, at least to a cer-
tain degree, P&G’s proposed situation alignment and routine con-
struction capabilities provide a mechanism for language acquisi-
tion (at least the learning of fixed grammatical constructions that
can generalize to new instances of the same constructions) which
avoids the enlistment of generative grammar mechanisms. If a sit-
uation alignment priming mechanism could be demonstrated to
perform in both the dialogue and acquisition time scales, this
would be evidence for an ingenious economy of functional mech-
anisms for language processing in the context of dialogue.
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Production-comprehension asymmetries
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) mechanistic theory of dialogue is
a major advance for psycholinguistics. But the commitment to represen-
tational parity in production and comprehension is problematic. Recent
research suggests that speakers frequently produce a structure that listen-
ers find ungrammatical and have trouble understanding. If the grammars
of the two systems are different, then the assumption of representational
parity must be relaxed.
The field of psycholinguistics has needed precisely what Picker-
ing & Garrod (P&G) provide: a mechanistic theory of dialogue.
P&G’s core idea is that priming is more than just a tool cognitive
psychologists use to learn about the structure or processing char-
acteristics of some cognitive system; in dialogue, priming is itself
a mechanism for producing alignment between interlocutors, and
from it ultimately emerges the common ground that is critical for
successful communication. But their views seem to commit them
to the idea that the production and comprehension systems use
the same representations, and this is one problematic aspect of
their approach.
If the same representations are used for comprehension and
production, speakers should not make use of a syntactic construc-
tion that comprehenders find unacceptable and hard to under-
stand. Yet recent work from our laboratory demonstrates that they
do (Ferreira & Swets 2003). We invented a paradigm for eliciting
sentences such as “This is a dog that I don’t know what it eats,”
which is ungrammatical in English. In the experiments, people
first see a picture of a cat (for example) combined with a short ver-
bal label such as “eats fish.” Then they see a picture of another cat
with a minimally different label – “eats chicken,” for example. The
next picture in the series consists of a cat and a question mark in
the same spot where the labels occurred in the other examples.
About 70% to 75% of the time, speakers will describe this third
picture with a sentence containing a relative clause that violates
island constraints (Chomsky 1973) and a resumptive pronoun in
place of the illegal trace (Creswell 2002). (Henceforth we refer to
these as IRPs: Island Resumptive Pronoun sentences.) This ex-
periment, then, provided evidence that speakers can reliably be
induced to produce a structure that is ungrammatical. But per-
haps this result is not surprising, as such sentences occur fairly of-
ten in natural situations (Prince 1990).
More interesting were the results from a follow-up study in
which speakers performed the same task but under time pressure.
Some views of the IRP structure assume that these forms result
from a failure to plan adequately. The idea is that speakers paint
themselves into a syntactic corner and at the last moment try to
salvage the utterance by inserting the resumptive pronoun. Yet,
we observed that this form was no more likely to occur when
speakers were under time pressure, and alternate, more accept-
able forms were actually more frequent (e.g., “This is a dog and I
don’t know what it eats,” or “This dog, I don’t know what it eats”).
It appears, then, that the production system plans this form and
considers it part of its expressive repertoire. After all, the mean-
ing that the utterance attempts to convey is not rare, and the IRP
form is really the only way to verbalize it succinctly (neither of the
paraphrases provided here as examples of alternate forms are as
semantically accurate).
Now, the interesting question is: How does the comprehension
system feel about these same structures? We knew from the start
that they are generally viewed as ungrammatical (McDaniel &
Cowart 1999). But, to be certain, we gave our listener-subjects
written versions of the sentences that the subjects from the pro-
duction experiments had uttered. Because this form is generally
encountered only in spoken language and therefore is perhaps
more easily processed with appropriate prosody, we conducted an
auditory version of the same grammaticality judgment task. We
obtained the same results. We were not shocked at these findings,
though, because our speaker-subjects often giggled nervously af-
ter producing IRPs, betraying their awareness that the utterances
were off in some way. We then conducted two more comprehen-
sion studies, one showing that comprehenders do not answer
questions about IRPs as accurately as questions about matched
controls (e.g., “This is a dog that doesn’t know what it eats”), and
the other demonstrating that IRPs elicited more regressive eye
movements, launched from the clause containing the resumptive
pronoun and aimed at the head noun of the relative clause.
It appears that the production system makes reliable use of a
structure that the comprehension system views as ungrammatical
and has a hard time understanding. We believe these results sug-
gest a disconnect between the two systems. Now, P&G might re-
spond that this asymmetry could be because of processing differ-
ences rather than representational nonparity. There are three
problems with this argument. First, P&G invoked parity to explain
how interlocutors are able to complete each other’s utterances;
but certainly, if there are forms that only one system likes, then
these predictive feats will not be possible. Second, it is hard to
imagine that hearing an IRP sentence could prime a speaker to
produce one, given that the interpretive system balks at the form.
And third, and most important, the syntactic representations used
by the two systems appear to be nonoverlapping: The IRP form is
part of the grammar that the production system uses, but it is not
available to the comprehension system.
The authors might respond that these studies were obtained in
production and comprehension experiments conducted entirely
independently. Perhaps if these structures occurred as part of an
interactive dialogue, they would either fail to emerge (which is un-
likely, given that they are attested in natural conversations) or they
would be treated as licit and understood by listeners. This tack is
not unreasonable, but it does make me uncomfortable and it
should make the authors a bit nervous as well. For if we accept this
line of argument, then all of the findings from basic psycholin-
guistic experiments that have been done in monologue situations
are suspect. Moreover, this response would undermine the au-
thors’ fundamental goal, which is to provide a mechanistic theory
of dialogue – a theory that is informed by decades of systematic
research which has isolated the mechanisms of language process-
ing through experiments that could only be done in monologue
contexts. As a result, the authors’ theory would become less at-
tractive, because one major reason for its appeal is that it brings
together two important traditions in linguistics. Better to question
the assumption of representational parity than to cast doubt on
three decades of significant results, many of which critically in-
formed the authors’ approach.
Visual copresence and conversational
coordination
Susan R. Fussell and Robert E. Kraut
Human-Computer Interaction Institute, Carnegie Mellon University,
Pittsburgh, PA 15213. susan.fussell@cmu.edu robert.kraut@cmu.edu
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) theory of dialogue production
cannot completely explain recent data showing that when interactants in
referential communication tasks have different views of a physical space,
they accommodate their language to their partner’s view rather than mim-
icking their partner’s expressions. Instead, these data are consistent with
the hypothesis that interactants are taking the perspective of their con-
versational partners.
We applaud Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) attempt to explain one
of the most basic features of human language – its dialogue struc-
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ture. They provide a thought-provoking theory of dialogue in
which coordination in message production occurs when interac-
tants generate their messages from similar situation models and
mimic their partner’s production at the syntactic, semantic, lexi-
cal, phonological, and phonetic levels, based on primitive priming
mechanisms. They argue that these alignment processes plus
techniques for repairing misalignments are sufficient to explain
most cases of what others have considered evidence of a deeper
type of perspective-taking, in which speakers take their partners’
mental states into account in forming their own speech.
We believe, however, that P&G’s theory cannot completely ex-
plain recent data about language production. In our own work, for
example, we find evidence across several experiments that when
interactants in referential communication tasks have different
views of a physical space, they accommodate their language to
their partner’s view rather than mimicking their partner’s expres-
sions (e.g., Fussell et al. 2000; 2003; Kraut et al. 2002; 2003).
These data are consistent with the hypothesis that interactants are
taking the perspective of their conversational partners.
Consider, for example, the case of deictic reference in a bicycle
repair task (Kraut et al. 2003). In this task, one person (the
“worker”) performs a series of repair tasks under the guidance of
a second person (the “helper”). The helper is located either be-
side the worker, where both can see and interact with the work
area, or in a separate room connected only by an audio link. In a
third condition, they are connected by an audio/video link through
which the helper can see what the worker is doing but cannot in-
teract with the work area. The conversations typically consist of
helper’s instructions followed by worker’s actions, questions, or ac-
knowledgments of understanding. Interactants can refer to task
objects and locations with either extended linguistic expressions
(e.g., “take the long dangling piece and put it in where the two
large screws are”) or shorter deictic references (e.g., “take this
piece and put it there”).
As Figure 1 shows, the ways in which workers refer to parts,
tools, and other task objects depend on their partners’ ability to
see the work area. In the side-by-side condition, both helpers and
workers can view one another and task objects, and both use a
large number of deictic expressions. In the audio-only condition,
the remote helpers cannot see the work space, and neither work-
ers nor helpers use deictic expressions. The interesting case, from
an alignment point of view, is the video condition. Here, the
helpers can see the workers and work space but cannot point to
objects in it. Under these conditions, helpers rarely use deixis.
However, workers can point to task objects and they know that
helpers can see them do so through the video link. They use deixis
instead of matching the helpers’ nondeictic expressions. If con-
versational alignment were driven by primitive priming mecha-
nisms, then the workers should use nondeictic references in the
video condition, after hearing helpers’ uttering many of these ex-
pressions. (Because the helper could not be seen, he or she would
have no way of using deictic expressions to match the worker’s ut-
terances.) In short, the way workers referred to task objects and
locations depended upon what their partners could see, not the
language their partners previously used to refer to these same ob-
jects and locations.
We believe these results demonstrate that one type of deep
common ground – visual copresence – is assessed during message
production, at least for lexical selection processes. Indeed, in ex-
periments where the views can change, interactants often explic-
itly exchange information about what each can see, with phrases
such as: “Can you see the table?” (Kraut et al. 2002; 2003).
P&G might argue that video-mediated communication is a
nonprototypical dialogue setting and hence may elicit special
processes of assessing deep common ground. Note, however, that
the audio-only discourse from Garrod and Anderson’s (1987)
maze study is similarly nonprototypical. Rather than demonstrat-
ing that people in face-to-face dialogues use processes of verbal
alignment in lieu of deeper considerations of common ground,
Garrod and Anderson’s results may indicate that people verbally
align primarily when the context has been stripped of all other in-
dicators of common ground.
In their discussion of deep common ground versus automatic
alignment, P&G in essence take a straw-man approach to de-
scribing the processes involved in conversational grounding. As
Clark and Marshall (1981) have discussed, common ground can
be determined using heuristics based on community comember-
ship, linguistic copresence, and physical copresence. Some calcu-
lations of common ground (e.g., a helper trying to determine
whether a worker on the bicycle task knows what a derailleur is)
may be difficult; others (e.g., a worker trying to determine
whether the helper can see the work space) may be relatively easy.
Ruling out deep common ground as a fundamental process in di-
alogue production would require a series of carefully controlled
studies that have not been performed to date. P&G’s article is
valuable for the detail with which it specifies an alternative model
that would need to be included in such experiments.
We conclude by observing that calculations of deep common
ground are essential for determining when to speak and what to
say. For example, in the bicycle repair studies, in the audio condi-
tion, when the helpers cannot see them, workers describe what
they are doing. Helpers rely on these verbal reports to determine
when to provide new instructions or clarify preceding ones. In the
video and side-by-side conditions, workers do not bother describ-
ing what they are doing because they know that the helpers are
watching their activities. If common ground is available to com-
municators for these processes of message timing and content, it
should not require much additional effort for them to incorporate
it into the messages themselves.
Intrinsic misalignment in dialogue: Why there
is no unique context in a conversation
Jonathan Ginzburg
Dept of Computer Science, King’s College London, London WC2R 2LS,
United Kingdom. ginzburg@dcs.kcl.ac.uk
http://www.dcs.kcl.ac.uk/staff/ginzburg
Abstract: Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) claim that conversationalists do
not explicitly keep track of their interlocuters’ information states is im-
portant. Nonetheless, via alignment, they seem to create a virtually sym-
metrical view of the information states of speaker and addressee – a key
component of their accounts of collaborative utterances and of self-mon-
itoring. As I show, there is significant evidence for intrinsic contextual mis-
alignment between conversationalists that can persist across turns.
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Figure 1 (Fussell & Kraut). Percentage of references to task ob-
jects containing verbal deixis, by media condition and participant
role (from Kraut et al. 2003).
I am very sympathetic with Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) cen-
tral message: namely, that there is a need to develop a detailed,
computationally oriented account of the mechanisms underlying
language use in dialogue, and moreover, that these – not mech-
anisms developed for monologue – should be regarded as the
primary mechanisms of the language faculty.1 On a more tech-
nical front, I think that a key claim of the authors, that dialogue
participants do not explicitly keep track of their interlocuters’ in-
formation states, but rather, that this is emergent from the dy-
namic alignment of each other’s information states, is an impor-
tant one.
Nonetheless, in seeking intrinsically to couple dialogue partici-
pants via alignment, they seem to create a virtually symmetrical
view of the information states of speaker and addressee. Thus, a
key component of P&G’s accounts of collaborative utterances as
well of self-monitoring is the claim that who is speaking at a given
point does not, in some sense, make a difference given alignment:
The addressee can take over or the speaker can “change voice” and
self-correct. As I show in this commentary, this claim is incorrect:
There is significant evidence that the contexts available to the con-
versationalists are not identical. Hence, there is actually intrinsic
contextual misalignment between conversationalists that can per-
sist across turns.
That a common context (cf. the common ground prominent in
work by Clark & Marshall 1981; Lewis 1979; Stalnaker 1978)
emerges in dialogue is an important insight. It yields a better pic-
ture of, for instance, querying, than classical speech-act views pro-
vide (Searle 1969). So in asking a question, to take one example, a
speaker puts up a question for discussion and whoever takes over
the turn can address it – either the original asker or the original
addressee:
1. A: Whom should we invite to the conference?
A or B: Would Phil be a good idea?
And yet, the actual situation is not as symmetrical as this: The
speaker’s options for self-repair or, indeed, other follow-up are
quite distinct from the addressee’s options. This can be illustrated
succinctly by a phenomenon I have dubbed the Turn Taking Puz-
zle (Ginzburg 1997a; 1997b). Questions of the form “Why?” in-
volve radical context dependence – pre-theoretically, the context
supplies a propositional referent of some kind (Moore 1995). In-
terestingly, examples 2a and 2b (below) show that the resolution
accorded to the bare “why” changes according to who keeps or
takes over the turn. The resolution that can be associated with
“Why?” if A keeps the turn is unavailable to B if he or she had
taken over, and vice versa:
2a. A: Which members of our team own a parakeet?
2a. A: Why? ( Why own a parakeet?)
2b. A: Which members of our team own a parakeet?
2b. B: Why? ( Why are you asking which members of our
team own a parakeet?)
2c. Which members of our team own a parakeet? Why am I
asking this question?
Example 2c shows that these facts cannot be reduced to coher-
ence or plausibility – the resolution unavailable to A in example
2a yields a coherent follow-up to A’s initial query if it is expressed
by means of a nonelliptical form. In other words, the context is re-
sponsible for these interpretational asymmetries or, rather, they
are a consequence of the fact that distinct contexts are associated
with the conversationalists.
Similarly, a common strategy for requesting a clarification is by
means of a reprise fragment – a word or constituent of the previ-
ous utterance (see Purver et al. 2002; 2003 for corpus and exper-
imental evidence on clarification requests, particularly reprise
fragments). Reprise fragments have two prominent understand-
ings (Ginzburg & Cooper 2004), exemplified in 3a (below). How-
ever, it is quite strange for a speaker to follow up her utterance
with a reprise fragment. This becomes felicitous only if followed
up by an additional correction, such as “Wait, did I say Bo, no I
mean Lou,” or some such. However, even then the readings that
arise in example 3a, whose resolution is radically context-depen-
dent, are not manifested:
3a. A: Did Bo leave?
3a. B: Bo? ( Either: Are you asking if BO of all people left?
Or: Who were you referring to as “Bo”?)
3b. A: Did Bo leave?
3b. A: #Bo?2
It is worth noting that contextual asymmetries of this kind can
persist for quite a number of turns – essentially as long as a given
discourse topic remains under discussion. Example 4 is an extract
from the British National Corpus in which Chris’s “Why?” is nat-
urally understood to refer to Norrine’s utterance five turns back,
an utterance which seems to be viewed as grounded (Clark 1996):
4. Norrine (1): When is the barbecue, the twentieth? (pause)
Something of June.
Chris (2): Thirtieth.
Norrine (3): A Sunday.
Chris (4): Sunday.
Norrine (5): Mm.
Chris (6): Why? ( Why do you ask when is the barbecue?)
Norrine (7): Because I forgot (pause) That was the day I was
thinking of having a proper lunch party but I won’t do it if
you’re going out.
Note that the resolution associated with Chris’s “Why?” is simply
unavailable to Norrine at all subsequent points, as illustrated in
the constructed variant of statement (4) in example 5a. As with
previous examples, this cannot be explained on “pragmatic”
grounds because the speaker can fairly coherently express the req-
uisite reading in nonelliptical fashion, as in example 5b:
5a. Norrine (1): When is the barbecue, the twentieth? (pause)
Something of June.
5a. Chris (2): Thirtieth.
5a. Norrine (3): A Sunday.
5a. Chris (4): Sunday.
5a. Norrine (5): # Why? (Cannot mean: Why is Norrine asking
when is the barbecue?)
5b. Norrine (5): Mm. Why am I asking? Can you guess?
5a. Chris (6): No idea.
Phenomena such as this suggest that the different roles con-
versationalists play with respect to a given utterance (speaker vs.
addressee) are not something that gets neutralized in the utter-
ance’s aftermath. The contextual possibilities available for one
conversationalist differ from those of the other conversationalist
(I am referring to dialogue here; as P&G point out, multilogue is
a genre with various distinct properties from two-person dia-
logue). In other words, a single context is not fully adequate to de-
scribe dialogue, even when talking about “public” context, which
results from overtly registered conversational actions. Instead,
one needs to view dialogue as involving updates by each conver-
sationalist of some type of a publicly accessible domain which is
relative to each conversationalist and so is parametrizable by un-
publicized factors such as individual goals and intentions (cf.
Hamblin’s individual commitment slate, Hamblin 1970). The
framework named KOS spells out this view and develops theoret-
ical accounts as well as computational implementations of illocu-
tionary and metacommunicative acts, including a detailed account
of puzzles such as the Turn Taking Puzzles exemplified above (cf.
Cooper et al. 2000; Ginzburg 1996; 2002; forthcoming; Larsson
2002).
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NOTES
1. The authors point out the dearth of work in mechanistic psychology
and theoretical linguistics (primarily by syntacticians) on dialogue. Since
the late 1990s, however, there has been work by formal and computational
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semanticists precisely on developing theories of information states and
their dynamics in dialogue – see, for example, work within the EU TRINDI
project (Consortium 2000) and the annual SEMDIAL series of conferences
on the semantics and pragmatics of dialogue. Links to all previous confer-
ences, starting in 1997, in Munich, are available from: http://cswww.essex.
ac.uk/semdial/
2. The # symbol is used here, as standard in linguistics, to mark an in-
felicitous utterance.
Dialogue: Can two be cheaper than one?
Sam Glucksberg
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod (P&G) argue that language processing in
dialogue is in principle easier than in monologue. Although dialogue situ-
ations may provide more opportunities for facilitative priming, those prim-
ing mechanisms are also available in monologue situations. In both cases,
the interactive alignment model calls strict modular accounts of language
processing into serious question.
Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) argument for the primacy of dia-
logue is a refreshing alternative to the isolated sentence as the unit
of analysis in psycholinguistics. Others, such as Krauss, Clark, and
their students and colleagues, have made similar arguments (cf.
Clark 1996; Fussell & Krauss 1992), but none have made the ad-
ditional argument that much of dialogue production and compre-
hension is automatic, requiring minimal cognitive or linguistic re-
sources. The details of the priming processes have yet to be
worked out in detail, but P&G provide enough empirical evidence
to warrant optimism about an eventual fleshing out of their inter-
active alignment proposal. Beyond such details, their account has
several intriguing implications, not the least of which is the claim
that language production and comprehension are easier in inter-
active dialogue than in monologue. This flies in the face of the con-
sensus that dialogue requires complex inferences about the men-
tal state of one’s interlocutor that are not required when one is,
say, talking to oneself, or processing utterances under monologue
conditions.
Is language processing in dialogues inevitably easier (more flu-
ent, requires less processing, etc.) than in monologues? I do not
think this question can be answered unequivocally. I can think of
contexts in which dialogue language production would be quite
difficult and contexts in which monologue production would be
quite easy. An example of the former might be trying to hold a con-
versation with a sullen teenaged son or daughter on the merits of
atonal music. Examples of the latter might include the think-aloud
paradigm used in research on reasoning and problem-solving, or
young children talking to themselves or to their dolls when no one
else is around. So, as usual, the answer is: It depends.
A more useful question addresses the ways in which dialogue
might be more likely than monologue to facilitate language pro-
cessing. Such ways might in principle be available only in dia-
logue. Alternatively, it might just be a matter of likelihood, rather
than a principled difference between monologue and dialogue.
Consider the stages of speech production that could be facilitated
in monologues and in dialogues. Following Levelt (1989), pro-
duction could be facilitated at any or all of the following stages:
the message (what to talk about); grammatical encoding (syntac-
tic representation and lexical access); phonological encoding; and
articulation. One of the more obvious ways to facilitate speech
production is to provide something to talk about. In dialogue, the
situation (including one’s interlocutor) usually provides this, but
of course there are (sometimes painful) situations where one does
not know what to talk about next. In monologue, including the
occasional classroom lecture (or a BBS commentary, for that mat-
ter), one can be at a loss as to what to say or write, but this is not
a principled characteristic of monologues, just an unfortunate oc-
casional one.
Grammatical and phonological encoding, on the other hand,
may well be advantaged in dialogue via the mechanisms of prim-
ing and the opportunities for imitation. P&G make a convincing
argument that such priming not only occurs but may well be au-
tomatic. However, such priming could in principle operate in
monologue as well, although the opportunities are undoubtedly
less likely. In monologue, as in dialogue, opportunities to repeat
specific syntactic forms should facilitate successive productions.
Similarly, opportunities to repeat specific word senses should fa-
cilitate lexical access and sense selection. What’s missing from
monologue, of course, are the contributions of an interlocutor,
which can provide opportunities for imitation, as well as for syn-
tactic, lexical, and phonological priming (but see Ferreira & Grif-
fin 2003 for evidence of potential sources of priming in mono-
logue).
Finally, P&G note that contextual constraints might operate
more efficiently in dialogue than in monologue, but, again, this is
probably not a principled difference. They write “With respect to
lexical ambiguity, we predict that context will have a very strong
role, so that effects of meaning frequency can be overridden”
(sect. 5.4, para. 3). To my knowledge, this prediction has not yet
been tested under dialogue conditions. However, it has been con-
firmed under monologue conditions, most recently by Sereno et
al (2003), who found very early context effects on word recogni-
tion that overrode frequency effects.
To the extent that automatic priming can facilitate language
comprehension and production, dialogue may well afford more
opportunities for such priming than monologue. Nevertheless, the
same mechanisms should be available for both. P&G’s contribu-
tion is thus more profound than the observation that language pro-
cessing in dialogue might be easier than in monologue. Instead,
the contribution is in the insight that there may be mechanisms of
language production and comprehension that can circumvent the
need for costly cognitive processing in interactive conversation.
People may not need to use a theory of mind or make inferences
about common ground and mutual knowledge. They may, instead,
rely on automatic priming both within and between interlocutors
to produce alignment of representations, which, in turn, makes for
successful and relatively effortless speech processing. The theo-
retical implication for theories of language processing is clear: A
strictly modular, bottom-up language processing model simply
will not do the job.
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod (P&G) deserve appreciation for their co-
gent argument that dialogue merits greater scientific consideration. Cur-
rent models make little contact with behaviors of dialogue, motivating the
interactive alignment theory. However, the theory is not truly “mechanis-
tic.” A full account requires both representations and processes bringing
those representations into harmony. We suggest that Grossberg’s (1980)
adaptive resonance theory may naturally conform to the principles of dia-
logue.
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In their target article, Pickering & Garrod (P&G) present a clear
and compelling case: Despite its being the predominate form of
linguistic behavior, dialogue has been unduly ignored. Moreover,
once dialogue is studied, it displays properties of entrainment at
all levels (semantic, syntactic, phonetic, and others), which few
psycholinguistic theories can address. To fill this void, the authors
propose the interactive alignment model, wherein interlocutors
share information at all linguistic levels, quickly arriving at states
near equilibrium, allowing people to communicate with tremen-
dous ease and efficiency. A by-product of alignment is that people
tend to converge in dialogue, using similar expressions, words, and
phrase structures. Beyond such linguistic constructs, interlocutors
also tend to converge in their manner of speaking and even their
physical postures (Capella 1981; Giles et al. 1991; Newtson 1994;
Shockley et al. 2003).
The interactive alignment model is advanced to explain these
coupling dynamics, using standard priming mechanisms. This ap-
proach is representation-driven, wherein one person’s utterances
prime ideas, words, and syntactic structures in his or her inter-
locutor. Mutual priming persists as a loosely coupled feedback
loop (Van Gelder & Port 1995), so the same forms tend to occur
repeatedly in conversation. At a general level, we believe this idea
must be correct. However, the proffered model is underspecified,
stated without explicit processes that act on the activated repre-
sentations. Thus, the model nicely characterizes the problem
space for a psychology of dialogue, but leaves many open ques-
tions. For example, how does the priming of extant representa-
tions predict new entities, such as routines, new jargon, or mo-
mentary changes in articulatory habit? How does speech
perception lead to cascaded priming across linguistic levels? In
short, what are the processes that explain the emergence of new
psychological structures when people engage in dialogue?
In both language perception and production, models based on
interactive activation have enjoyed great success (e.g., Dell 1986;
Gaskell & Marslen-Wilson 1997; Levelt et al. 1999; McClelland &
Elman 1986; McClelland et al. 1989). However, as P&G observe,
these are all monologue models. Moreover, all generally assume
fixed networks of nodes and connections, with weighting schemes
that develop over extensive periods of training. Given their archi-
tecture, it is difficult to imagine how such models could commu-
nicate at multiple “levels,” as suggested in Figure 2 of the target
article. Of greater importance is that the core processes of inter-
active activation are not amenable to rapid transformation of rep-
resentations or combinatorial rules. If one interlocutor can rapidly
change another’s internal weights, people would be subject to
“catastrophic unlearning” of language.
As an alternative approach, we believe that interactive align-
ment may naturally “fall out” of processing in Grossberg’s adap-
tive resonance theory (ART; Grossberg 1980; 1999; Grossberg &
Myers 2000; Grossberg & Stone 1986; Grossberg et al. 1997; Vite-
vitch & Luce 1999). In speech perception, a basic hypothesis of
ART is that conscious percepts are emergent products of resonant
brain states. This is an interdependent system: Perception occurs
when bottom-up and top-down knowledge sources bind into sta-
ble states. Processing begins when feature input activates items
(feature clusters) in working memory. Items, in turn, activate list
chunks in memory. Chunks are products of prior learning (per-
haps prototypes) corresponding to feature combinations, such as
phonemes, words, or common expressions.
Once items activate list chunks, a feedback cycle begins. Items
feed activation upward through synaptic connections, and input-
consistent chunks return activation. If items receive sufficient top-
down confirmation, they continue sending activation upward.
Within limits, this feedback loop (a resonance) is self-perpetuat-
ing, binding the respective activation patterns into a coherent
whole. The bottom-up pattern that initiates interactive activation
need not perfectly match its resultant feedback for resonance to
occur. Cooperation between “levels” and competition within “lev-
els” smooth out small mismatches, but large mismatches prohibit
resonance. This stipulation seems necessary for dialogue, as an-
other person’s utterances (even their manner of producing pho-
nemes) may never perfectly match one’s stored representations.
Rather than assuming tiered representations, chunks in ART
are attractor states. Of particular importance is that resonance can
momentarily bind attractors in original combinations, allowing the
creation of new mental structures (Carpenter & Grossberg 1987).
This is the natural basis of communication, wherein novel utter-
ances are constructed from familiar parts. In ART, however, those
“parts” are not relegated to modular levels of representation: Al-
though familiar patterns (e.g., common words) will cohere quickly
in processing, all structures – both familiar and novel – must self-
organize through competitive dynamics. Hence, in a dialogue, dif-
ferent structures, such as nascent jargon or momentary routines,
can naturally emerge, as P&G describe.
As we have argued elsewhere (Goldinger & Azuma, in press),
the self-organizing nature of ART makes it uniquely suited to
model context-sensitive perception, as dialogue seems to require.
For example, when ART recognizes a word spoken by Mary, its
emergent percept will reflect the unique aspects of her utterance,
allowing token-specific encoding (Goldinger 1998). Hence, the
model has a natural basis to engage in dialogue, where context-
specific cognition is pervasive. However, we are not suggesting
that ART can currently explain the wide-ranging behaviors de-
scribed by P&G. ART has successfully simulated many perceptual
and memorial behaviors (among others; see Carpenter & Gross-
berg 1991). However, full sentence processing, even in mono-
logue, remains a serious challenge.
As befits the study of dialogue, we envision a two-way street
with equal benefits to students of dialogue and students of self-or-
ganizing networks. The properties of ART may give substance to
the metaphoric theory described by P&G. By the same token, the
unique challenges of dialogue may force changes in ART: To study
dialogue, it would be ideal to have separate, self-contained ART
simulations that communicate with each other through one or
more channels, working together toward some shared goal (as in
the authors’ maze task). To our knowledge, no such study has ever
been conducted using ART. However, a conceptually similar study
by de Boer (2000) suggests that dialogues between autonomous
models can evoke self-organization. De Boer created speech-per-
ceiving “agents” equipped with articulatory synthesizers, percep-
tual systems that calculated the differences between signals, and
associative memories for storing signals. Each agent was able to
interact with others in an “imitation game.” The agents’ task was
to imitate other agents accurately with a large repertoire of vow-
els; they could update their vowel repertoires based on their in-
teractions. In many simulations, de Boer found that stable vowel
systems consistently self-organized from these simple “dialogues.”
Moreover, these emergent vowel systems were remarkably simi-
lar to those found in human languages. This suggests that self-or-
ganizing structures may partially drive the basic forms of language.
It also suggests that dialogue is a powerful force that should be
studied both empirically and computationally.
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Dialogue in the degenerate case?
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Abstract: The interactive alignment model treats within- and between-in-
dividual co-ordination as essentially equivalent. It is argued that this leads
to a conservative account of alignment that presupposes high levels of lin-
guistic and conceptual co-ordination. Data from the maze task are used to
argue that this approach is not sufficient to account for important co-or-
dination phenomena.
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) bring together a large body of empir-
ical evidence that highlights an important phenomenon. Partici-
pants in dialogue display higher levels of phonological, lexical, syn-
tactic, semantic, and situational co-ordination than is expected
from considering processes of production and comprehension in
isolation. The authors propose that the central mechanism driving
this level of communicative alignment is priming. This is envis-
aged as an automatic, bidirectional process operating in parallel
on several different levels of representation. Importantly, they
suggest that this process operates in essentially the same way both
within and between speakers.
The treatment of dialogue participants as effectively inter-
changeable embodies a strong claim. It presupposes a high degree
of equivalence between the representational systems underpinning
communicative co-ordination. In places this is qualified as equiva-
lent “in all essential respects” or “basically the same.” However, in
cases where priming is the mechanism of alignment, the residual
differences between individual’s representations are irrelevant.
What could underwrite the requisite similarity in mental rep-
resentation? Priming is itself a conservative mechanism that alters
the accessibility but not the form or content of the associated men-
tal representations. For example, the account of co-ordination in
the maze game distinguishes a basic repertoire of situational mod-
els of the maze (figure scheme, path scheme, line scheme, and ma-
trix scheme) and a variety of referring expressions built up from
the lexicon, syntax, and semantics of a fragment of English (Gar-
rod & Anderson 1987). By hypothesis, the same basic repertoire
of mental models and fragment of English are available to both
participants prior to co-ordination. Priming does not change the
repertoire; rather, it promotes alignment by favouring one partic-
ular model and its associated referring expressions.
Interactive alignment predicts that when maze game partici-
pants co-ordinate on a particular description and situational
model, it should become more strongly primed, and they should
stick with it. However, several aspects of the experimental data do
not fit this prediction. Evolution and development of description
schemes are common. As P&G observe, maze game pairs often
develop their own idiosyncratic description schemes. Pairs switch
description schemes frequently; for example, the isolated pairs in
Garrod and Anderson (1987) and the non-community group in
Garrod and Doherty (1994). Moreover, pairs do not reliably co-
ordinate on the scheme that is most highly primed initially. For ex-
ample, in Garrod and Doherty’s (1994) community group, the line
scheme is most frequent initially, but they subsequently co-ordi-
nate on a matrix scheme.
In order to account for phenomena of this kind and to provide
for co-ordination where participants are not effectively inter-
changeable, P&G propose iterative interactive repair as a key ad-
ditional co-ordination mechanism. If a participant cannot find an
interpretation for an utterance, he or she either shifts perspectives
until an interpretation can be found or reformulates. This sugges-
tion is not developed in detail, but it appears P&G envisage this
basic form of repair as a shift between different co-ordination
equilibria in the sense of Lewis (1969).
Data from the maze task suggest that this is inadequate. The re-
sults reported by Garrod and Anderson (1987), Garrod and Do-
herty (1994), and Healey (1997; in preparation) indicate underly-
ing patterns of migration from figure and path schemes to more
abstract line and matrix schemes. In addition, when maze game
pairs have trouble co-ordinating, there is evidence that they show
a reliable preference for shifting to a more basic (figure or path)
scheme. The direction of these shifts is not predicted by frequency
of prior exposure (Healey 1997; in preparation).
These observations show that the choice between different sit-
uational models is not neutral in the way that a co-ordination game
or priming mechanism presumes. It is sensitive to the particular
properties of the different situational models and, presumably,
this relates to their implications for co-ordination. The pattern of
preferences for shifts in description scheme and/or reformula-
tions needs to be accounted for by the co-ordination mechanisms.
P&G aim to provide a model of dialogue co-ordination that
avoids implausible assumptions about interlocutors constructing
elaborate models of each other’s context and mental states. This is
surely right. Explicit negotiation and repair are relatively rare and
do not provide a general account of co-ordination. However, the
mechanisms of the interactive alignment model do not seem to do
the work required.
Ironically, the idealisation of speaker and hearer as inter-
changeable reproduces one of the problems with treating dialogue
as a form of monologue: the implication that participants are lin-
guistically and conceptually transparent to one another. Interac-
tive alignment focuses on dialogue in the degenerate case: inter-
actions in which people are, in a sense, already co-ordinated. As
P&G note, dialogue is important partly because it is the primary
context for exposure to and acquisition of language. But this is also
the situation in which the assumptions embodied in the interac-
tive alignment model are least likely to be satisfied.
Interactive alignment: 
Priming or memory retrieval?
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) interactive alignment model ex-
plains the existence of alignment between speakers via an automatic prim-
ing mechanism. We propose that it may be preferable to explain alignment
through processes of memory retrieval. Our discussion highlights how
memory retrieval can produce the same results as the priming mechanism
and presents data that favor the memory-based view.
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) claim that dialogue is marked by a
great degree of alignment between interlocutors. The alignment
is taken to arise from the operation of a largely automatic priming
mechanism. We suggest that much of what P&G ascribe to the op-
eration of a priming mechanism can be captured by a memory-
based view of language processing.
The memory-based view is rooted in the assumption that lan-
guage processing is performed against the background of one’s ex-
perience. The comprehension of an incoming utterance is guided
by experience of utterances with similar structures and meanings,
just as experience communicating via speech shapes the produc-
tion of utterances. This assumption forms the basis of many extant
psycholinguistic theories: constraint-based approaches to sen-
tence processing (e.g., MacDonald et al. 1994), memory-based
models of text processing (Myers & O’Brien 1998), and theories
of lexical access (Goldinger 1998). The memory retrieval mecha-
nism is what has been called a “global matching” process (e.g.,
Hintzman 1986). That is, the memory retrieval process involves a
global, parallel search of memory that is influenced by both con-
textual and temporal factors (e.g., the retrieval process shows a re-
cency effect when recently processed language is treated as a sep-
arate context from previously processed language).
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The memory-based view explains why processing appears dif-
ferent in dialogue and monologue situations. It also provides an
alternative to the priming mechanism around which P&G build
their theory. For monologue experiments, which involve process-
ing language in a decontextualized and artificial situation, there is
little in the way of specific prior experience that might constrain
the memory retrieval process. The structure of the experiments
(e.g., randomized trials, random selection of materials) also makes
it unlikely that recent experience within the session will exert a
systematic influence on task performance. Hence, monologue-
based experiments produce memory retrieval conditions that are
sensitive to general properties of one’s linguistic experience, such
as the frequency of particular syntactic structures or word mean-
ings. On the other hand, dialogue situations foster highly con-
strained memory retrieval. For example, the perceptual similarity
between utterances within a dialogue can constrain memory re-
trieval so that it most strongly resonates with previous experiences
with that particular speaker (see Goldinger 1998). All other things
being equal, memory retrieval is also weighted toward more re-
cent experience (see Bock & Griffin 2000). Together, these factors
can produce the kinds of repetition and alignment that P&G dis-
cuss.
Support for the learning- and memory-based view comes from
experiments reported in Kaschak (2003). The participants in these
experiments were trained on a syntactic construction with which
they were not familiar, called the Needs construction. In the first
part of the experiments, participants in the Needs training condi-
tion were exposed to the novel construction in sentences such as:
“The meal needs cooked given that dinner is in an hour.” Partici-
pants in the control training condition had an identical training
phase in which they read the standard version of the Needs con-
struction for their dialect (“The meal needs to be cooked given that
dinner is in an hour”). By the end of the training phase (which in-
cluded 10 to 12 exposures to the Needs or standard constructions,
depending on the experiment), participants in the Needs training
condition read the novel construction as quickly as participants in
the control training condition read the standard construction. This
is consonant with P&G’s claim that recent experience has a strong
influence on language processing. Indeed, it fits nicely with the
claim that recent experience can override global frequency effects
in determining the speed of processing for particular kinds of lan-
guage.
One of the questions addressed in these experiments was how
training on the Needs construction would affect the processing of
another construction with which the participants were already fa-
miliar: the modifier construction (“The meal needs cooked vegeta-
bles given that the guests are vegetarian”). Training on the Needs
construction sets up an ambiguity between the novel structure and
the existing modifier construction, such that the sentence is am-
biguous at the word “cooked.” The priming mechanism favored by
P&G (and discussed earlier in Pickering & Branigan 1998) makes
a straightforward prediction about the influence of Needs train-
ing on the processing of the modifier construction. Recent expo-
sure to Needs sentences will prime the syntactic features associ-
ated with the construction, leading readers to initially choose the
Needs interpretation of the ambiguous sentences (thereby slow-
ing processing of the modifier construction).
Kaschak’s (2003) results showed that the effect of Needs train-
ing on the reading of the modifier construction depends on the
particular nature of one’s experiences during training. If partici-
pants reading, “The meal needs cooked . . .” during training ini-
tially interpreted the sentence as the modifier construction before
figuring out that the sentence was an example of the Needs con-
struction, Needs training facilitated the participants’ reading of
the modifier construction. If the participants were given instruc-
tions such that they did not initially misinterpret the Needs sen-
tences as examples of the modifier construction, the Needs train-
ing did not facilitate processing of the modifier construction.
Kaschak (2003) discusses how these data can be explained by as-
suming that the participants in these experiments remembered
not only the outcome of processing the initial examples of the
Needs construction, but also the processing work that went into
comprehending those sentences. This leads to the conclusion that
it is the memory that one has for particular linguistic experiences,
rather than a priming mechanism, that may better explain how re-
cent experience with language shapes the way subsequent utter-
ances are processed.
We resonate with many of the arguments and claims advanced
by P&G, but we think their explanation can be substantially im-
proved by replacing the notion of alignment-by-priming with
alignment based on retrieval from memory of recent processing
episodes.
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Abstract: This commentary argues that dialogue alignment can be ex-
plained if parsing-directed grammar formalisms are adopted. With syntax
defined as monotonic growth of semantic representations as each word is
parsed, alignment between interlocutors is shown to be expected. Hence,
grammars can be evaluated according to relative success in characterizing
dialogue phenomena.
Although Pickering & Garrod (P&G) suggest grammars should be
compatible with alignment patterns in dialogue, commending
multilevel constraint-based formalisms, they could have posed a
stronger challenge. Given that dialogues constitute primary data,
can linguistic theory provide a basis for explaining alignment?
Does some grammar-external mechanism determine alignment,
or is it a consequence of the architecture of the language system
and the way it is put to use in dialogue? The authors opt for the
first alternative. However, with grammar formalisms being pro-
moted which reflect the dynamics of a parser (Kempson et al.
2001; Phillips 1996), alignment can be more strongly buttressed
by natural-language grammars than they anticipated.
In Dynamic Syntax (Kempson et al. 2001), a grammar formal-
ism is defined that provides such underpinnings. A constraint-
based architecture is defined, with syntax as the progressive
growth of semantic representations, specifying possible parse rou-
tines. That syntactic and semantic alignment go hand in hand, is
thus ensured. Semantic representations (logical forms) are in tree
format, with the propositional formula assigned to a string deco-
rating the top node and the dominated nodes in the tree decorated
with sub-terms of this formula (quantification is expressed in the
form of names denoting witness sets, so resulting representations
resemble the situational models of Johnson-Laird 1983). Growth
of logical forms, central to this concept of syntax, is goal-directed
– first setting out the overall goal to establish a propositional struc-
ture, with subgoals introduced for predicate-argument structure.
The partial structure induced by such goals is enriched by updates
which the words in sequence provide for these skeletal structures;
and these, together with construal of pronouns relative to context
(context construed as a sequence of semantic representations), de-
termine the building up of a semantic representation which, when
complete, meets the goal (a goal tree).
Lexical specifications are also defined in terms of tree growth,
with each word associated with some input it provides to progres-
sive articulation of semantic representations. That lexical align-
ment should go along with syntactic/semantic alignment thus fol-
lows. The apparent syntax-specific alignment across interlocutors
relative to constant semantic content, for example, repeating dou-
ble-object constructions rather than their full dative equivalent –
a putative counter-example to such collapse of syntactic/semantic/
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lexical distinctions – follows from this definition of lexical content.
A word with both double-object and full-dative variants provides
two distinct forms of update onto a single structure, hence a pro-
cessing ambiguity. Repeating words across interlocutors will re-
trieve the lexical specification just used, not some alternant. By
collapsing what would in other systems be discrete syntactic/se-
mantic/lexical levels, the multilevel nature of alignment is trans-
formed into a single phenomenon.
We can now see perception/production correspondences and
self-monitoring of production as essential, not merely functionally
convenient. The consequences of taking parsing as basic when de-
signing a production model are twofold. First, in using the same
grammar formalism, the production mechanism must be using the
same structure-inducing growth process as is articulated for pars-
ing, the major difference being that in production, the goal tree is
known. Following general tree development steps defined by the
parser, which in the initial steps of the parse define only a skeletal
partial tree, the task is to retrieve from the lexicon some appro-
priate first word that can take the partial tree so far defined and
update it to provide a more developed structure that subsumes the
goal tree. If such a subsumption relation holds, then utterance of
that word is licensed. This task repeats itself to induce a sequence
of words until the goal tree is obtained through the parse mecha-
nism – hence the correspondence between comprehension and
production and essential self-monitoring in production.1
Alignment between interlocutors is now explicable. The major
challenge of production, given some conceptual structure to be
communicated, is selecting words to express that content, impos-
ing a general lexicon search. The incrementality of the tree growth
mechanisms suggests that this search is activated successively,
which is a huge task. However, production, like parsing, is context-
dependent; and part of the context is that small subset of the 
lexicon already accessed. Repeating words accordingly avoids a
general lexicon search. Pronouns equally, being place-holders
substituted by contextually available representations, sidestep full
lexicon access. And with elliptical fragments, lexical search is re-
stricted to the fragment. So the high rate of alignment, as dis-
played by these forms, arises because production, following the
parsing dynamics, is context-dependent, which is essential for
minimizing the word-retrieval burden.
Finally, shared utterances are expected. Given the use of pars-
ing tools to induce production steps, in successful communication,
interlocutors must coincide on constructing some particular se-
quence of structures. The shift from parser to producer is thus
straightforward if the parser, having constructed some partial tree,
makes an abduction step to determine what is needed to complete
it. The shift from producer to parser is equally natural: It is a shift
into the task of processing lexical input to complete the partial
tree, which up to that point was constructed as the means of mak-
ing production choices.
Hence, there is a stronger conclusion than the authors’ modest
challenge to linguists. Rather, we might adopt methodologies in
which linguistic theories are evaluated by their potential for ex-
pressing coordination of comprehension and production in dia-
logue. Grammar formalisms defined in terms of parsing meet this
challenge in a particularly direct way.
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) mechanistic theory of dialogue
attempts to detail the psychological processes involved in communication
that are lacking in Clark’s theory. By relying on automatic priming and
alignment processes, however, the theory falters when it comes to ex-
plaining much of dialogic interaction. We argue for the inclusion of less
automatic, though not completely conscious and deliberate, processes to
explain such phenomena.
In his influential book Using Language, Clark (1996) argued
against a conceptualization of communicators as autonomous in-
formation processors, contending that language use is intrinsically
a joint activity and examining communicators’ practices from this
perspective. His account provides a compelling description of
some of the things talkers accomplish in dialogue, but it is weak
on details of the psychological processes on which these accom-
plishments rest. Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) mechanistic theory
of dialogue is an attempt to provide such an account. In many re-
spects, it is quite successful, providing a glimmer of light at the
end of a long psycholinguistic tunnel. However, there are some re-
spects in which the theory falls short of its authors’ goal of pro-
viding a mechanistic explanation for the phenomena Clark de-
scribed.
There are two key propositions in the target article’s argument:
first, that communication entails the alignment of participants’ sit-
uation models; second, that priming is the principle mechanism
by which this is accomplished. We find the first proposition more
convincing than the second. By stressing the automaticity of the
process, P&G’s mechanistic theory appears incapable of account-
ing for the way interlocutors use information in what appears to
be a more reflective fashion. Because of space limitations, we shall
confine ourselves to just a few instances where the theory is defi-
cient.
1. The automatic priming mechanism appears to leave no room
for addressee accommodation in the absence of a misunderstand-
ing, yet there are many examples of interlocutors taking their part-
ners’ informational needs into account that are incompatible with
automatic priming. For example, Kingsbury (1968) found that
Bostonians who were asked, “I’m from out of town, can you tell
me how to get to Jordan Marsh?” gave more detailed directions
than those simply asked, “Can you tell me how to get to Jordan
Marsh?” When asked the latter question in an exotic (nonlocal) di-
alect, Bostonians also gave more detailed directions. Fussell and
Krauss (1992) found that the number of words used in the initial
reference to a photo of a landmark in an interactive coordination
task was a function of the landmark’s perceived identifiability – the
more identifiable the landmark was thought to be, the fewer the
words used to refer to it. It is not clear how priming could account
for these results or those of a host of similar studies (see Krauss &
Fussell 1996 for a review). We believe that such “audience design”
effects (Clark & Murphy 1982; Fussell & Krauss 1989) occur prior
to referent selection, and not just as an attempt to remedy an
emergent misunderstanding.
2. Representational alignment requires that two or more enti-
ties be identical in some way. Assertions of identity may work for
descriptions of relatively abstract syntactic and lexical levels of
representation, but not for representations at the phonological
level, because the phonological level is graded and repeated pho-
netic elements (even within the same talker) are not physically
identical. Although different instances of a phoneme may be per-
ceived as members of the same phoneme category, perception
preserves some phonetic distinctions. Hence, the very level that is
the point of contact between talkers, the acoustic-phonetic level,
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cannot support an automatic alignment/imitation-based model
because it is impossible to produce a perfect imitation – the mon-
itoring system would be reporting continual error. Although the
mechanism allows for degrees of alignment, we lack a rule for de-
termining how much alignment is required.
Interestingly, the strongest evidence cited by P&G for phonetic
alignment comes from Goldinger’s (1998) study of lexical shad-
owing. However, Goldinger’s procedure assessed perceived imi-
tation, which is not equivalent to phonetic similarity. Imitations of
the voices of well-known figures by vocal impressionists are cari-
catures that exaggerate particularly salient features rather than
produce acoustically accurate reproductions. The remainder of
the published evidence for phonological imitation is mainly of in-
creased similarity in speech rate and pitch (Giles et al. 1991; Na-
tale 1975a; 1975b) and voice onset timing (Sancier & Fowler
1997). In a continuously variable system, what degree of similar-
ity constitutes an imitation?
3. Interlocutors’ speech does not always become more similar
over the course of their interaction; in some cases, interaction
yields divergence rather than convergence. Moreover, the speech
of different participants may change to different degrees; conver-
gence can be radically asymmetrical. It would be little more than
an annoyance if such departures from symmetrical convergence
were random, but frequently they reflect social processes that are
fundamental to the interlocutors’ interpersonal relationship and
the ways in which they define the interaction situation. For exam-
ple, Bourhis and Giles (1977) found divergence in accentedness
when a talker’s ethnic identity was devalued. Gregory and Web-
ster (1996) found that the symmetry of pitch convergence be-
tween a talk-show host and his guests depended on the guest’s sta-
tus relative to that of the host – not surprisingly, higher-status
guests changed less than their lower-status counterparts. Again, it
is difficult to reconcile such phenomena with an automatic prim-
ing explanation. It seems more plausible to suppose that they de-
rive from a prior assessment that sets up the system to evoke par-
ticular kinds of priming.
Although our commentary is directed at what we see as defi-
ciencies in P&G’s theory, we applaud their attempt to move be-
yond participants’ goals and intentions and focus on the psycho-
logical mechanisms that make dialogue possible. Their thoughtful
article is admirable in both its scope and depth, and offers much
to contemplate. A complete account, we believe, will require a hy-
brid model in which alignment or imitation derives from both the
kinds of automatic processes they describe and processes that are
more directed or reflective. Hybrid models of this sort may be less
tidy (although not necessarily less mechanistic) than the one P&G
propose, but they do seem necessary to capture the subtlety and
richness of dialogic phenomena. We are reminded of an anecdote
about French President François Mitterand, who, when asked by
an acquaintance if she might address him using the personal tu
form, responded, “Si vous voulez.” Even in cooperative settings
without misunderstanding, alignment may be used strategically –
language is used in the pursuit of individual goals. An elaboration
of how a situation model incorporates key aspects of social and in-
terpersonal dynamics would increase the explanatory power of a
mechanistic theory of dialogue.
One alignment mechanism or many?
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod (P&G) suggest that communicators syn-
chronize their processing at a number of linguistic levels. Whereas their
explanation suggests that representations are being compared across indi-
viduals, there must be some representation of all conversation participants
in each participant’s head. At the level of the situation model, it is impor-
tant to maintain separate representations for each participant. At other lev-
els, it seems less crucial to have a separate representation for each partic-
ipant. This analysis suggests that different mechanisms may synchronize
representations at different linguistic levels.
Introduction. The core of Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) article
is illustrated in their Figure 2. Participants in a conversation are
attempting to achieve alignment between linguistic representa-
tions at the phonetic, lexical, semantic, and discourse levels si-
multaneously. Two key questions arise from this figure. First, what
sorts of representations are being aligned; and second, how is this
alignment achieved?
What is being aligned? The target article’s Figure 2 illustrates
that linguistic representations at a variety of levels are aligned. The
authors suggest that representations from one participant’s head
are aligned directly with those from the other participant’s head.
This notation is a convenient shorthand, but people cannot di-
rectly access each other’s mental states. To make this model work
as it is drawn, participants must keep track separately of their own
knowledge at these levels, as well as the knowledge of other par-
ticipants.
For some levels of discourse, this separation is more critical
than others. For the situation model, it is important that speakers
know what information is possessed by the listener. This informa-
tion is crucial for ensuring that given new conventions are fol-
lowed when generating sentences, for ensuring that new utter-
ances are relevant to the discourse, and for maintaining common
ground (Clark 1996; Sperber & Wilson 1986). A key question is
the degree of information participants must have about their part-
ner’s knowledge (Keysar 1994; Keysar et al. 1998).
At other linguistic levels, the distinction between one’s own
knowledge and that of a partner may be less crucial. It may not be
necessary to distinguish between one’s own grammatical con-
structions and those of a partner. Similarly, representations of
phonology and prosody of speech need not be kept separate in or-
der to process a discourse. This distinction in the knowledge re-
quired to process and use language for the situation model as op-
posed to grammatical or phonetic representations suggests that
these levels may differ in the degree to which people are aware of
the effects of alignment. In particular, people may recognize that
they have designed their utterances to convey particular kinds of
information that their partner does not have. In contrast, they may
be unaware that the grammatical, phonological, or prosodic form
of one sentence has been influenced by the form of a sentence
spoken previously by a partner.
How are representations aligned? The target article refers to
the process that synchronizes participants’ linguistic representa-
tions as alignment. The discussion of the roles of linguistic repre-
sentations in the previous section suggests that there may not be
a single alignment mechanism at work. In particular, the dis-
course-level representation (e.g., the situation model) is the only
one that really seems to require a separate representation of what
is known by each conversational participant. In contrast, the lower
levels of representation need not have distinct representations for
each participant.
When there are separate representations for each conversa-
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tional participant, a structural alignment process like the one
posited to be involved in analogical reasoning and similarity can
be used to help synchronize representations (Gentner 1983; Gen-
tner & Markman 1997). The structural alignment process takes
pairs of relational representations and places them in correspon-
dence. Structural alignment requires that the relations and objects
that are matched be seen as identical (or can be decomposed into
structures that are partially identical). Thus, this process provides
a method for creating semantic parallels between people’s situa-
tion models and their representations of conversational partners’
situation models.
One advantage of thinking about the alignment of situation
models as a structural alignment process is that there are several
established empirical benchmarks that are hallmarks of analogical
reasoning (Markman & Gentner 2000). It is possible to test for the
presence of these benchmarks in discourse-level processing. For
example, there is substantial interest in discourse on the role of in-
ferences in comprehension (e.g., Graesser et al. 2001; McKoon &
Ratcliff 1992). The structural alignment process suggests that in-
ferences are made on the basis of systematicity. Specifically, a
piece of information is inferred when there is a correspondence
between two representations and there is information in one rep-
resentation that is connected to the correspondence that can be
carried over to the second representation (Clement & Gentner
1991; Markman 1997). Other information is not carried over as an
inference. Thus, this view makes a testable prediction about what
kinds of information are likely to be inferred by conversational
participants. Similarly, experiments could be devised to explore
the other published benchmarks.
It is not clear that the structural alignment process should be
involved at other linguistic levels. If people do not maintain sepa-
rate representations for themselves and their partners for gram-
matical and phonetic processing, then some other process must be
involved in synchronizing these representations across individu-
als. The authors suggest one way this could occur. If the same rep-
resentations are used for both production and comprehension at
the level of grammar and phonology, then these representations
will be synchronized by virtue of the nature of the language
process. Representations at these levels would be influenced by
factors such as priming (as suggested in the target article).
This analysis suggests that factors such as systematicity that
should affect the formation of situation models should not have an
influence on phonetic and grammatical processing. It would be in-
teresting to carry out studies to explore whether systematicity and
other benchmark phenomena of structural alignment affect other
levels of linguistic processing. If they did, this would suggest that
people are maintaining separate representations of their own pro-
cessing and that of their partners at a variety of linguistic levels.
Beyond linguistic alignment
Allan Mazur
Center for Environmental Policy and Administration, Maxwell School,
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Abstract: Dialogue requires ability beyond the production and compre-
hension of word strings. The interactive alignment account is good as far
as it goes, but it must be embedded in a broader model encompassing
alignment of paralinguistic representations.
Dialogue is not only the natural arena for language; it requires
abilities that are different from the production and comprehen-
sion of sentences and phrases. Children with the variant of autism
known as Asperger’s Syndrome have good sentence skills but can-
not carry on a normal conversation because they have difficulty
with eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, and body gestures that reg-
ulate the exchange.
Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) ingenious account of interactive
alignment illustrates gains that can be had in broadening the study
of language from monologue to dialogue. I urge upon the authors
a further expansion, embedding spoken dialogue within a broader
model of human (and ape) turn-taking communication.
Conversations allow interlocutors to share meaning conveyed by
body postures, facial cues, and intonation – apart from the partic-
ular strings of words that are used. Sometimes the words spoken
are irrelevant to the primary representation that is to be aligned. A
conversation between two knowledgeable people, ostensibly about
Chaucer, may be more importantly a dominance contest, or a se-
duction, or bonding chatter between friends – though words man-
ifestly about these meanings may never be exchanged.
We often recognize the relationship between conversing for-
eigners and the general intent of their communication, even
though we may not understand their language.
As long as actors can see one another, they can communicate
with remarkable efficiency even when distance or a barrier pre-
cludes speech. I recall standing with a handsome male colleague
on a busy street corner. He whispered aside to me that he was vi-
sually flirting with a woman seated on a bus some distance away;
he predicted (correctly) that as the bus drove off, she would turn
toward him with a broad smile.
Paralinguistic signaling is especially effective in aligning social
relationships within a dyad. This enables Ego and Alter to agree
on who is the leader and who the follower; to communicate affil-
iation, affection, or hostility; and to sympathize emotionally. Con-
sider, as an example, how dialogue can establish the relative status
of interlocutors, independently of the words that are used.
Spoken or nonverbal “dialogue” is governed by mutually un-
derstood rules (Mazur 1985). Some rules are asymmetrical, spec-
ifying different actions for a high-status actor and for a low-status
one. Two asymmetrical rules are:
1. The high-status person sets the pace and mood of the con-
versation, and the low-status person follows. Pace and mood may
be set with smiles, jokes, frowns, exclamations, and volume, ra-
pidity, or intonation of speech. If Ego tells a loud joke, Alter can
deferentially comply with a loud laugh or can challenge by substi-
tuting an inappropriate response.
2. The high-status person introduces and terminates major top-
ics of conversation. This rule, like the previous one, indicates that
the high-status person can take control of the conversation, which
is the essence of having high status. If both interlocutors attempt
to set the conversational agenda, there is a dominance contest.
Other rules are symmetrical, applying without regard for the sta-
tus of the actor. It is the violation of symmetrical rules that signals
a dominant act, whereas strict conformity to them signals defer-
ence or politeness. Important symmetrical rules are:
3. If one individual is speaking, the other should remain quiet.
If Ego interrupts Alter’s speech, Ego has acted dominantly.
4. A listener who is offered the floor should speak. A speaker
can pass the floor by asking a question of the listener, or by di-
recting his eyes to the listener after concluding a speech. If Ego
remains silent after Alter offers the floor, Ego has acted domi-
nantly.
5. Do not look into another individual’s eyes when no one is
speaking (unless in a romantic context). The violation of this rule,
silent staring, is a common dominant act among primates, whereas
rule-following eye aversion indicates deference.
6. Look at the speaker’s face, especially if the speaker is looking
at you. To look away, suggesting inattention, is hard to do if you
respect the person speaking to you. If the speaker is of minor con-
sequence, it is easy to violate the rule, thus showing your domi-
nance. (This rule is inoperative when averted eyes overtly signal
submission, as in looking down while being scolded.)
7. Do not speak loudly, sternly, or angrily. Shouting matches
and arguments are obviously dominance contests.
8. The speaker should direct the listener’s actions by request
rather than command, and should avoid a stern or stubborn tone.
To speak in a commanding or inflexible way implies that the lis-
tener is of lower status.
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These rules operate within a context of linguistic interaction.
The words spoken may or may not be an important part of the
whole display. When we deferentially compliment someone, we
speak in strict accordance with the rules, whereas our verbal in-
sults gain emphasis when violating the rules of dialogue. We ac-
company our speech with appropriate gestures, perhaps glaring
for dominance or smiling for deference. This full array of actions
– words, gestures, and rules – constitutes the status display.
A natural model of conversation must go beyond the interactive
alignment of word strings. P&G have briskly stepped onto the
road of dialogue. I hope they soon take another step forward.
Correspondences between the interactive
alignment account and Skinner’s in
Verbal Behavior
Joseph J. Pear
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) interactive alignment account
corresponds directly with the account Skinner (1957) gave in his book Ver-
bal Behavior. This correspondence becomes evident when “properties of
verbal stimuli” substitutes for “channels of alignment.” Skinner’s account
appears to have the dual advantages of requiring fewer basic terms and in-
tegrating the field of verbal behavior with the whole field of human be-
havior.
There are strong correspondences between Pickering & Garrod’s
(P&G’s) interactive alignment (IA) account and Skinner’s (1957)
verbal behavior (VB) account. Similar to P&G’s assumption that
dialogue is the basic form of language processing, Skinner took the
interaction between speaker and listener as fundamental (see
Skinner 1957, Figures 1–6, pp. 38, 39, 57, 84, 85). I explain fur-
ther correspondences with reference to Table 1 below, which is
based on Table 2 in the target article.
Regarding row 1, the situation models in the IA account corre-
spond in the VB account with variables controlling each inter-
locutor’s behavior, some of which may be private (Skinner 1957,
pp. 130–46; also see Skinner 1953, Ch. 17). The alignment chan-
nels in the IA account correspond with properties of verbal stim-
uli. Because of reinforcement of many different instances of
echoic behavior, which is the direct imitation of the properties of
verbal stimuli, echoic behavior generalizes widely (Skinner 1957,
pp. 55–56), just as the tendency to align generalizes across align-
ment channels in the IA account.
Regarding row 2, sustained dialogue occurs only if the inter-
locutors have implicit common ground in the IA account or emit
similar verbal behavior in the VB account. In the VB account, ef-
fective verbal interaction occurs between the extremes of identi-
cal and completely dissimilar verbal behavior (Skinner 1957,
pp. 271–72). In the IA account, there is a repair mechanism for
preventing dialogue from breaking down or for restoring it if it
does. In the VB account there are several reinforced response-
strengthening techniques that maintain dialogue, such as prompts
and probes (Skinner 1957, Ch. 10, pp. 253–92; see also p. 58 for
examples of clarification and expansion requests involving echoic
behavior).
What in the IA account is called full common ground – a com-
plex model shared by both interlocutors – is not common in ordi-
nary dialogue according to either account. Both accounts maintain
that constructing and using these models are derived (e.g.,
learned) abilities or behaviors.
Both accounts also agree that we obtain a distorted view of
grammar by looking at it only in monologue. In the VB account,
grammar is the expression of responses called autoclitics that
modify the effect on the listener of responses that Skinner (1957,
p. 312) called “the raw material out of which sustained verbal be-
havior is manufactured.” When listeners cannot frequently or im-
mediately prompt or probe the speaker’s verbal behavior, there is
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Table 1 (Pear). Correspondences between the interactive alignment account of language processing in dialogue 
and the verbal behavior account
Interactive alignment account (IA) Verbal behavior account (VB)
1. Linkage between interlocutors 1. Linkage between interlocutors
Links across multiple levels of representation via Control across multiple properties of verbal stimuli. 
“alignment channels.” Sound comes to encode Sound comes to bring the listener’s behavior under 
words, linguistic information, and aspects of the control of variables controlling the speaker’s behavior.
situational models. 
2. Inference 2. Inference
Externalized in the interaction between Externalized in the interaction between interlocutors 
interlocutors via a basic interactive repair mechanism. via reinforced techniques of strengthening verbal behavior.
3. Routines 3. Routines
Arise out of the application of the interactive alignment Functional verbal units that are conditioned or strengthened 
in specific situations. A high proportion of dialogue process. A high proportion of dialogue uses routines, which 
contains these units, which facilitate both production simplify both production and comprehension. 
and comprehension.
4. Self-monitoring 4. Self-monitoring
Monitoring occurs at any level of representation that is Occurs for all aspects of verbal behavior because speakers 
subject to alignment as a consequence of the account. typically are also listeners.
5. Repair mechanisms 5. Repair mechanisms
The same basic repair mechanism for self-repair and The same basic principles apply for strengthening one’s own ver-
other-repair. bal behavior and strengthening that of others in specific situations.
6. Linguistic representations 6. Linguistic representations
Needed to deal with linked utterances in dialogue, Not needed because the contextual stimuli suffice to produce 
including nonsentential “fragment.” linkages in dialogue.
often pressure on speakers to incorporate a high density of auto-
clitics according to constraints embodied in formal rules of gram-
mar. When these pressures are weak, as in much of dialogue as
well as certain literary styles (Skinner 1957, p. 356), verbal behav-
ior is more fluid. Skinner likely would have endorsed the call in
the last sentence of the target article for “a more flexible account
of grammar capable of capturing linguistic constraints on linked
sentence fragments.”
Regarding row 3, a routine in the IA account appears to be, in
the VB account, a functional verbal unit (Skinner 1957, pp. 21,
116) that has been conditioned or strengthened in a specific situ-
ation. In the IA account, repetition of “the previous speaker’s ut-
terance” appears to be important in this process (sect. 5.1 of tar-
get article). According to Skinner, “a verbal response of a given
form sometimes seems to pass easily from one type of operant to
another” (Skinner 1957, p. 188). Hence, a response emitted as an
instance of echoic behavior may simultaneously or subsequently
appear in other categories of verbal behavior (for examples, see
Skinner 1957, pp. 188–89, 360–62).
Like routines in the IA account, functional verbal units in the
VB account may be larger than a single word. Similar to the
process of routinization in the IA account (sect. 5.2 of the target
article), a process called composition in the VB account generates
large verbal patterns that can come to function as units. Skinner
(1957, Ch. 14, pp. 344–67) proposed that composition consists
primarily of adding autoclitics (including ordering) to the raw ver-
bal material mentioned above. “Formal evidence alone will not
show whether sentences [or other large segments of verbal be-
havior] have been composed” (Skinner 1957, p. 346) as opposed
to being emitted as units. Once a composed utterance has been
reinforced several times, it may begin to function as a unit. Given
the right conditions, however, a unit may break into smaller units
(Skinner 1957, pp. 116–17). This seems very close to the dynam-
ics of routines as described in the IA account.
Regarding row 4, in the VB account “[a]n important fact about
verbal behavior is that speaker and listener may reside within the
same skin” (Skinner 1957, p. 163). As in the IA account, in the VB
account speakers monitor their own verbal behavior and edit it af-
ter, during, or even before its emission (Skinner 1957, Ch. 15, 16,
pp. 369–402). Both accounts agree that there is no difference in
principle between self- and other-monitoring. Both accounts also
agree that when interacting with oneself, the stimuli need not be
in the form of an external medium.
Regarding row 5, the techniques for strengthening one’s own
weak verbal behavior are in principle the same as those for
strengthening another’s verbal behavior (Skinner 1957, Ch. 17,
pp. 403–17). These include manipulating stimuli and changing
the level of editing.
Finally, regarding row 6, by focusing on contextual stimuli, the
VB account provides a flexible account of grammar.
Given the correspondences between the two accounts, it may
be impossible to distinguish them empirically. However, the VB
account appears to require fewer terms, “and the terms created
are derived from a few prior technical terms common to the whole
field of human behavior” (Skinner 1957, p. 456).
Putting the interaction back into dialogue
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Abstract: I share the authors’ stance on the dialogic or interactional char-
acter of language. The authors, however, have left actual interaction out of
their conception of dialogue. I sketch a number of organizations of prac-
tices of talking and understanding that supply the basic arena for talk-in-
interaction. It is by reference to these that mechanisms for speech pro-
duction and understanding need to be understood.
I write as a conversation analyst. I have spent nearly 40 years
studying the sorts of events which Pickering & Garrod (P&G) now
take to be the fundamental premise of language. I am, of course,
predisposed to take the same view. Indeed I have already done so
in a number of publications (Schegloff 1979; 1989; 1996a, inter
alia). The arguments of the target article aside, in the choice be-
tween a fundamentally monologic, “individualist” stance and a di-
alogic, interactional one, there are compelling reasons for prefer-
ring the latter. For now, one line will have to do.
For most humans on the planet since the species developed
“language,” the overwhelmingly most common ecological niche
for its use has been (1) the turn at talk, (2) as part of a coherent
sequence of turns, (3) through which a course or trajectory of ac-
tion is jointly pursued by some or all of the participants (not nec-
essarily cooperatively, but jointly), (4) in an episode of interaction,
(5) between two or more persons, (6) organized into two or more
parties, (7) the occasion of interaction being composed of one or
more such episodes. If that is where language as a publicly de-
ployed resource and utility resides, it is plausible to expect that it
has been designed and fashioned by its users and uses in a man-
ner adapted to the contingencies of its “environment” – that is, by
the contingencies of talk-in-interaction (of which the foregoing
are but several aspects) and its virtually omnipresent bodily com-
panions – gesture, posture, gaze deployment, facial expression,
and so on. Such an expectation is not merely plausible; detailed
and repeated examination of recorded episodes of naturally oc-
curring talk-in-interaction shows it to be so – indeed, at a thor-
oughly implausible (and yet demonstrable) level of detail. The
mechanisms of production and comprehension being addressed
by P&G need to be understood in this context. It is this context
that is missing from P&G’s treatment.
By “context” here I do not mean the ordinary characterizations
of settings as domestic or public, intimate or formal, and others
drawing on different genres of social and cultural diction (impor-
tant as these may be). I mean the various organizations of practice
that deal with the various generic organizational contingencies of
interaction without which it cannot proceed in an orderly way: (1)
The “turn-taking” problem: Who should talk next and when
should they do so? How does this affect the construction and un-
derstanding of the turns themselves? (2) The “sequence-organi-
zational” problem: How are successive turns formed up to be “co-
herent” with the prior turn (or some prior turn), and what is the
nature of that coherence? (3) The “trouble” problem: How
should one deal with trouble in speaking, hearing, and/or under-
standing the talk such that the interaction does not freeze in
place, that intersubjectivity is maintained or restored, and that
the turn and sequence and activity can progress to possible com-
pletion? (4) The word selection problem: How do the compo-
nents that get selected as the elements of a turn get selected, and
how does that selection inform and shape the understanding
achieved by the turn’s recipients? (5) The overall structural orga-
nization problem: How does the overall structural organization of
an occasion of interaction get structured, what are those struc-
tures, and how does placement in the overall structure inform the
construction and understanding of the talk as turns, as sequences,
and so on?
The organizations of practice addressed to these issues – turn
organization (Goodwin 1979; Schegloff 1996a), turn-taking orga-
nization (Jefferson 1986; Sacks et al. 1974; Schegloff 1987a;
2000a; 2001), sequence organization (Schegloff 1990; 1995; forth-
coming), the organization of repair (Drew 1997; Jefferson 1974;
1987; Schegloff 1979; 1987b; 1991; 1992; 1997a; 1997b; 2000b;
Schegloff et al. 1977), the organization of word selection (Sacks
1972a; 1972b; 1992; Sacks & Schegloff 1979; Schegloff 1972;
1996b), overall structural organization (Schegloff 1986; Schegloff
& Sacks 1973), and others – constitute, in the options that they
shape and the practices made available, a spate of interaction rec-
ognizable as “conversation,” as “interview,” as “meeting,” as “lec-
turing,” as “giving a speech,” as “interrogation,” and so on. These
are what we call “speech-exchange systems” (Sacks et al. 1974,
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pp. 729–31), and can be seen as particular, here-and-now-with-
these-participants instances of these.
What makes an interaction is not just the juxtaposition of bod-
ies. What mediates and organizes the conduct of the parties is not
a structureless, featureless, transparent medium. The composi-
tion of a turn at talk – whether it is made up of one or more com-
ponent units; whether these are sentences or sub-sentential – its
syntactic construction and choice of lexicon are shaped in part by
the contingencies of turn production imposed by a turn-taking or-
ganization that will have others empowered or required or allowed
to talk next, at points in the turn’s development not wholly under
the speaker’s control. Particular courses of action implemented
through turns at talk (such as request sequences, complaint se-
quences, storytelling sequences, news-conveying sequences, etc.)
implicate certain ways of understanding what is being said that
render meaningful and consequential selection between appar-
ently equivalent expressions, the delay of a turn’s start by two-
tenths of a second or less, and the like. How one says what one says
can depend on who the other is; and, of all the persons and cate-
gories which could be used to characterize “the other,” depend on
which ones have been made relevant at that moment in the talk,
or can be made relevant by constructing the same “sayable” in this
way or that. And so on.
A very high proportion of the matters discussed by P&G as if
they were unrelated to anything but the mechanisms the authors
are concerned to develop, are not interactionally random. They
are part of the fabric of some organization of practices for talk-in-
interaction. Many of them have been given quite detailed and sys-
tematic treatment in the literature – things like “routines” (target
article, sect. 5.2.1, cf. Schegloff 1986) and “how are you” routines
in particular (Jefferson 1980; Sacks 1975); things like “joint con-
structions” (sect. 7.1, para. 3; cf. Lerner 1991; 1996; Sacks 1992,
vol. I, pp. 144–47 et passim); things like “non-sentential turns”
(sect. 7.1, para. 6; cf. Sacks et al. 1974; Schegloff 1996a): things
like “monitoring during overlapping speech (sect. 6, para. 6; cf.
Schegloff 2000a; 2001); and so on and on.
Most striking is P&G’s treatment of “repair”; the discussion
rests on a terminology (“repair,” “other-repair,” “self-repair”) which
they neither explicate nor cite but the latter two of which they treat
as discrete sets of things, not an organization of practices. This
leads them – incorrectly, in my view – to treat the basic mecha-
nisms of self-repair and other-repair as the same (see Table 2 of the
target article) when, interactionally speaking, they are not the same
in either execution or interactional import (Schegloff 1979,
pp. 267–69; Schegloff et al. 1977, inter alia). I believe the analysis
of talk-in-interaction along such lines has much to contribute not
only to our understanding of the mechanisms addressed by P&G,
but to work in the neurobiology of behavior more generally – pre-
cisely the remit of this journal. But that is another matter.
Some notes on priming, alignment,
and self-monitoring
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Abstract: Any complete theory of speaking must take the dialogical func-
tion of language use into account. Pickering & Garrod (P&G) make some
progress on this point. However, we question whether their interactive
alignment model is the optimal approach. In this commentary, we specif-
ically criticize (1) their notion of alignment being implemented through
priming, and (2) their claim that self-monitoring can occur at all levels of
linguistic representation.
The primary way of language use is dialogue, not monologue. We
want to acknowledge the authors’ effort to stress this important
point, which needs to be addressed explicitly in empirical and
modeling work in speech production and comprehension re-
search. We believe that these issues are especially relevant for syn-
tactic processing. For instance, one wonders how syntactically in-
complete (dialogue) utterances can be syntactically encoded in
more traditional models, if there is no overt verb present in the
generated utterance. Take, for example, the following extract from
the dialogue transcript in section 2 of the target article:
1——B: . . . Tell me where you are?
[Utterances 2 and 3 omitted]
4——A: Right: {I am} two along from the bottom one up:* [our ad-
dition in curly brackets]
In this example, speaker A does not produce the appropriate verb
form of “to be” (i.e., “I am”) but nevertheless gives an acceptable
and cooperative answer to speaker B’s question. This type of el-
lipsis can only be correctly produced if the syntax generator has
access to previously stored discourse information, allowing the
speaker to omit “I am,” even though the original question con-
taining the verb occurred several utterances earlier in the dis-
course (see also Levelt 1989, p. 89, for a similar analysis).
Although we agree in principle with the authors’ assessment
that the dialogical structure of language should receive more at-
tention in accounts of language processing, we are not convinced
that adopting the interactive alignment model is the right way to
do so. For instance, it is unclear to us exactly how priming can ac-
count for alignment, and, in particular, we fail to see in what way
priming is more than “a behavioral effect” (see target article, sect.
2.2). We believe that “priming” does not explain or implement in-
teractive alignment. Real interactive alignment necessarily in-
volves storing selected fragments from previous utterances. Prim-
ing can raise the probability of certain linguistic structures being
selected, but this is not sufficient for the strong and explicit type
of alignment the authors want to incorporate in models of lan-
guage processing. Also, syntactic priming effects are weak effects.
It is hard to see how an elaborate mechanism such as interactive
alignment could be realized by only raising the probability of se-
lecting a certain syntactic construct by roughly 10% to 20% (see,
e.g., Pickering & Branigan 1998).
Our second critical note concerns one of the few testable pre-
dictions from the interactive alignment model, namely, that self-
monitoring by the speaker occurs at all levels of linguistic repre-
sentation (see sect. 6). While other researchers (e.g., Wheeldon &
Levelt 1995) have claimed that internal self-monitoring works on
abstract phonological form representations, Pickering & Garrod
(P&G) propose that self-monitoring can occur at any level of lin-
guistic representation that can be aligned (i.e., semantic, syntac-
tic, lexical, phonological, and phonetic representations) – and not
only at the phonological level.
For example, the authors explicitly claim that speakers can cor-
rect gender errors, such as le tête instead of la tête (“the head”) in
French or de been instead of het been (“the leg”) in Dutch not only
after they have been articulated but even before their overt pro-
duction. This is an interesting claim that needs to be investigated in
the future. However, we are somewhat skeptical about this claim
because to our knowledge there is no evidence that self-monitoring
of gender features (or any other syntactic features) is possible. For
example, Desrochers and his collaborators (Desrochers & Paivio
1990; Desrochers et al. 1989; Muller-Gass et al. 2000) found that
selecting a gender label (e.g., feminine or masculine) took about
200 msec longer than selecting the indefinite article in French gen-
der decision. Furthermore, Tucker et al. (1977) provided empiri-
cal evidence suggesting that French speakers implicitly construct
a noun phrase including the article and the noun to determine a
noun’s gender. However, if speakers can self-monitor abstract gen-
der information at the level of syntactic representation, as sug-
gested by P&G, why would they go through the trouble of gener-
ating the gender-marked article of a noun to determine its gender?
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In contrast to these findings about syntactic representations, re-
cent evidence from our own laboratory as well as from other lab-
oratories demonstrated that self-monitoring does occur at the
level of phonological encoding. We have empirical data about the
monitoring of phonological segments (Schiller, in press; Wheel-
don & Morgan 2002), word stress (Schiller 2001; Schiller et al., in
press), syllable boundaries ( Jansma & Schiller 2004), and sylla-
bles (Morgan & Wheeldon 2003). However, we also have evi-
dence that participants are unlikely to monitor a phonetic-
acoustic representation of the respective utterances. Although
gender decision as a task is widely used (Müller & Hagoort 2001;
Schiller et al. 2003; Schmitt et al. 2001a; 2001b; Van Turennout
et al. 1998), it remains to be shown whether or not this task actu-
ally taps syntactic processing, because abstract gender informa-
tion may not be directly available to the speaker. Rather, gender
information may be available only via its phonological realization,
for example, an article or gender-marking suffix. Interestingly, ef-
fects of gender congruency have recently been re-interpreted as
determiner congruency effects occurring at the phonological level
and not at the gender feature level (see overview in Schiller &
Caramazza 2003).
To conclude, we believe that internal self-monitoring does not
occur at every single level of linguistic representation (as claimed
by P&G) or at every processing level in models of speech produc-
tion (e.g., Levelt et al. 1999). Rather, there is abundant evidence
that internal self-monitoring works on phonological representa-
tions, which are created during phonological encoding in speak-
ing, for example, when segments are prosodified into phonologi-
cal words. It is at this level that information about segments,
syllables, syllable boundaries, and word stress is available to the
speaker. Although the abundance of evidence for phonological-
level monitoring does not necessarily exclude other monitoring
levels (e.g., at the conceptual level; see Levelt 1989), we are un-
aware of any evidence for self-monitoring at earlier or later levels
of grammatical and form encoding.
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Just how aligned are interlocutors’
representations?
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Abstract: Conversational partners’ representations may be less aligned
than they appear even when interlocutors believe they have successfully
understood each other, as data from a series of experiments on surveys
about facts and behaviors suggest. Although the goal of a mechanistic psy-
chology of dialogue is laudable, the ultimate model is likely to require far
greater specification of individual and contextual variability.
When conversational partners come to agree that they are talking
about the same thing, how aligned are their conceptualizations?
The interactive alignment account holds that when dialogue is
successful, interlocutors’ linguistic representations are aligned at
multiple levels. Although Pickering & Garrod (P&G) observe that
alignment is sometimes only approximate and that evident mis-
alignments can be interactively repaired, the general thrust of
their approach is that successful communication requires repre-
sentations to be the same.
I contend that interlocutors’ using the same words can actually
mask a surprising degree of undetected misalignment. Fred Con-
rad and I, with other colleagues, have carried out a series of labo-
ratory and field studies examining how people interpret ordinary
words in ongoing U.S. government surveys about facts and be-
haviors, words like “job,” “bedroom,” “smoking,” and “cigarettes”
(Conrad & Schober 2000; Schober & Conrad 1997; Schober et al.
2004; Suessbrick et al. 2000). Because the agencies that carry out
these surveys have thorough definitions for the terms, answers to
the survey questions provide evidence about the extent to which
respondents’ conceptions match the survey designers’. Our find-
ing is that people’s representations are frequently wildly mis-
aligned with the survey designers’ – and with each other’s – with-
out anyone’s noticing.
For example, in one study (Suessbrick et al. 2000), survey re-
spondents interpreted terms like “smoking” and “cigarettes” in a
question such as “have you smoked at least one hundred cigarettes
in your entire life?” differently enough (tobacco, cloves, mari-
juana? Finished or just a puff? Bought or borrowed?) that 10% 
of the respondents subsequently presented with a definition
changed their answer to the question from yes to no or from no to
yes. In a national telephone sample (Conrad & Schober 2000),
more than 40% of reported purchases did not fit the survey de-
signers’ definitions, even though the questions had been widely
pretested. And this is not just because the official definitions failed
to match the population consensus about the meaning of terms;
respondents’ interpretations differed from each other’s as much as
they differed from the survey designers’.
Across our various studies, respondents are quite surprised at
the thought that someone else might interpret the same words dif-
ferently from the way they do; when given the opportunity to re-
quest clarification about the meanings of survey terms, they
choose to do it a very small percentage of the time. People seem
to follow a “presumption of interpretability” (Clark & Schober
1991): It should be the questioner’s responsibility to forestall mis-
interpretation.
These data suggest a far more Quinian view of successful re-
ferring than the P&G account encompasses: Seemingly success-
ful referring can mask conceptual misalignments that reflect deep
underlying indeterminacies. The point is that people can believe
they have understood each other well enough for current pur-
poses (as proposed in Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs 1986) and yet never
actually discover that their conceptions were misaligned.
An important contention in the P&G article is that seemingly
complex interactional processes can be modeled largely with sim-
ple individual mechanistic processes. The proposal is that conver-
sational partners, following a principle of parsimony, do not ordi-
narily model each other’s mental states or make inferences about
common ground, except when there is evidence that not doing so
has led to obvious misunderstanding and when cognitive re-
sources allow.
I would argue that none of the current data actually allow us to
distinguish this position from an alternative: that the ordinary case
is that conversational partners do model each other, and that they
fail to do so only when they are under heavy cognitive load or when
circumstances weigh heavily against doing so. Why should we as-
sume that the ordinary case is one where the interlocutor does not
need to be modeled and the speaker is under heavy cognitive
load? As far as I can tell, no one knows the level of load encoun-
tered in the range of ordinary interactive situations. As Susan
Brennan and I have argued (Schober & Brennan 2003), the evi-
dence for egocentric processing is far from conclusive; the exper-
iments purported to show egocentric processing as basic rely on
null results and experimental methods that are far removed from
ordinary processing situations. When such studies are carried out
in more realistic settings, the findings can look rather less ego-
centric.
Not to overstate the case, but one could argue that modeling
one’s partner only when it is needed may require a level of situa-
tional monitoring that leads to a paradox: How can one know ex-
actly when one needs to model one’s partner without already
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knowing what the partner model would clarify? (This seems akin
to Fodor’s frame problem or the notorious conundrums about se-
lective attentional filtering). Arguably, it might be simpler to
model the partner as the ordinary case. P&G assume that repre-
senting common ground requires unusually complex mental rep-
resentations; this may be so, but it is also possible that represen-
tations of common ground are ordinary memory representations
with the right content.
In fact, what is parsimonious may well vary across individuals
and conversational contexts. Our notions of what is effortful in di-
alogue are not well worked out (Schober 1995; 1998a); people’s
knowledge of each other’s perspectives, interest in modeling their
partners, and abilities for doing so probably vary substantially
more than current theories allow. For example, people who have
very poor mental rotation abilities may be unable to conceive of a
partner’s point of view on a scene, leading to a different sort of
partner modeling than that carried out by mental rotation whizzes
(Schober 1998b). And different abilities may be relevant in differ-
ent conversational contexts; mental rotation ability may have little
to do with the consideration of lexical alternatives in dialogues that
are not about physical scenes, whereas working memory capacity
differences or different conversational agendas (Russell &
Schober 1999) might. P&G are to be applauded for furthering the
attempts to bridge the “language as product” and “language as ac-
tion” traditions, but they have also opened a can of worms; the ul-
timate mechanistic account of dialogue is likely to require far
greater specification of individual and contextual variability.
Dialogue processing: Automatic alignment or
controlled understanding?
Hadas Shintel and Howard C. Nusbaum
Department of Psychology, The University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637.
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) mechanistic account of dialogue
assumes that linguistic alignment between interlocutors takes place auto-
matically, without using cognitive resources. However, even the most ba-
sic processes of speech perception depend on resource use. The lack of in-
variant mapping between input patterns and interpretations in dialogue,
as in speech perception, may require controlled, rather than automatic,
processing.
In their target article, Pickering & Garrod (P&G) challenge cur-
rent psycholinguistic theory by proposing the study of dialogue as
the appropriate paradigm for understanding language processing.
They argue that the main problem facing interlocutors is the align-
ment of their respective situation models, and they propose a
mechanistic account of alignment in dialogue, based on an inter-
active and resource-free priming mechanism. Linguistic struc-
tures, produced on the surface by one interlocutor, putatively
prime corresponding structures in the other interlocutor. While
we agree that conversation, rather than decontextualized, isolated
sentences, should be taken as basic form of language use and as
the foundation upon which language has evolved, it seems less
plausible that much of the cognitive work in conversation takes
place automatically.
P&G’s model of automatic alignment assumes that a mapping
can be established directly between the representations uttered
by one interlocutor and those activated in the head of the other
interlocutor. But as they themselves note, the linguistic informa-
tion is encoded in sound. Hence, for the listener the spoken ut-
terance must be recognized antecedent to any alignment occur-
ring. However, even findings regarding the basic processes of
speech perception argue against the assumption of automatic pro-
cessing. Automaticity implies a passive process in which the input
is processed in an invariant, inflexible manner, regardless of the
beliefs and expectations of the listener (Nusbaum & Schwab
1986). For a process to be automatized, there must be a consis-
tent mapping between input patterns and responses, the benefit
of which is a process that does not impose demands on cognitive
and attentional resources (Shiffrin & Schneider 1977).
Of course the hallmark of speech is the lack of consistent, in-
variant mapping between acoustic patterns and linguistic cate-
gories across phonetic contexts (Liberman et al. 1967) and across
talkers (Peterson & Barney 1952). As a result of variable mapping,
speech perception depends on controlled, active processing re-
quiring attention and working memory (Nusbaum & Magnuson
1997). For example, variation between talkers (as in the circum-
stance of a conversation among three interlocutors) requires
talker normalization, the process by which listeners compensate
for acoustic-phonetic variability in vocal characteristics (see, e.g.,
Nearey 1989). Nusbaum and Morin (1992) found that talker vari-
ability slowed speech recognition (see also Mullennix & Pisoni
1990), and this slowing was because of increased demand on work-
ing memory.
Furthermore, talker normalization is contingent on listeners’
expectations regarding the interpretation of acoustic patterns –
which should not happen for an automatic direct-mapping
process. Magnuson and Nusbaum (1994) demonstrated that when
listeners expected a pitch difference to signal a talker difference,
they showed talker normalization, but if the same pitch difference
was expected as a way one talker accented speech, no normaliza-
tion occurred. Similarly, the expectation that a talker was male or
female significantly changed the interpretation of vowel tokens
(Johnson et al. 1999). The acoustic patterns of speech are
processed differently depending on listeners’ expectations, argu-
ing against invariant automatic processing. Expectation effects
suggest that alignment may not be a result of a direct, automatic,
causal link between the activation of a representation in one in-
terlocutor and the activation of an objectively matching represen-
tation in the other interlocutor. Rather, the process is mediated by
listeners’ expectations. For example, alignment at the level of ar-
ticulation, where interlocutors converge on each other’s speaking
style, may be mediated by interlocutors’ stereotypic expectations
about the other interlocutor’s accent and speech rate, resulting in
subjective but not objective alignment (Thakerar et al. 1982).
Listeners may need to use controlled active processing because
the one-to-many mapping (one pattern may have multiple inter-
pretations) in speech represents a nondeterministic computa-
tional problem that cannot be solved, in principle, by a determin-
istic system such as an automatic process (cf. Nusbaum &
Magnuson 1997). This problem of one-to-many relationships be-
tween linguistic patterns and interpretations occurs across all lev-
els of linguistic analysis (Nusbaum & Henly 1989). Indeed, re-
search has shown that the same spoken sentence can be differently
interpreted in different visual referential contexts (Tanenhaus et
al. 1995) and that the same indirect requests can be processed dif-
ferently as a result of speaker status (Holtgraves 1994). Although
P&G focused on utterance-level matches that can occur within
stretches of dialogue, real conversation is less predictable and rou-
tinized – otherwise communication would be unnecessary.
This raises several deep questions facing dialogue research:
How do interlocutors cope with variability in linguistic and per-
ceptual context? How are diverse sources of information inte-
grated to constrain production and comprehension? And how do
interlocutors flexibly adapt to different conversational circum-
stances? Although in real conversations these questions are often
subjectively resolved quickly and without apparent effort, this is
seldom an accurate barometer of the demands on cognitive re-
sources such as attention and working memory.
P&G propose that the process of automatic alignment bypasses
the need for modeling the interlocutor’s mental states and for dis-
tinct, conscious decision stages. We agree that a constant moni-
toring of common ground would be unnecessary and costly, but
the dichotomy between automatic processes and conscious deci-
sion processes involving complex inferences about the interlocu-
tor’s mental state does not represent the full range of possible pro-
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cessing alternatives. In clarifying this point, it is worth consider-
ing what is meant by automatic, as distinct from controlled, pro-
cessing. Automatic processes have been defined by different cri-
teria such as being unintentional, occurring outside of conscious
awareness, not requiring cognitive resources, and being au-
tonomous; but these criteria do not necessarily hold simultane-
ously (Bargh 1989). Speech perception involves controlled active
processes that are not resource-free or autonomous, yet they do
occur largely outside of awareness, do not require a conscious in-
tention on the part of the listener, and are subjectively experi-
enced as effortless. Likewise, the subjective ease and speed that
subjectively characterize language use in dialogue may not reflect
the complexity of the underlying processing. The variability and
flexibility shown in the processes of language comprehension and
production in dialogue call for dynamic adaptation rather than a
passive automatic mechanism.
Top-down influences in the interactive
alignment model: The power of the
situation model
Tessa Warrena and Keith Raynerb
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) model is an innovative and im-
portant step in the study of naturalistic language. However, the simplicity
of its mechanisms for dialogue coordination may be overstated and the hy-
pothesized direct priming channel between interlocutors’ situation mod-
els is questionable. A complete specification of the model will require
more investigation of the role of top-down inhibition among representa-
tions.
Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) new model of linguistic interaction
in dialogue is an important contribution to the study of psycholin-
guistics. This model breaks new ground between two traditionally
disparate areas of language research and combines the mechanis-
tic detail characteristic of sentence processing research with the
emphasis on language as a cooperative process characteristic of di-
alogue research.
The central mechanism of P&G’s interactive alignment model
is a process they term “alignment,” whereby dialogue participants’
linguistic and discourse representations become more similar over
the course of an interaction. Alignment is an automatic process
that results from priming between linguistic representations.
Priming can occur among different levels of representation within
a single individual, as when increased lexical or semantic overlap
between a prime and a target causes increased syntactic priming,
or between the representations of different individuals, as when a
speaker who has just comprehended a particular syntactic form
produces the same form in a subsequent utterance. The resource-
free characterization of the system relies on the assumption that
alignment at one level of representation increases alignment at
other levels of representation, and therefore essentially complete
alignment can be obtained through simple and automatic
processes.
Though the strength of this model is in its elegance and sim-
plicity, it is not clear whether these characteristics will survive a
more explicit specification of the system. According to the char-
acterization of the model as a network of linked representations
where priming and alignment in one representation causes in-
creased alignment in all others, alignment at the level of the situ-
ation model is simply an epiphenomenon of alignment at lower
levels. Yet P&G acknowledge that in some cases priming at one
level will decrease alignment at other levels and specifically note
that alignment of the situation model takes priority over alignment
at other levels of representation. This complicates the system, as
lower-level priming is constrained by the very alignment it drives.
In fact, lower-level priming, supposedly a driving force in align-
ment, can be inhibited by extremely subtle nuances of local con-
text. For example, P&G discuss Garrod and Anderson’s (1987)
findings that participants used different words for horizontal
groupings of boxes depending on whether the grouping was mod-
ified with an ordinal adjective or not. So participants who used the
phrase “the second row” later spoke of “the bottom line,” even
though “the bottom row” was an acceptable, unambiguous, and
more lexically primed alternative. From examples like this it is
clear that priming and alignment at the level of the situation model
are very powerful mechanisms in the system, and that they have
significant inhibitory power over the automatic, lower-level prim-
ing that is hypothesized to drive alignment at all levels of the sys-
tem. It remains to be seen whether bottom-up mechanisms are ro-
bust enough to drive alignment, as P&G claim, or whether
top-down inhibition directs the system.
The interactive alignment model relies heavily on the assump-
tion that the situation model of one individual can directly prime
the situation model of another individual through the same auto-
matic mechanisms that are responsible for phonological, lexical,
semantic, and syntactic priming between individuals. This as-
sumption seems hasty. Phonological, lexical, and syntactic priming
are similar in that the representation that will eventually be
primed is an inalienable part of the structure of the message that
causes the priming. The words, sounds, and structural patterns
that make up an input string necessarily activate representations
for exactly those words, sounds, and patterns. Semantic priming is
not as direct, as semantic representations cannot be directly read
off an input string. However, semantic representations are gener-
ally similar across individuals. For example, it is safe to assume that
the word “dog” will activate the concept “cat” more strongly than
the concept “book” for the wide majority of individuals. This sim-
ilarity of representation may allow for what P&G represent as a di-
rect priming link between the semantic representations of differ-
ent individuals. If an individual produces the word “goat,” the
concepts that will be primed in her own semantic representation
are likely similar to the concepts that will be primed in her inter-
locutor’s representation, because the representations are struc-
tured in a similar way. In this indirect way, it could be said that the
semantic representation of one individual can prime the repre-
sentation of another.
The same thing cannot be said of situation models. Like se-
mantic priming and unlike phonological, lexical, and syntactic
priming, there is no direct priming channel between individuals
through physical aspects of a message such as sounds, words, or
word patterns. Again, priming must be indirect, through the acti-
vation of words or phrases that suggest a particular state or prop-
erty of a situation model. But unlike semantic representations, in-
dividuals do not necessarily begin dialogue with similar situation
representations. Therefore the priming link between individuals’
situation models in the interactive alignment model must be of a
different sort from the priming channels between other repre-
sentations.
The interactive alignment model opens a new and exciting area
of inquiry into language processing. However, more research into
the details of situation model priming and the complex interplay
of priming and inhibition between different levels of representa-
tion will be necessary in order to fully specify the operation of the
model and to evaluate its ascribed simplicity. Carrying out this re-
search will not be easy, as it will be difficult to maintain the nec-
essary experimental control in the sorts of experiments that will be
required. But as P&G optimistically point out, “Well-controlled
studies . . . may require some ingenuity, but such experimental in-
genuity has always been a strength of psychology” (target article,
sect. 1, para. 4).
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Abstract: The interactive-alignment model of dialogue provides
an account of dialogue at the level of explanation normally associ-
ated with cognitive psychology. We develop our claim that inter-
locutors align their mental models via priming at many levels of
linguistic representation, explicate our notion of automaticity, de-
fend the minimal role of “other modeling,” and discuss the rela-
tionship between monologue and dialogue. The account can be
applied to social and developmental psychology, and would bene-
fit from computational modeling.
The target article set out to show how it would be possible
to develop a theory of interactive language processing at the
level of explanation normally associated with cognitive psy-
chology. In our theory, successful communication involves
the alignment of interlocutors’ representations. We pro-
posed that each level of representation becomes aligned via
an automatic process that we treat as a form of priming, and
that alignment at one level automatically strengthens align-
ment at other levels. The role of conscious or deliberate
strategies involving explicit reasoning about the mental
states of one’s interlocutor is comparatively small in our ac-
count.
Our commentators have raised a number of insightful
points that have caused us to refine our proposals. Many
commentators have focused on the nature of the alignment
process. At a basic level, they consider whether alignment is
the primary mechanism leading to conversational success, to
what extent it is automatic, and whether it can be explained
by a single mechanism at all levels and in all contexts. Com-
mentators have also questioned our downplaying of “other
modeling” in ordinary conversation and our claims about the
nature of the difference between monologue and dialogue.
In responding to these and other comments, we have di-
vided our reply into eleven sections whose order roughly fol-
lows that of the topics raised in our target article.
R1. To what extent do interlocutors align?
Perhaps the most basic issue about our model is whether
interlocutors actually align their situation models, or, less
dramatically, whether they align to the extent that we claim
they do. Schober proposes that interlocutors may be much
less aligned than they appear even when they believe that
they have understood each other. Of course, this would not
matter if it solely concerned rare cases of genuine misun-
derstanding (e.g., when two interlocutors refer to different
people called John); see also Branigan, who points out that
communication may be “successful” in some sense even
when there is some misunderstanding. But Schober argues
that misalignment is endemic to dialogue. His comments
relate particularly to the interpretation of referring expres-
sions with respect to the discourse model. He draws on ex-
amples from surveys where respondents interpret terms in
ways that are very different from those intended by the sur-
vey compositors. Our response is that such surveys do not
constitute dialogue: The compositors construct the survey,
and the respondents then respond. There is no feedback,
no possibility for repair, and hence no interactive align-
ment. Schober also raises the important point that people
need not necessarily fully interpret expressions (Clark &
Wilkes-Gibbs 1986). In fact, full interpretation probably
does not always occur in the comprehension of monologue
(Barton & Sanford 1993; Frazier & Rayner 1990; Frisson &
Pickering 1999; 2001; cf. Sanford & Sturt 2002), with peo-
ple often not determining the precise sense of referring ex-
pressions (e.g., newspaper meaning an object vs. a day’s edi-
tion), and there is no reason to assume that dialogue is any
different. We suspect that both producers and comprehen-
ders determine meaning to the extent necessary for current
purposes, and that one way in which interlocutors align is
by each processing referring expressions to equal depth.
R2. What precisely are they aligning?
Several commentators appear concerned with the question
of what exactly is being aligned within our model. At the
“lower levels” of phonology, syntax, the lexicon, and so on,
interlocutors presumably align the representational con-
tent of each of those levels (phonemes, syntactic structures,
lexical items, etc.), but it is perhaps less clear what they
align at the level of the situation model. In the target arti-
cle, our intention was to argue for alignment of structural
aspects of the situation model, as exemplified by our exam-
ple of reference frames. Some of our commentators assume
that we are referring to the content of the situation model.
The questions about alignment of content are much more
difficult, and we shall try to explain the issues below.
In our account, interlocutors align on representations
relevant to the dialogue. These include lexical, semantic,
and syntactic representations, but also the situation model.
So if, at a given point in a conversation, one interlocutor has
a situation model containing two individuals, Mary and
John, with Mary in focus, with each at different locations,
and so on, then the conversation will be successful to the
extent that the other interlocutor constructs the same situ-
ation model. Of course, one interlocutor can now introduce
another character (or a new relation between the existing
characters) – indeed, introducing new information is cen-
tral to any conversation that is not entirely repetitive. To do
this, the speaker draws upon his knowledge (typically using
long-term memory) and adds information to his situation
model. The effect of the alignment is that the listener up-
dates his model so that it remains similar to that of the
speaker. For example, the listener will interpret ambiguous
words and utterances in the way that the speaker has em-
ployed them.
A much bolder claim is that the choice of new topics is
affected by alignment. We did not make this claim in the
target article, although we believe that it is true to some ex-
tent. For example, if one interlocutor refers to the couch,
then the other is more likely to refer to the couch as well
(Brennan & Clark 1996; Garrod & Anderson 1987). As a re-
sult of this, the use of couch presumably activates knowl-
edge about couches, and hence makes it more likely that
the interlocutor will talk about couches rather than some
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other topic. To this extent, alignment is surely unsurprising
(and simply amounts to the claim that interlocutors will per-
sist with particular topics).
It may also be that interlocutors align on particular styles
of reasoning or accessing of knowledge. For instance, if one
interlocutor is engaged in a careful search of long-term
memory, then the other will tend to behave similarly (e.g.,
if you play a general-knowledge game seriously, then I am
likely to do so too). Alignment on style of reasoning is rele-
vant to the construction of the situation model (cf. Gentner
& Markman 1997), but takes us beyond the scope of the tar-
get article, just as nonlinguistic imitation more generally
does (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh 1999). For now, our goals are
limited to understanding linguistic factors that assist in the
alignment of situation models.
Cutting questions our characterization of interactive
alignment as reflecting a direct link between interlocutors.
He suggests that it only has an indirect effect on the lan-
guage processes themselves. To answer this comment we
need to clarify how interactive alignment relates to lan-
guage processing. As we have said, our contention is that in-
teractive alignment (and in particular the automatic align-
ment channels) affects the structures used in production
and interpretation rather than directly determining the
content of production and interpretation. In other words,
we assume that alignment provides an explanation of the
manner in which interlocutors produce and interpret con-
tributions. So we propose that alignment channels only pro-
duce a direct link between the structures that the inter-
locutors use in language processing. Hence, the alignment
process is automatic and direct, even though it does not de-
termine exactly what the speaker produces (as this depends
on his long-term knowledge) or how the addressee inter-
prets what he hears “beyond” the level of the situation
model.
Other commentators also query whether we have speci-
fied the appropriate mechanism for alignment of situation
models. They raise this concern in relation to two more spe-
cific topics: whether there is one alignment mechanism or
several (Branigan, Glucksberg, and Markman, Kim,
Larkey, Narvaez, & Stilwell [Markman et al.]), and
whether (or in what sense) alignment is automatic (Krauss
& Pardo). All of these commentaries, in some sense, are
concerned with the issue of how alignment could affect the
content of situation models. We address these in the fol-
lowing two sections.
R3. The mechanisms of alignment
Several commentators question the details of the interac-
tive alignment mechanism itself and point out that we have
not fully specified a mechanistic account. Brown-Schmidt
& Tanenhaus make a general plea for modeling, which we
fully agree with (see sect. R11). Goldinger & Azuma ar-
gue that we do not give a detailed characterization of the
process by which alignment comes about. We have no com-
mitment to interactive-activation models and are open to
the suggestion that Grossberg’s (1980) adaptive-resonance
theory may provide an appropriate framework for the in-
teractive-alignment account.1
Beyond this, two somewhat different issues are raised.
Some commentators argue that we assume alignment is
based on transient activation, and they propose instead that
it is based on facilitated memory retrieval or implicit learn-
ing. Others claim that we are wrong to assume a unified ac-
count for all levels of alignment.
Kaschak & Glenberg argue that alignment is not due
to priming but rather to a facilitated memory retrieval
mechanism. In response, we note that the interactive-align-
ment model is specified at a functional level and makes no
commitment to specific mechanisms, and that we use the
term “priming” to refer to both transient activation and fa-
cilitation in memory-based accounts. Our model attempts
to capture the way in which representations used for both
production and comprehension automatically become
aligned as a consequence of the process of interaction.
These representations may be subject to transient activa-
tion or, instead, there may be enhancement of the mecha-
nisms underlying their retrieval from memory (as envisaged
by Kashak & Glenberg).
Perhaps more likely, there may be two separate mecha-
nisms involved in alignment. For example, some recent ac-
counts of syntactic priming are based on implicit learning
(Bock & Griffin 2000; Chang et al. 2000), whereas some are
based on activation of grammatical nodes (Hartsuiker et al.
2004; Pickering & Branigan 1998). Some experimental re-
search finds clear evidence for long-term priming that is
largely unaffected by intervening material (Bock & Griffin
2000; Hartsuiker & Westenberg 2000), whereas others
shows rapid decay (Branigan et al. 1999; Levelt & Kelter
1982; Wheeldon & Smith 2003). Most likely, different tasks
and sentence types lead to very different time-courses of
priming. Although most of this work does not involve dia-
logue (except Levelt & Kelter 1982), under our account we
would expect similar patterns of results to occur in dia-
logue. We therefore suggest that transient activation ex-
plains some aspects of alignment, and memory-based
mechanisms explain other aspects of alignment. In section
R9 below, we suggest that alignment due to routinization is
likely to involve the establishment of memory traces for
semi-fixed expressions.
Schiller & de Ruiter argue that interactive alignment
involves storing and re-using selected fragments from pre-
vious utterances (see sect. R9); this constitutes a specific
version of a memory-based account. However, their argu-
ment is based on the claim that priming is insufficient to ac-
count for interactive alignment because syntactic priming
effects are too weak. In fact, the 10–20% effects that they
refer to, occur in monologue. In dialogue, our studies have
shown 55% priming effects when the verb is repeated
(Branigan et al. 2000) and up to 47% with a rare structure
when the noun is repeated (Cleland & Pickering 2003).
Likewise, lexical entrainment almost always occurs for am-
biguous words (Brennan & Clark 1996; Garrod & Ander-
son 1987). In our model, percolation effects between levels
also increase the degree of alignment, and extended dia-
logue iteratively reinforces alignment.
A number of commentators question whether alignment
operates in the same way at all levels in our model. Mark-
man et al. argue that there are different requirements on
alignment at the different levels. In particular, they sepa-
rate the situation model from lower levels of linguistic rep-
resentation. We agree that the structural alignment process
they identify may well be appropriate at the level of the sit-
uation model, because models reflect complex higher order
relations between elements (see sect 2.2 of the target arti-
cle). However, we disagree with their argument that, unlike
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lower level representations, situation models have to be
partially misaligned either to ensure that given-new con-
ventions are followed, or for the maintenance of common
ground. We propose that these requirements can be ful-
filled through the implicit common ground which does not
differentiate between the speaker’s and listener’s situation
models.
Branigan also separates the situation model from other
levels, but for reasons that differ from those of Markman
et al. In our terms, she accepts channels of alignment at
syntactic, lexical, and morpho-phonological levels but not at
the level of the situation model, because she believes that
utterances do not provide direct evidence about the situa-
tion model. She claims that I am in row two provides direct
evidence about lower levels, whereas the listener has to in-
terpret the utterance (presumably, by using background
knowledge) in order to construct the situation model. We
disagree with this, because all levels of analysis require a
combination of top-down and bottom-up information. For
example, resolving phonemes, ambiguous words, or syntac-
tically ambiguous utterances requires the use of context. It
is therefore wrong to assume that only the level of the situ-
ation model is “abstract.” We therefore see no reason to as-
sume that channels of alignment are used only at lower lev-
els, nor do we see any reason to alter our assumption that
alignment at lower levels leads to alignment at the level of
the situation model.
Warren & Rayner argue that the priming link between
individuals’ situation models must be different from that for
lower levels. This is because interlocutors do not necessar-
ily begin dialogues with similar situation representations
and so alignment has to be built up over a period of inter-
action. Again, we see no fundamental difference between
situation models and lower levels in this respect – align-
ment at all levels is built up, though the rate of alignment
may differ at different levels. Additionally, Warren &
Rayner question how conflicts in alignment at different lev-
els are resolved (e.g., when aligning on the same name,
“John” might produce a semantic misalignment in contexts
where there are two Johns present). In fact, the issue was
briefly discussed in the target article where we argued that
alignment at the level of the situation model would override
alignment at lower levels (target article, endnote 4). Adopt-
ing a particular situation model will influence the way a
speaker frames almost everything he says, whereas adopt-
ing a particular word or syntactic structure will only affect
the subsequent choice of that word in preference to an-
other or influence the subsequent use of that particular syn-
tactic structure. Because the situation model is so perva-
sive, it will be constantly reinforced in implicit common
ground, and misalignment at this level will be more likely
to trigger interactive repair. This suggests that the time-
course of priming at the level of the situation model may be
long-lasting, whereas priming at low levels, such as phonol-
ogy, may be much more short-lived. Priming at the syntac-
tic level might be intermediate in duration, or depend more
on its precise context (as suggested above). It therefore
might be the case that priming of the situation model de-
pends primarily on memory representations, whereas prim-
ing at low levels might depend primarily on transient acti-
vation. All of this, however, requires detailed modeling.
We also believe that routinization plays an important role
in reinforcing the links between lower and higher levels of
representation. We take this up in section R9.
R4. What it means for interactive alignment to be
an automatic process
The commentators raise two important issues about auto-
maticity that require discussion. Krauss & Pardo argue
against the idea that alignment can be accounted for in
terms of automatic priming between interlocutors. Shintel
& Nusbaum argue that speech comprehension processes
may be far from automatic in dialogue. To answer these
concerns we need to first explicate our notion of auto-
maticity, and, second, indicate what we assume to be auto-
matic.
Our notion of automaticity is derived from the perspec-
tive of perception-action relationships (e.g., Hommel et al.
2001) and, more particularly, social cognition and social
cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Bargh 2001;
Hurley & Chater, in press). Just as Dijksterhuis and Bargh
argue for an automatic perception-behavior expressway, we
propose that the alignment channels are automatic (see
sect. 3.2) – they operate without any intermediary decision
process. Hence, the alignment process is automatic. To be
more explicit, we propose that the automaticity of align-
ment may take place at what Bargh (1989) calls the post-
conscious level, whereby automaticity requires awareness
of the stimulus when it originally occurred. This means that
interlocutors have to attend to what the other is saying in
order for automatic alignment to occur. Dijksterhuis and
Bargh (2001, p. 29) also argue that automatic social influ-
ences can be inhibited when they conflict with current goals
and purposes. We suggest that the same is true for interac-
tive alignment (see Garrod & Pickering 2004). For exam-
ple, if a maze game player wants to try a new description
scheme because he has failed to understand the last de-
scription from his interlocutor (see sect. 2.1 of the target ar-
ticle), then this high level goal of introducing a new scheme
may inhibit low level alignment arising from what his inter-
locutor has just said. However, in a similar vein to Dijkster-
huis and Bargh, we predict that overriding alignment is 
going to be more difficult (or effortful) than adopting align-
ment. Additionally, this postconscious notion of automatic-
ity can explain why alignment is affected by partner-specific
factors (e.g., Branigan et al., submitted; Metzing & Bren-
nan 2003), without invoking additional mechanisms such as
“other modeling.” It is also presumably relevant to many of
the factors that affect the extent of speech accommodation
(Giles et al. 1992). In general, we expect that rate of align-
ment may be affected by social factors even when the inter-
locutors are unaware that they are aligning. There is evidence
for such alignment outside language (Epley & Gilovich
1999; Lakin & Chartrand 2003), and we expect it also to
occur in language.
Krauss & Pardo agree with our claim that communica-
tion entails the alignment of situation models, but suggest
that it does not principally take place via automatic prim-
ing. For example, they point to evidence that speakers ac-
commodate to their listeners. This presents no problem ac-
cording to the above conception of automaticity, which
allows inhibition or facilitation by social factors. Glucks-
berg raises an interesting case, involving a difficult dia-
logue with a non-cooperative teenage son, in which degree
of alignment may be reduced.
Shintel & Nusbaum argue that speech comprehension
processes may be far from automatic in dialogue. We are
quite happy to accept this general point but see no prob-
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lems for our proposal. In our account, the process of align-
ing the structures used in comprehension (and production)
is automatic, but other aspects of comprehension (and pro-
duction) are presumably not automatic. Additionally, their
conception of automaticity is that it “implies a passive
process in which the input is processed in an invariant, in-
flexible manner, regardless of the beliefs and expectations
of the listener.” This is not the notion of automaticity that
we intend, and we hope that the above discussion of Bargh
(1989) helps to make this clear.
Our conception of automaticity also differs from a Skin-
nerian one, as suggested by Pear. Crucially, we assume that
alignment is not due to reinforcement, just as Dijksterhuis
and Bargh (2001) assume for the perception-behavior ex-
pressway. Instead, alignment follows from a primitive ten-
dency to imitate that does not appear to be learned (e.g.,
Metzoff & Decety 2003). However, our account does share
certain features with Skinner’s (1957) account, in particular
that alignment implicates low-level learning mechanisms.
R5. Parity
One concern is whether there is true representational par-
ity between production and comprehension. Ferreira de-
scribes experiments in which participants plan to produce
utterances that they know to be ungrammatical (i.e., par-
ticipants do not simply make errors). She assumes that in-
terlocutors use and understand such utterances during di-
alogue (which is almost certainly correct) and suggests that
comprehenders in dialogue would regard them as illicit.
Whereas it is possible that there are differences between
monologue and dialogue with respect to judgments of
grammaticality, we accept that such differences are un-
likely. In her experiments, we suggest that speakers realize
they are producing something ungrammatical, but do so
anyway because they cannot think of any other way of say-
ing what they want to say. As long as this realization takes
place within the production system (i.e., does not purely oc-
cur during self-monitoring), there does not appear to be a
problem for the parity assumption. Compare sports com-
mentators who sometimes cannot identify a player at the
point when they need to produce the utterance (“About to
kick the ball, Smith”), which listeners might well regard as
illicit. This account seems more likely than a real disconnect
between grammars in comprehension and production.
However, if there is a disconnect for some highly specific
constructions, it merely leads to a very slight weakening of
the parity assumption, not its abandonment.
Ginzburg argues that the interpretation of the same se-
quence of words can change according to whether it repre-
sents a single contribution from one speaker or two contri-
butions from different speakers:
1. A: Which members of our team own a parakeet? A:
Why? ( Why own a parakeet?)
2. A: Which members of our team own a parakeet? B:
Why? ( Why are you asking which members of our team
own a parakeet?)
He suggests that our interactive alignment mechanism can-
not account for the fact that Why? has a different interpre-
tation in interactions (1) and (2). This is an interesting ob-
servation, but the difference in interpretation between (1)
and (2) hinges on the dialogue move (e.g., questioning, an-
swering, checking, informing) being performed at that
point. Because dialogue moves are generally associated
with particular speakers, it is obviously crucial that inter-
locutors monitor the source of an utterance when inter-
preting it (as also follows from results like those of Metzing
& Brennan 2003). For example, the speaker treats a ques-
tion from his interlocutor differently from the way he would
treat a question from himself. We accept that interlocutors
can monitor the source of a contribution (i.e., they can dif-
ferentiate between what they are saying and what their
partner is saying) and can take this into account in their in-
terpretation at the level of the dialogue move.
Cutting proposes parity for semantic but not phonolog-
ical representations on the basis of picture-word interfer-
ence experiments. From his brief description, we suggest
that participants process the words that they actually pro-
duce both semantically and phonologically, but that they
process the words that they are told to ignore semantically
but not phonologically (or at least not to a sufficient depth
to affect priming). Krauss & Pardo also question evidence
for phonological alignment (and by implication for phono-
logical parity). Although we accept that Goldinger (1998)
does not directly demonstrate phonological alignment, re-
cent evidence does support parity between production and
comprehension at this level (Fowler et al. 2003).
Kempson defends a more radical proposal that parity
comes from the symmetry between production and parsing
processes. In her Dynamic Syntax account of parsing, syn-
tactic information is combined with lexical information,
which define semantic interpretations that are built up
word-by-word. Production is assumed to work in essentially
the same way. Hence, she sees interactive alignment as op-
erating at the level of the production and parsing processes
themselves. This is a challenging linguistic proposal, but it
would need explicit modeling before it could be incorpo-
rated into a mechanistic account of language processing in
dialogue.
R6. Is it only misunderstanding that drives
interactive repair?
One concern is whether interactive repair is driven primar-
ily by comprehension failure, as we proposed in section 4.3
of the target article. Healey points out that even in the con-
text of Garrod and Anderson’s (1987) maze-game dialogues,
interlocutors change their description scheme in a system-
atic fashion (e.g., shifting from a path or figural scheme to
a line or matrix scheme). He argues that it is unlikely that
this systematic shift can be accounted for only in terms of
an interactive repair mechanism based on comprehension
failure. Of course we recognize (see sect. 4.4 of the target
article) that alignment does not depend only upon this
process. There are many things that determine what peo-
ple choose to say and even how they do so which go beyond
the simple automatic mechanisms discussed in the target
article. For example, the shift in description scheme that
Healey mentions probably reflects two opposing pressures.
Whereas the abstract line and matrix descriptions are more
efficient over a period of time than figural or path descrip-
tions (e.g., a line or matrix description involves few words
and is not influenced by whether the position is near a
salient point in the maze or lies in a salient pattern), they
are more difficult to align (e.g., matrix descriptions depend
upon alignment of the origin and of the counting conven-
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tions used). So they can often not be used securely until
there is a richer implicit common ground (e.g., repeated
use of path descriptions which begin at one corner of the
maze can lead to this corner being adopted as the origin for
matrix description). We suspect that once the implicit
common ground has become sufficiently rich to support the
more abstract description, a speaker is more likely to adopt
that scheme when he encounters a position that is particu-
larly awkward to describe even when it requires a violation
of alignment.
Note that this shift occurs without the speaker having to
take account of the listener’s knowledge. Healey therefore
brings up an important general point, that interlocutors can
go beyond interactive alignment and repair in ways that do
not require other-modeling or the establishment of a full
common ground. For example, a speaker can decide that a
representational scheme is unnecessarily complex or a re-
ferring expression is unnecessarily long even if the inter-
locutors have aligned on that scheme or expression. Simi-
larly, in preparing lectures, I might change how I am
speaking on the basis of my knowledge of the audience (full
common ground), but I might also do it on the basis that
“Hang on, I’m not doing this efficiently, given my own re-
sources – I am trying to remember too much and can’t man-
age it.” This might be argued to involve access to a second
model of one’s own mental state, which is therefore costly,
but less costly than keeping track of full common ground.
Such decisions require there to be some inhibition of the
basic alignment process in light of a conflicting goal (see
sect. R4). In conclusion, Healey’s point reflects something
that is additional to our account rather than in conflict with
it (cf. Krauss & Pardo, who point out that not only mis-
understanding drives accommodation).
R7. Other modeling
Although interlocutors undeniably do pay attention to each
others’ mental states on occasion, our contention is that
such other-modeling is resource-intensive, essentially be-
cause it involves storing two representations: a repre-
sentation of one’s own state of knowledge, and a separate
representation of one’s partner’s state of knowledge. We
therefore believe that most of the process of alignment oc-
curs via the interactive-alignment mechanism where other-
modeling is not required. But we stress that other-model-
ing is not purely used for “difficult” cases of interactive
repair when automatic processes fail to work. When a boy
decides to tell his mother what happened at school today,
he presumably realizes that his mother does not know about
the event in question, and therefore that he knows some-
thing that his mother does not know. This explicit modeling
of the difference between knowledge states leads to him
running to tell his mother about the event, and does not fol-
low from the failure of interactive alignment and interac-
tive repair. Similarly, a bilingual decides which language to
speak on the basis of his assumptions about which language
his listener knows. However, the undeniable use of such
“broad-brush” other-modeling does not mean that other-
modeling is employed in a fine-grained way to explain de-
tailed decisions about one’s individual contributions to an
ongoing dialogue.
In this context, Krauss & Pardo point to evidence that
speakers sometimes modulate their utterances to take into
account their knowledge of the listener: They produce
more informative contributions when they perceive their
addressees to be less knowledgeable about the relevant
topic (see also Isaacs & Clark 1987). The evidence from
Kingsbury (1968) shows that speakers do not simply pay at-
tention to what they believe about their specific interlocu-
tor but make inferences about how much such a person is
likely to know on the basis of the evidence at hand, which
is, in this case, made quite deliberately apparent to the
speaker (e.g., the questioner frames a question to stress his
ignorance of the city). In general, we suspect that speakers
make a one-off decision based on such issues as the per-
ceived expertise of their addressees about how to frame
their contributions (e.g., the decision not to make any as-
sumptions about local geographic knowledge). A teacher
can be much less explicit in the common room than in the
classroom, and a mother does not speak motherese to her
friends. Such decisions need not remain fixed for the whole
conversation (e.g., they might change when the speaker
guesses that his addressee is not a local but then realizes he
is mistaken). But such a change is very different from a con-
tinuous, dynamic process of utterance accommodation
based on full common-ground inference, which we argue
to be implausible for reasons of resource limitations (see
sect. 4.1 of the target article). We are therefore grateful to
Krauss & Pardo for stressing that explicit modeling does not
only occur when automatic processes fail to produce align-
ment, but we see no concern for our assumption that auto-
matic mechanisms underlie alignment.
Fussell & Kraut argue that speakers with different
views of a spatial scene take into account the listener’s per-
spective, in effect modeling the listener’s mental state. They
describe a collaborative bicycle repair situation in which an
expert helper guides a novice repairer. They note that when
the repairer knows that he can be seen even when he can-
not see his remote helper, he will use deictic expressions to
describe the things in front of him (e.g., See this piece, while
pointing at a cycle component), whereas the remote helper
will not (e.g., See the derailleur). They argue that this is in-
consistent with alignment and provides further evidence of
other modeling. We are not convinced. We suspect that
speakers in this situation prefer to use deictic expressions
because they are shorter, do not require word finding, and
so on. But deixis is not an option for the remote helper be-
cause he cannot point to anything. Instead, he has to fall
back on more complex nondeictic descriptions. (One re-
mote helper is quoted as saying in frustration, “If I could
point to it, it’s right there”; Kraut et al. 2003, p. 36.) So the
circumstances may force the speaker to use a more complex
nonaligned utterance. It is of course reasonable that align-
ment is broken under such circumstances, because it sim-
ply would not work. One important point this raises is that
the tendency toward alignment is likely to be stronger un-
der conditions where two interlocutors are placed in com-
parable environments. Presumably this reflects nonlinguis-
tic contributions to linguistic alignment (see also the
discussion of Dominey in sect. R11).
Nevertheless, we certainly agree with the general point
that when communicators share a physical situation they
take situational awareness into account in formulating ut-
terances. But is this evidence for listener modeling? In the
“side-by-side” situation described by Kraut et al. (2003,
communicators use direction of gaze to establish joint at-
tention, but the effect of one partner’s point of gaze on the
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other partner’s focus of attention reflects low-level mecha-
nisms which do not depend on inferences about the part-
ner’s mental state (see Schuller & Rossion 2001). And, be-
cause in this situation what is accessible to the speaker will
usually be equally accessible to the partner (see sect. 4.1),
an essentially egocentric approach will generally support
successful communication without requiring speakers to
model their listeners.
Schober suggests that current evidence cannot distin-
guish two possibilities: that interlocutors only model each
other’s mental states under exceptional circumstances, and
that interlocutors normally model each other’s mental
states and only fail to do so when under great cognitive load
or when circumstances weigh heavily against doing so. We
accept that current evidence does not distinguish between
these two positions. However, our account assumes the use
of fewer resources and is parsimonious (obviously, an ac-
count containing two mental models is harder to falsify than
an account limited to one, just as a parallel account is harder
to falsify than a serial account). Moreover, Schober’s pro-
posal cannot hold for multiparty dialogues containing more
than a small number of people, because it must become im-
possible to retain and regularly update a different mental
model for each person. In general, cognitive psychology
teaches us that constructing mental models is hard and
holding onto different models at the same time is especially
hard (e.g., Johnson-Laird 1983). We suggest that the para-
dox of how one can know when to model one’s partner is
easy to accommodate: Contributions to the dialogue will
make it clear that alignment is breaking down, and if inter-
active repair does not solve the problem, the interlocutor is
forced to assume that what his partner knows is likely to be
different from what he knows. Even in such cases, it may
be that interlocutors only model those differences between
themselves and their partners that need to be modeled in
order to allow the recovery of alignment.
Brennan & Metzing also criticize our assumption that
interlocutors do not routinely employ full common ground.
A fast-growing body of literature suggests that interlocutors
sometimes do pay attention to each others’ knowledge in
comprehension and production (e.g., Hanna et al. 2003;
Lockridge & Brennan 2002; Nadig & Sedivy, 2002) and
sometimes do not (e.g., Brown & Dell 1987; Ferreira &
Dell 2000; Keysar et al. 2003). It is too early to say precisely
when such knowledge can affect processes of production
and comprehension, but current evidence suggests both
that interlocutors can immediately draw upon knowledge
about differences between their own knowledge and their
beliefs about their partner’s knowledge, and that interlocu-
tors can make egocentric decisions about production and
comprehension. Most of these studies involve a fairly arti-
ficial situation in which the experimental subject is in-
formed that his interlocutor may have knowledge about the
situation that differs from his in quite specific ways. Exper-
iments like that of Hanna et al. (2003) show that it can be
straightforward to add one fact about your interlocutor –
namely, that he does not have access to a particular piece of
information that you have. Even in such cases, some ego-
centric behavior remains, as Hanna et al. acknowledge and
Keysar et al. (2003) demonstrate. But adding one fact about
your interlocutor’s knowledge is quite different from main-
taining a full representation of the interlocutor’s situation
model, and performing reasoning based on that model.
Available resources do not normally allow interlocutors to
constantly update models of each others’ mental states.
However, this does not lead to communicative breakdown
because aligned interlocutors develop the same situation
models.
In response to Brennan & Metzing, we stress that it
was not our intention to commit to a two-stage account
(e.g., Horton & Keysar 1996), in which other modeling oc-
curs during revision but not during initial processing
(whether production or comprehension). We note that
Krauss & Pardo and Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus also
interpret us as making this proposal, and accept that we did
not make this very clear. Rather, we claim that “performing
inferences about common ground is an optional strategy
that interlocutors employ only when resources allow” (tar-
get article, sect. 4.2, para. 4).
We do not regard Metzing and Brennan’s (2003) demon-
stration of partner-specific effects as problematic, and as-
sume they can be explained in similar ways to Branigan et
al.’s (2003) demonstration that syntactic alignment is sensi-
tive to participant status (see sect. 2.3 of the target article).
As we have pointed out in section R4 of this response, we
assume that alignment is automatic at a postconscious level
(Bargh 1989) and, hence, can be affected by a range of so-
cial factors from stereotype activation to participant status.
A particular speaker is associated with a particular form,
and breaking that association causes disruption. There is no
need for other modeling to occur in this process of partner-
specific lexical entrainment. The term conceptual pact ap-
pears to suggest that other modeling is used in lexical en-
trainment. If so, we would question whether it is generally
appropriate.
R8. Routines
Schiller & de Ruiter propose that interactive alignment
necessarily involves selecting stored fragments from previ-
ous utterances. This corresponds to our notion of rou-
tinization (see sect. 5 of the target article). We suspect that
routinization comes about as a result of a longer lasting
alignment mechanism based on memory retrieval rather
than transient activation. This is because routines reflect
multiple links between different levels of representation
(e.g., they fix the relation between a word and its meaning,
its syntactic form, and even its interpretation within a situ-
ation model) and it is difficult to imagine how this could be
captured and routinized through purely transient activa-
tion. Rather than assume that routinization is the sole ex-
planation of alignment, we suggest that it is a consequence
of implicit learning but that transient activation also pro-
motes alignment (see sect. R3). It may of course be that
routines emerge from a resonance process, as Goldinger
& Azuma suggest. In addition, because routinization works
by linking levels of representation, it may explain how align-
ment percolates up from lower to higher levels (cf. issues
raised by Warren & Rayner and Branigan, as discussed
in sect. R3).
Within the interactive-alignment account, we regard
routines as an extreme case of alignment, involving a fixed
form and interpretation. It may be best to think of rou-
tinization as falling on a continuum, with expressions that
contain some fixed elements (as in many of Kuiper’s 1996
examples) being more or less “semi-routinized.” Assuming
that it is correct to regard alignment as a mixture of tran-
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sient activation and implicit learning, we propose that the
more routinized an expression is, the more it is best ex-
plained in terms of implicit learning – for the purposes of
the conversation at least, the expression and its interpreta-
tion are stored and retrieved. Of course, if an expression be-
comes sufficiently entrenched, it may survive that conver-
sation. Although other frameworks are no doubt possible,
we regard Jackendoff ’s (2002) account of fixed and semi-
fixed expressions as an appropriate representational scheme
for semi- and completely routinized expressions (see Pick-
ering & Garrod, in press, for discussion).
R9. Self-monitoring
Schiller & de Ruiter question our claim that self-moni-
toring can occur at any level of linguistic representation that
can be aligned. We did not claim that there is conclusive ev-
idence for this hypothesis and we believe that careful em-
pirical work is needed to distinguish our proposal from the
proposal that monitoring works externally on sound and in-
ternally on phonological representations alone. However,
we would query whether the reported evidence provides
strong support for this alternative proposal. First, the com-
parative slowness of selecting a gender label in comparison
to selecting the indefinite article in French may have many
explanations, perhaps most likely that selecting between
genders is a more abstract and difficult task than selecting
between (very common) words. Second, the strong evi-
dence for monitoring of various aspects of phonological
representations is completely compatible with monitoring
of other linguistic representations. Although some or all
gender-congruency effects in picture-word interference
tasks may really be determiner congruency effects (Schiller
& Caramazza 2003), there is also considerable evidence
that grammatical gender can be accessed when phonologi-
cal form is not available (Badecker et al. 1995; Vigliocco et
al. 1997). Therefore, it is at least plausible that people can
directly monitor for errors of grammatical gender and in-
deed for other aspects of syntactic representations. If an ut-
terance is ill-formed at different levels of representation si-
multaneously, we suspect that there may be a race between
monitoring processes at these different levels, in which case
it might not always be possible to detect monitoring that
takes place at the “slower” level.
R10. On the difference between dialogue and
monologue
A number of commentators argue that language processing
in dialogue is not fundamentally different from that in
monologue. For example, both Barr & Keysar and
Glucksberg point out that the same basic language pro-
cesses operate in monologue and dialogue so there is no
principled difference between the two. We agree in the
sense that the actual production and comprehension mech-
anisms are the same (at what we might term a “microlevel”).
However, the radically different contexts in which they op-
erate lead to very different results. For example, a speaker’s
utterances are dramatically affected by the presence of the
interlocutor – the speaker aligns with the interlocutor’s ut-
terances via the mechanisms we have described. In this re-
spect we argue that the language processing system is de-
signed for dialogue rather than monologue. As a result,
speakers have to learn special strategies to deal with mono-
logue which are not required during dialogue processing.
We agree with Glucksberg that dialogue is not neces-
sarily easier than monologue, and accept that contextual ef-
fects can be very strong in monologue. We propose that the
priming mechanisms are ideally suited for dialogue. Pre-
sumably they have developed from imitation (Arbib, in
press) and it may be that the organization of dialogue (e.g.,
time between turns) is optimal for the mechanisms of prim-
ing. Therefore, dialogue does not need to rely on nonauto-
matic inference. In contrast, monologue cannot use prim-
ing between interlocutors (by definition) and therefore has
to rely on inference, other-modeling, and so on. Priming is
of course present in monologue, but we contend that it is
far less useful than in dialogue (e.g., repetition is much rarer
in monologue than in dialogue; see sect. 5.1 of the target ar-
ticle). So we concur that there is not a principled distinc-
tion between dialogue and monologue, but at the same time
maintain that dialogue will usually but not always be easier
than monologue.
Barr & Keysar appear to disagree with us more than we
think they actually do. They are mistaken in assuming that
we propose a categorical distinction between monologue
and dialogue. In section 8 of the target article, we refer to
a “dialogic continuum” with monologue at one end, and
fully interactive dialogue at the other. We assume that the
same mechanisms are present in dialogue and monologue
(i.e., people do not set some processing “switch”). In true
monologue, the speaker has no interlocutor to align with.
He can of course align with himself and certainly does so
(e.g., re-using the same word with the same meaning). We
completely agree that dialogues go through various stages,
with some involving rapid turn-taking (e.g., question an-
swering) and some involving much more limited feedback
(e.g., during narratives). Boden (1994) distinguishes be-
tween conversational phases and presentational phases in
group discussion. These presentational phases are not
monologues, as even minimal feedback affects them con-
siderably (Bavelas et al. 2000).
Hence, we stress that monologue and dialogue lie on a
continuum, and we predict that the degree of alignment
will be affected by the position on the continuum. One im-
portant area for research is to consider the effects of dia-
logue genre on alignment (in which context we can regard
monologue as particular genre). For example, Schegloff
points to the importance of different speech-exchange sys-
tems (conversation, interview, giving a speech, etc.) in af-
fecting the characteristics of the dialogue (e.g., turn-taking
behavior, routinization). We predict that the rate and char-
acteristics of alignment are not constant for all forms of di-
alogue, but will depend on the speech-exchange system.
For example, forms of interaction that do not allow uncon-
strained feedback and where turn-taking is externally man-
aged (e.g., interviews) will fail to employ the interactive re-
pair mechanism to the extent that is possible in casual
conversation.
R11. Extensions and discussion
Schegloff argues that our mechanistic account fails to con-
sider the richness of the interaction afforded by dialogue.
Although Schegloff ’s sociological starting point (i.e., in
terms of organizational practice and interaction contingen-
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cies) is somewhat different from ours, we certainly agree
that there are additional specific details of dialogue organi-
zation that must enter into any complete mechanistic ac-
count. We also recognize the considerable contribution that
Schegloff and colleagues have made in mapping out the de-
tails of these organizational practices and the contingencies
they afford. However, our mechanistic aspiration goes be-
yond mapping out such practices and contingencies. Like
Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus we believe that a mecha-
nistic account should make it possible to formulate a com-
putational model of the processes involved in the compre-
hension and production of dialogue and how these take
advantage of the interactional nature of dialogue. We also
recognize that any complete model will have to take ac-
count of both self and other commitments in dialogue pro-
cessing (see our response to Ginzburg in sect. R5). We
stress that our paper is entitled “Toward a mechanistic psy-
chology of dialogue”!
Two commentators argue for a broadening of the inter-
active alignment account to include other interactive situa-
tions. Mazur proposes that interactive alignment needs to
be embedded in a broader theory of communication that
pays attention to a range of social conventions. We agree
that a full theory of interactive alignment will make refer-
ence to nonlinguistic as well as linguistic information, and
believe that our suggestions about the relations between
our account and implicit social cognition is a step in this di-
rection.
Dominey draws interesting parallels between the inter-
active alignment process in adult dialogue and certain fea-
tures of language acquisition. Language learning depends
upon extralinguistic or prelinguistic alignment mechanisms
(e.g., establishing joint attention on intended referents
through gaze direction or postural orientation). Also, there
is evidence that routinization of utterances associated with
repeated action scenarios (feeding, bathing, etc.) may play
an important role in the acquisition of syntax (Tomasello
2003). These suggestions help reinforce the claim that non-
linguistic alignment may lead to linguistic alignment, just as
linguistic alignment at one level leads to linguistic align-
ment at other levels (see our discussion of Fussell & Kraut
in sect. R7). In fact, Dominey suggests that such linguistic/
nonlinguistic links are necessary to explain the process of
language acquisition, where one partner (the infant) does
not initially have linguistic abilities. A full theory of how in-
teractive alignment might explain acquisition would be fas-
cinating. In particular, we are intrigued by the suggestion
that learning by alignment might avoid the enlistment of
generative grammar mechanisms, perhaps in a way similar
to that envisaged by Tomasello.
Language acquisition is a good example of how it may be
possible to extend our account into new domains. Other ar-
eas that we have highlighted at various points in the target
article and this response include social psychology and hu-
man-computer interaction. A recurring theme is that it may
be sensible to include nonlinguistic alignment into devel-
opments of our model; interlocutors who are aligned in
nonlinguistic (e.g., body posture) or paralinguistic (e.g.,
tone of voice) ways may be more likely to align linguistically.
We emphasize that our use of the term “priming” is at a
fairly abstract functional level, as our notion of automatic-
ity makes clear (sect. R4). It allows nonconscious media-
tion by factors that may originate in distinctions that inter-
locutors are aware of (e.g., participant status, social status,
cooperativeness). We also note that “priming” may employ
transient activation or implicit learning or both. To be more
speculative, we suspect that interactive alignment may
work by two distinct mechanisms: a brief activation-based
process that may not be affected by intentional distinctions,
and a longer-lasting memory-based process that is inten-
tionally mediated. The effects of these two processes will
depend on precise timing, and will therefore be differ-
entially affected by aspects of the conversation that affect
timing. For example, a high-engagement face-to-face dia-
logue between intimate friends may result in timing that is
precisely attuned to increasing alignment, whereas a dia-
logue between strangers that depend on external factors
such as rules of engagement (e.g., in an interview) or tech-
nology (e.g., walkie-talkies) may not. We suspect that the
longer-lasting process will not be affected but the activation
process might be impaired in low-involvement dialogue.
These speculative comments could inform an extensive
program of empirical research concerned with the condi-
tions that lead to alignment in dialogue (e.g., its time
course).
The other obvious area for development is explicit com-
putational modeling, as highlighted by Brown-Schmidt &
Tanenhaus in particular. To perform such modeling, it
would of course be necessary to explicate many assump-
tions of our account that are currently vague or implicit, for
instance by developing interactive alignment, interactive
repair, and other-modeling components. It would be nec-
essary to model the process whereby alignment at one level
leads to alignment at other levels, and to understand how
conflicts of alignment are resolved (see Warren &
Rayner). We need to know whether transient activation
and implicit learning should be distinguished, and if so, how
they interact. Finally, any such account should explain the
process of routinization and describe its effects on align-
ment.
NOTE
1. Note that the uses of “interactive” in interactive alignment
and interactive activation are unrelated.
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